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arXiv:1810.04663 · Physical Review A

Security of quantum key distribution with detection-efficiency mismatch in the single-photon case: Tight bounds

M. K. Bochkov, Anton Sergeevich Trushechkin

Published Mar 5, 2019• 29 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

One of the challenges in practical quantum key distribution is dealing with efficiency mismatch between different threshold single-photon detectors. There are known bounds for the secret key rate for the BB84 protocol with detection-efficiency mismatch provided that the eavesdropper sends no more than one photon to the legitimate receiver. Here we improve these bounds and give tight bounds for the secret key rate with a constant detection-efficiency mismatch under the same single-photon assumption. We propose a method based on the analytical minimization of the relative entropy of coherence, which can be used in other problems in quantum key distribution. Also we propose an adaptation of the decoy state method to prove the security in the case of weak coherent pulses on the source side.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.99.032308

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One of the challenges in practical quantum key distribution is dealing with efficiency mismatch between different threshold single-photon detectors. There are known bounds for the secret key rate for the BB84 protocol with detection-efficiency mismatch provided that the eavesdropper sends no more than one photon to the legitimate receiver. Here we improve these bounds and give tight bounds for the secret key rate with a constant detection-efficiency mismatch under the same single-photon assumption. We propose a method based on the analytical minimization of the relative entropy of coherence, which can be used in other problems in quantum key distribution. Also we propose an adaptation of the decoy state method to prove the security in the case of weak coherent pulses on the source side.
Detection-efficiency mismatch is a common problem in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Current security proofs of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch rely either on the assumption of the single-photon light source on the sender side or on the assumption of the single-photon input of the receiver side. These assumptions impose restrictions on the class of possible eavesdropping strategies. Here we present a rigorous security proof without these assumptions and, thus, solve this important problem and prove the security of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch against general attacks (in the asymptotic regime). In particular, we adapt the decoy state method to the case of detection-efficiency mismatch.
We suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations in detector efficiency as a function of a control parameter accessible to an eavesdropper. With gated single-photon detectors, this control parameter can be the timing of the incoming pulse. When the eavesdropper sends short pulses using the appropriate timing so that the two gated detectors in Bob's setup have different efficiencies, the security of quantum key distribution can be compromised. Specifically, we show for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol that if the efficiency mismatch between 0 and 1 detectors for some value of the control parameter gets large enough (roughly 15:1 or larger), Eve can construct a successful faked-states attack causing a quantum bit error rate lower than 11%. We also derive a general security bound as a function of the detector sensitivity mismatch for the BB84 protocol. Experimental data for two different detectors are presented, and protection measures against this attack are discussed.
Detection-efficiency mismatch is a common problem in realistic quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. The existing security proofs for the case of the passive basis choice provide a nonzero secret key rate only for a small detection-efficiency mismatch. Unfortunately, in realistic setups, the detection-efficiency mismatch can be significant. Here we present a more precise estimation of the secret key rate for the BB84 protocol with the passive basis choice, which accounts for the detection-efficiency mismatch between four threshold detectors as well as an adaptation of the decoy-state method. The suggested approach is used to estimate the secret key rate in a QKD experiment between the Micius satellite and the Zvenigorod ground station.
Subject of study. The effect of different quantum efficiencies of single-photon detectors in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems implementing the BB84 protocol with passive basis choice is investigated. Aim of study. The aim of this study is to determine the secret key generation rate and security of the final key in quantum cryptography systems as functions of detector efficiency mismatch. Additionally, an analytical equation is derived for estimating the secret key generation rate in quantum communication systems with passive basis choice while accounting for different detector efficiencies. Method. The secret key is calculated by dividing the received measurement data according to the measurement bases, followed by performing separate post-processing for each dataset, and finally summing the resulting estimates of the secret key. Main results. An analytical method for estimating the secret key generation rate in systems with passive basis choice and mismatched detector efficiencies is developed. A satellite-to-ground quantum communication channel is modeled using the parameters of the Zvenigorod Observatory in Russia. The proposed theory for accounting for the detector efficiency mismatch is applied to a model of a satellite QKD system, and the determined length of the secret key generated during a single communication session with the satellite is found to be 300 kbit. Practical significance. The obtained results account for the effect of detector efficiency mismatch when estimating the length of the secret key in QKD systems, thereby increasing their reliability in practical implementations.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols with threshold detectors are driving high-performance QKD demonstrations.The corresponding security proofs usually assume that all physical detectors have the same detection efficiency.However, the efficiencies of the detectors used in practice might show a mismatch depending on the manufacturing and setup of these detectors.A mismatch can also be induced as the different spatialtemporal modes of an incoming signal might couple differently to a detector.Here we develop a method that allows to provide security proofs without the usual assumption.Our method can take the detection-efficiency mismatch into account without having to restrict the attack strategy of the adversary.Especially, we do not rely on any photon-number cutoff of incoming signals such that our security proof is directly applicable to practical situations.We illustrate our method for a receiver that is designed for polarization encoding and is sensitive to a number of spatial-temporal modes.In our detector model, the absence of quantum interference between any pair of spatial-temporal modes is assumed.For a QKD protocol with this detector model, we can perform a security proof with characterized efficiency mismatch and without photon-number cutoff assumption.Our method also shows that in the absence of efficiency mismatch in our detector model, the key rate increases if the loss due to detection inefficiency is assumed to be outside of the adversary's control, as compared to the view where for a security proof this loss is attributed to the action of the adversary.
The use of decoy states in quantum key distribution (QKD) has provided a method for substantially increasing the secret key rate and distance that can be covered by QKD protocols with practical signals. The security analysis of these schemes, however, leaves open the possibility that the development of better proof techniques or better classical postprocessing methods might further improve their performance in realistic scenarios. In this paper, we derive upper bounds on the secure key rate for decoy-state QKD. These bounds are based basically only on the classical correlations established by the legitimate users during the quantum communication phase of the protocol. The only assumption about the possible postprocessing methods is that double click events are randomly assigned to single click events. Further, we consider only secure key rates based on the uncalibrated device scenario which assigns imperfections such as detection inefficiency to the eavesdropper. Our analysis relies on two preconditions for secure two-way and one-way QKD. The legitimate users need to prove that there exists no separable state (in the case of two-way QKD) or that there exists no quantum state having a symmetric extension (one-way QKD) that is compatible with the available measurements results. Both criteria have been previously applied to evaluate single-photon implementations of QKD. Here we use them to investigate a realistic source of weak coherent pulses. The resulting upper bounds can be formulated as a convex optimization problem known as a semidefinite program which can be efficiently solved. For the standard four-state QKD protocol, they are quite close to known lower bounds, thus showing that there are clear limits to the further improvement of classical postprocessing techniques in decoy-state QKD.