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arXiv:1905.03075

The Wallstrom objection as a possibility to augment quantum theory

I. Schmelzer

Published May 7, 2019• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Wallstrom has argued that quantum interpretations which construct the wave function starting from Madelung variables $ψ(q)=ρ(q)\exp(\frac{i}{\hbar}S(q))$, in particular, many variants of Nelsonian stochastics, are not equivalent to quantum theory. Accepting this, we explicitly add the physical restriction $(\forall q\in Q)|ψ(q)|^2>0$ in the configuration space representation to quantum theory. The resulting theories depend on the choice of the configuration space $Q$. The restriction adds possibilities to falsify such theories, making them preferable following Popper's criterion of empirical content until they have been really falsified. Considering the case of a relativistic scalar field, we argue that it is reasonable to expect that the variant based on particle ontology can be (or even has been already) falsified, while to falsify the variant based on field ontology seems much harder, if not impossible. If correct, switching to a field ontology seems a reasonable choice for interpretations based on Madelung variables to circumvent the Wallstrom objection.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1905.03075

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Wallstrom has argued that quantum interpretations which construct the wave function starting from Madelung variables ψ(q)=ρ(q)exp⁡(iℏS(q))ψ(q)=ρ(q)\exp(\frac{i}{\hbar}S(q))ψ(q)=ρ(q)exp(ℏi​S(q)), in particular, many variants of Nelsonian stochastics, are not equivalent to quantum theory. Accepting this, we explicitly add the physical restriction (∀q∈Q)∣ψ(q)∣2>0(\forall q\in Q)|ψ(q)|^2>0(∀q∈Q)∣ψ(q)∣2>0 in the configuration space representation to quantum theory. The resulting theories depend on the choice of the configuration space QQQ. The restriction adds possibilities to falsify such theories, making them preferable following Popper's criterion of empirical content until they have been really falsified. Considering the case of a relativistic scalar field, we argue that it is reasonable to expect that the variant based on particle ontology can be (or even has been already) falsified, while to falsify the variant based on field ontology seems much harder, if not impossible. If correct, switching to a field ontology seems a reasonable choice for interpretations based on Madelung variables to circumvent the Wallstrom objection.
This interpretation establishes a completely classical ontology -- only the classical trajectory in configuration space -- and interprets the wave function as describing incomplete information (in form of a probability flow) about this trajectory. This combines basic ideas of de Broglie-Bohm theory and Nelsonian stochastics about the trajectory with a Bayesian interpretation of the wave function. Various objections are considered and discussed. In particular a regularity principle for the zeros of the wave function allows to meet the Wallstrom objection.
One of the major concerns of Schr\"odinger, Lorentz, Einstein, and many others about the wave function is that it is defined on the 3N3\mathbf{N}3N-dimensional configuration space, rather than on the three-dimensional (3D) physical space. This gives the impression that quantum mechanics cannot have a 3D3\mathrm{D}3D space or space-time ontology, even in the absence of quantum measurements. In particular, this seems to affect interpretations which take the wave function as a physical entity, in particular, the many-worlds and the spontaneous collapse interpretations, and some versions of the pilot wave theory. Here, a representation of the many-particle states is given, as multilayered fields defined on the three-dimensional physical space. This representation is equivalent to the usual representation on the configuration space, but it makes it explicit that it is possible to interpret the wave functions as defined on the physical space. As long as only unitary evolution is involved, the interactions are local. I intended this representation to capture and formalize the nonexplicit and informal intuition of many working quantum physicists, who, by considering the wave function sometimes to be defined on the configuration space and sometimes on the physical space, may seem to researchers in the foundations of quantum theory as adopting an inconsistent view about its ontology. This representation does not aim to solve the measurement problem, and it allows for Schr\"odinger cats just like the usual one. But, it may help various interpretations to solve these problems, through inclusion of the wave function as (part of) their primitive ontology. In appendices, it is shown how the multilayered field representation can be extended to quantum field theory.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
Quantum theory and the de Broglie – Bohm pilot-wave theory are empirically equivalent. In addition to other objections to the pilot-wave theory, many physicists (and some philosophers) take this to be enough to dismiss the pilot-wave theory, as they say it adds nothing to the standard theory. In this short paper I review some objections and replies to the pilot-wave theory. In particular I respond to the empirical equivalence challenge arguing that, given their mutual relationship, there is no reason to expect the two theories to make different predictions, even if they actually might.
It has been widely thought that the ontology of quantum mechanics is real, physical fields. In this paper, I will present a new argument against the field ontology of quantum mechanics by analyzing one-body systems such as an electron. First, I argue that if the physical entity described by the wave function of an electron is a field, then this field is massive and charged. Next, I argue that if a field is massive and charged, then any two parts of the field in space will have gravitational and electromagnetic interactions, while the existence of such self-interactions for an electron contradicts quantum mechanics and experimental observations. This poses a serious difficulty for the field ontology of quantum mechanics. Third, I argue that a particle ontological interpretation of the wave function may avoid the difficulty by providing a plausible explanation of the non-existence of self-interactions. According to this explanation, the wave function of an electron is a description of the state of the random motion of the electron as a particle, and in particular, the modulus squared of the wave function gives the probability density that the electron appears in every possible position in space. Finally, I answer a major objection to the explanation of the non-existence of self-interactions in terms of particle ontology.
Abstract The three major interpretations of quantum mechanics—Bohm, GRW, and many worlds—all treat the wave function as a physical entity. But this entity apparently resides in a high-dimensional configuration space, with three coordinates for each particle in the universe. Some conclude on this basis that the three-dimensionality of the world of experience is an illusion. Others respond by adding three-dimensional ontology to the theory or by reinterpreting the wave function either as a law or as an indirect representation of properties in three-dimensional space. It is argued that the latter possibility makes it unnecessary to postulate either additional ontology or a fundamentally high-dimensional world.