Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1809.08441 · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

Comments on “Unconditionally Secure, Universally Composable Privacy Preserving Linear Algebra”

Babak Siabi, Mehdi Berenjkoub

Published May 23, 2019• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this paper, we discuss the security of a distributed inner product (DIP) protocol [IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, 11.1, 59, (2016)]. We show information leakage in this protocol that does not happen in an ideal execution of the DIP functionality. In some scenarios, this information leakage enables one of the parties to completely learn the other party's input. We will give examples of such scenarios.

DOI
10.1109/tifs.2019.2912068

Related papers

Unconditionally Secure, Universally Composable Privacy Preserving Linear Algebra

Bernardo David, Rafael Dowsley, Jeroen van de Graaf +3 more

Linear algebra operations on private distributed data are frequently required in several practical scenarios (e.g., statistical analysis and privacy preserving databases). We present universally composable two-party protocols to compute inner products, determinants, eigenvalues, and eigenvectors. These protocols are built for a two-party scenario where the inputs are provided by mutually distrustful parties. After execution, the protocols yield the results of the intended operation while preserving the privacy of their inputs. Universal composability is obtained in the trusted initializer model, ensuring information theoretical security under arbitrary protocol composition in complex environments. Furthermore, our protocols are computationally efficient since they only require field multiplication and addition operations.

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security•Sep 3, 2015•17 citations

A Two-Party Protocol with Trusted Initializer for Computing the Inner Product.

Rafael Dowsley, Jeroen van de Graaf, Davidson Marques +1 more

Abstract. We propose the first protocol for securely computing the inner product modulo an integer m between two distrustful parties based on a trusted initializer, i.e. a trusted party that interacts with the players solely during a setup phase. We obtain a very simple protocol with universally composable security. As an application of our protocol, we obtain a solution for securely computing linear equations. 1

•Jan 1, 2010•0 citations

There Is Always an Exception: Controlling Partial Information Leakage in Secure Computation.

Máté Horváth, Levente Buttyán, Gábor Székely +1 more

Private Function Evaluation (PFE) enables two parties to jointly execute a computation such that one of them provides the input while the other chooses the function to compute. According to the traditional security requirements, a PFE protocol should leak no more information, neither about the function nor the input, than what is revealed by the output of the computation. Existing PFE protocols inherently restrict the scope of computable functions to a certain function class with given output size, thus ruling out the direct evaluation of such problematic functions as the identity map, which would entirely undermine the input privacy requirement. We observe that when not only the input x is confidential but certain partial information g(x) of it as well, standard PFE fails to provide meaningful input privacy if g and the function f to be computed fall into the same function class.

•Jan 1, 2019•0 citations

On Protocol Security in the Cryptographic Model

Copyright C, Jesper Buus Nielsen

It seems to be a generally acknowledged fact that you should never trust a computer and that you should trust the person operating the computer even less. This in particular becomes a problem when the party that you do not trust is one which is separated from you and is one on which you depend, e.g. because that party is the holder of some data or some capability that you need in order to operate correctly. How do you perform a given task involving interaction with other parties while allowing these parties a minimal influence on you and, if privacy is an issue, allowing them to learn as little about you as possible. This is the general problem of secure multiparty computation. The usual way of formalizing the problem is to say that a number of parties who do not trust each other wish to compute some function of their local inputs, while keeping their inputs as secret as possible and guaranteeing the correctness of the output. Both goals should be obtained even if some parties stop participating or some malevolent coalition of the parties start deviating arbitrarily from the agreed protocol. The task is further complicated by the fact that besides their mutual distrust, nor do the parties trust the channels by which they communicate. A general solution to the secure multiparty computation problem is a compiler which given any feasible function describes an efficient protocol which allows the parties to compute the function securely on their local inputs over an open network. Over the past twenty years the secure multiparty computation problem has been the subject of a large body of research, both research into the models of multiparty computation and research aimed at realizing general secure multiparty computation. The main approach to realizing secure multiparty computation has been based on verifiable secret sharing as computation, where each party holds a secret share of each input and during the execution computes secret shares of all intermediate values. This approach allows the parties to keep all inputs and intermediate values secret and to pool the shares of the output values to learn exactly these values. More recently an approach based on joint homomorphic encryption was introduced, allowing for an efficient realization of general multiparty computation secure against an eavesdropper. A joint encryption scheme is an encryption scheme where all parties can encrypt, but where it takes the participation of all parties to open an encryption. The computation then starts by all parties broadcasting encryptions of their inputs and progresses through computing encryptions of the intermediary values using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. The encryptions of the outputs can then be jointly decrypted. In this dissertation we extend this approach by using threshold homomorphic encryption to provide full-fledged security against an active attacker which might control some of the parties and which might take over parties during the course of the protocol execution. As opposed to a joint encryption scheme a threshold encryption scheme only requires that a given number of the parties are operating correctly for decryption to be possible. In this dissertation we show that threshold homomorphic encryption allows to solve the secure general multiparty computation problem more efficiently than previous approaches to the problem. Starting from an open point-to-point network there is a long way to general secure multiparty computation. The dissertation contains contributions at several points along the way. In particular we investigate how to realize secure channels. We also show how threshold signature schemes can be used to efficiently realize a broadcast channel and how threshold cryptography can be used to provide the parties of the network with a source of shared randomness. All three tools are well-known to be extremely powerful resources in a network, and our principle contribution is to provide efficient realizations. The dissertation also contains contributions to the definitional part of the field of multiparty computation. Most significantly we augment the recent model of universally composable security with a formal notion of what it means for a protocol to only realize a given problem under a given restricted input-output behavior of the environment. This e.g. allows us to give the first specification of a universally composable zero-knowledge proof of membership which does not at the same time require the proof system to be a proof of knowledge.

•Jan 1, 2003•10 citations

Exploratory designs of unconditionally secure distributed oblivious transfer protocols

Christian L. F. Corniaux

The security of digital goods buyers and sellers is unbalanced. Of course, the property of sellers is protected; for example, when customers acquire digital books or films from Internet's merchants, they only receive the products they have paid for. Unfortunately, the buyers' privacy is rarely respected: purchases are often — without the buyers' knowledge — monitored, recorded, analysed, and sometimes sold to marketing companies. As a consequence, even if the customers do not intend to acquire additional products, their computer screens are later invaded with targeted advertisements. The main purpose of this thesis is to propose some methods to restore the balance and guarantee the buyers' privacy, while protecting the interests of the sellers. To this end, it is worth looking into the area of cryptography and more specifically, it is worth studying and designing some protocols called distributed oblivious transfer (DOT) protocols. A DOT protocol allows a party A to obtain one of the secret pieces of information (a secret for short) held by a party B so that the following two fundamental conditions are satisfied: • A chooses the secrets she wishes to obtain and does not obtain anything on the secrets she has not chosen, • B does not learn which secret was obtained by A. Furthermore, to improve the availability of the information, the protocol is distributed. That is, the party B transmits his secret information to m servers and the party A needs to contact at least k of these servers to obtain the chosen secret. The servers are not fully trusted, neither by A, nor by B. Therefore, from the information exchanged with A and B, no coalition of servers should be able to learn the secrets of B or the choice of A. The results of a preliminary literature review are surprising. In fact, the number of publications on DOT protocols is small (fewer than 20) compared to, for example, the number of publications on a similar concept, secret sharing (100s of publications). And yet, oblivious transfer is a fundamental component of more complex cryptographic protocols such as multi-party computation protocols, which allow a group of participants to securely calculate any function of their joint secret inputs. So, one could expect many variants, for example of the original DOT protocol introduced in 2002 by Naor and Pinkas [74], to fulfil the requirements of specific scenarios. The design of variants of DOT protocols in traditional cryptography has been the guiding thread of my research. My contribution mainly consists in (a) a critical analysis of the existing protocols, demonstrating their limitations, weaknesses, and in some cases, flaws; and (b) the design of the following protocols,well adapted to some specific situations: A Strongly Secure DOT Protocol. This DOT protocol addresses the most important weakness of unconditionally secure, one-round, polynomial interpolation-based DOT protocols: after the protocol has been executed, if the party A corrupts only one server, she can learn all the secrets of the party B. The protocol is secure even if A corrupts up to k - 1 servers. A Verifiable DOT Protocol. The party A should obtain the secret she has chosen, even when some servers are controlled by a malicious adversary whose objective is to sabotage the protocol. This is the case with this protocol, assuming that the adversary cannot control more than k - 1 servers. A Multiple Secrets DOT Protocol. When the party A wishes to obtain n > 1 secrets, the current protocols have to be executed n times. In this context, they are inefficient. The DOT protocol introduced here allows the party A, by contacting in the same session k - 1 + n servers, to collect n secrets. Adaptive DOT Protocols. The previous protocol allows the party A to request several secrets. However, the request of one secret may depend on the values of secrets already obtained. Two efficient protocols are presented in this scenario. The first one allows A to receive a limited number of secrets and therefore, is well adapted to a single receiver. For several receivers, a second protocol is proposed. This second protocol accepts an unlimited number of queries, but requires communications amongst the servers. A Threshold DOT protocol. Most existing DOT protocols rely on threshold secret sharing schemes. In a k-threshold protocol or scheme, security is guaranteed not only when k parties are contacted, but also when more than k parties are contacted. However, the existing DOT protocols based on k-threshold secret sharing schemes require an additional mechanism to control that exactly k servers are contacted, which is an under-utilisation of the underlying functionality. The proposed protocol is the first k-threshold DOT protocol which allows the party A to contact as many servers as she wishes to obtain the chosen secret, provided that at least k servers are contacted. This research is limited to unconditionally secure protocols, i.e., protocols whose security does not depend on mathematical (unproven) assumptions; within the limits of the given security models, the protocols are secure even against an adversary with unlimited computing power and time. In brief, the results presented in this thesis are a significant advance to the state of the art research on DOT protocols because on one hand, they point out the weaknesses of the DOT protocols most commonly accepted by the cryptographic community and on the other hand, they contribute to the cryptographic field through the design of new protocols, secure and efficient.

•Jan 1, 2015•0 citations

Lightweight multi-party quantum secure scalar product protocol for privacy-preserving collaborative computing

Can Wang, Runhua Shi, Jiang-Yuan Lian +1 more

Abstract With the rapid development of distributed collaborative computing, privacy leakage risks in multi-source data joint analysis are increasing, and classical secure scalar product (SSP) protocols are vulnerable to quantum attacks. Existing quantum secure scalar product schemes mostly rely on complex quantum resources or third parties, only support two-party computation, and have poor scalability. To address these issues, this paper proposes a secure multi-party quantum scalar product protocol based on single-photon resources without a third party. The protocol adopts a two-layer architectural design, integrating pairwise secure product operation and privacy-preserving aggregation mechanism. It realizes result blinding via data splitting and reconstruction to fully guarantee data confidentiality. By adopting ring interaction structure and lightweight secure computing modes, it completes collaborative computation of multi-party private data and effectively prevents information leakage in interactive processes. Performance analysis shows that the protocol requires no more than single-photon and single-particle measurements, with complexity within a reasonable range, making it feasible with current quantum technology. This protocol provides an efficient and secure primitive for multi-party privacy-preserving collaborative computing in quantum-resistant scenarios.

Physica Scripta•Aug 21, 2026•0 citations
In this paper, we discuss the security of a distributed inner product (DIP) protocol [IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, 11.1, 59, (2016)]. We show information leakage in this protocol that does not happen in an ideal execution of the DIP functionality. In some scenarios, this information leakage enables one of the parties to completely learn the other party's input. We will give examples of such scenarios.
Linear algebra operations on private distributed data are frequently required in several practical scenarios (e.g., statistical analysis and privacy preserving databases). We present universally composable two-party protocols to compute inner products, determinants, eigenvalues, and eigenvectors. These protocols are built for a two-party scenario where the inputs are provided by mutually distrustful parties. After execution, the protocols yield the results of the intended operation while preserving the privacy of their inputs. Universal composability is obtained in the trusted initializer model, ensuring information theoretical security under arbitrary protocol composition in complex environments. Furthermore, our protocols are computationally efficient since they only require field multiplication and addition operations.
Private Function Evaluation (PFE) enables two parties to jointly execute a computation such that one of them provides the input while the other chooses the function to compute. According to the traditional security requirements, a PFE protocol should leak no more information, neither about the function nor the input, than what is revealed by the output of the computation. Existing PFE protocols inherently restrict the scope of computable functions to a certain function class with given output size, thus ruling out the direct evaluation of such problematic functions as the identity map, which would entirely undermine the input privacy requirement. We observe that when not only the input x is confidential but certain partial information g(x) of it as well, standard PFE fails to provide meaningful input privacy if g and the function f to be computed fall into the same function class.
It seems to be a generally acknowledged fact that you should never trust a computer and that you should trust the person operating the computer even less. This in particular becomes a problem when the party that you do not trust is one which is separated from you and is one on which you depend, e.g. because that party is the holder of some data or some capability that you need in order to operate correctly. How do you perform a given task involving interaction with other parties while allowing these parties a minimal influence on you and, if privacy is an issue, allowing them to learn as little about you as possible. This is the general problem of secure multiparty computation. The usual way of formalizing the problem is to say that a number of parties who do not trust each other wish to compute some function of their local inputs, while keeping their inputs as secret as possible and guaranteeing the correctness of the output. Both goals should be obtained even if some parties stop participating or some malevolent coalition of the parties start deviating arbitrarily from the agreed protocol. The task is further complicated by the fact that besides their mutual distrust, nor do the parties trust the channels by which they communicate. A general solution to the secure multiparty computation problem is a compiler which given any feasible function describes an efficient protocol which allows the parties to compute the function securely on their local inputs over an open network. Over the past twenty years the secure multiparty computation problem has been the subject of a large body of research, both research into the models of multiparty computation and research aimed at realizing general secure multiparty computation. The main approach to realizing secure multiparty computation has been based on verifiable secret sharing as computation, where each party holds a secret share of each input and during the execution computes secret shares of all intermediate values. This approach allows the parties to keep all inputs and intermediate values secret and to pool the shares of the output values to learn exactly these values. More recently an approach based on joint homomorphic encryption was introduced, allowing for an efficient realization of general multiparty computation secure against an eavesdropper. A joint encryption scheme is an encryption scheme where all parties can encrypt, but where it takes the participation of all parties to open an encryption. The computation then starts by all parties broadcasting encryptions of their inputs and progresses through computing encryptions of the intermediary values using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. The encryptions of the outputs can then be jointly decrypted. In this dissertation we extend this approach by using threshold homomorphic encryption to provide full-fledged security against an active attacker which might control some of the parties and which might take over parties during the course of the protocol execution. As opposed to a joint encryption scheme a threshold encryption scheme only requires that a given number of the parties are operating correctly for decryption to be possible. In this dissertation we show that threshold homomorphic encryption allows to solve the secure general multiparty computation problem more efficiently than previous approaches to the problem. Starting from an open point-to-point network there is a long way to general secure multiparty computation. The dissertation contains contributions at several points along the way. In particular we investigate how to realize secure channels. We also show how threshold signature schemes can be used to efficiently realize a broadcast channel and how threshold cryptography can be used to provide the parties of the network with a source of shared randomness. All three tools are well-known to be extremely powerful resources in a network, and our principle contribution is to provide efficient realizations. The dissertation also contains contributions to the definitional part of the field of multiparty computation. Most significantly we augment the recent model of universally composable security with a formal notion of what it means for a protocol to only realize a given problem under a given restricted input-output behavior of the environment. This e.g. allows us to give the first specification of a universally composable zero-knowledge proof of membership which does not at the same time require the proof system to be a proof of knowledge.
The security of digital goods buyers and sellers is unbalanced. Of course, the property of sellers is protected; for example, when customers acquire digital books or films from Internet's merchants, they only receive the products they have paid for. Unfortunately, the buyers' privacy is rarely respected: purchases are often — without the buyers' knowledge — monitored, recorded, analysed, and sometimes sold to marketing companies. As a consequence, even if the customers do not intend to acquire additional products, their computer screens are later invaded with targeted advertisements. The main purpose of this thesis is to propose some methods to restore the balance and guarantee the buyers' privacy, while protecting the interests of the sellers. To this end, it is worth looking into the area of cryptography and more specifically, it is worth studying and designing some protocols called distributed oblivious transfer (DOT) protocols. A DOT protocol allows a party A to obtain one of the secret pieces of information (a secret for short) held by a party B so that the following two fundamental conditions are satisfied: • A chooses the secrets she wishes to obtain and does not obtain anything on the secrets she has not chosen, • B does not learn which secret was obtained by A. Furthermore, to improve the availability of the information, the protocol is distributed. That is, the party B transmits his secret information to m servers and the party A needs to contact at least k of these servers to obtain the chosen secret. The servers are not fully trusted, neither by A, nor by B. Therefore, from the information exchanged with A and B, no coalition of servers should be able to learn the secrets of B or the choice of A. The results of a preliminary literature review are surprising. In fact, the number of publications on DOT protocols is small (fewer than 20) compared to, for example, the number of publications on a similar concept, secret sharing (100s of publications). And yet, oblivious transfer is a fundamental component of more complex cryptographic protocols such as multi-party computation protocols, which allow a group of participants to securely calculate any function of their joint secret inputs. So, one could expect many variants, for example of the original DOT protocol introduced in 2002 by Naor and Pinkas [74], to fulfil the requirements of specific scenarios. The design of variants of DOT protocols in traditional cryptography has been the guiding thread of my research. My contribution mainly consists in (a) a critical analysis of the existing protocols, demonstrating their limitations, weaknesses, and in some cases, flaws; and (b) the design of the following protocols,well adapted to some specific situations: A Strongly Secure DOT Protocol. This DOT protocol addresses the most important weakness of unconditionally secure, one-round, polynomial interpolation-based DOT protocols: after the protocol has been executed, if the party A corrupts only one server, she can learn all the secrets of the party B. The protocol is secure even if A corrupts up to k - 1 servers. A Verifiable DOT Protocol. The party A should obtain the secret she has chosen, even when some servers are controlled by a malicious adversary whose objective is to sabotage the protocol. This is the case with this protocol, assuming that the adversary cannot control more than k - 1 servers. A Multiple Secrets DOT Protocol. When the party A wishes to obtain n > 1 secrets, the current protocols have to be executed n times. In this context, they are inefficient. The DOT protocol introduced here allows the party A, by contacting in the same session k - 1 + n servers, to collect n secrets. Adaptive DOT Protocols. The previous protocol allows the party A to request several secrets. However, the request of one secret may depend on the values of secrets already obtained. Two efficient protocols are presented in this scenario. The first one allows A to receive a limited number of secrets and therefore, is well adapted to a single receiver. For several receivers, a second protocol is proposed. This second protocol accepts an unlimited number of queries, but requires communications amongst the servers. A Threshold DOT protocol. Most existing DOT protocols rely on threshold secret sharing schemes. In a k-threshold protocol or scheme, security is guaranteed not only when k parties are contacted, but also when more than k parties are contacted. However, the existing DOT protocols based on k-threshold secret sharing schemes require an additional mechanism to control that exactly k servers are contacted, which is an under-utilisation of the underlying functionality. The proposed protocol is the first k-threshold DOT protocol which allows the party A to contact as many servers as she wishes to obtain the chosen secret, provided that at least k servers are contacted. This research is limited to unconditionally secure protocols, i.e., protocols whose security does not depend on mathematical (unproven) assumptions; within the limits of the given security models, the protocols are secure even against an adversary with unlimited computing power and time. In brief, the results presented in this thesis are a significant advance to the state of the art research on DOT protocols because on one hand, they point out the weaknesses of the DOT protocols most commonly accepted by the cryptographic community and on the other hand, they contribute to the cryptographic field through the design of new protocols, secure and efficient.
Abstract With the rapid development of distributed collaborative computing, privacy leakage risks in multi-source data joint analysis are increasing, and classical secure scalar product (SSP) protocols are vulnerable to quantum attacks. Existing quantum secure scalar product schemes mostly rely on complex quantum resources or third parties, only support two-party computation, and have poor scalability. To address these issues, this paper proposes a secure multi-party quantum scalar product protocol based on single-photon resources without a third party. The protocol adopts a two-layer architectural design, integrating pairwise secure product operation and privacy-preserving aggregation mechanism. It realizes result blinding via data splitting and reconstruction to fully guarantee data confidentiality. By adopting ring interaction structure and lightweight secure computing modes, it completes collaborative computation of multi-party private data and effectively prevents information leakage in interactive processes. Performance analysis shows that the protocol requires no more than single-photon and single-particle measurements, with complexity within a reasonable range, making it feasible with current quantum technology. This protocol provides an efficient and secure primitive for multi-party privacy-preserving collaborative computing in quantum-resistant scenarios.