In this paper we we will argue against the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement which has been implicitly grounded on several widespread (metaphysical) presuppositions which have no relation whatsoever to the formalism of QM. We will show how these presuppositions have been introduced through a naive interpretation of the quantum mathematical structure which assumes dogmatically that the theory talks about "small particles" represented by pure states (in general, superpositions) which suddenly "collapse" when a measurement takes place. In the second part of this paper we will present a non-collapse approach to QM which makes no use whatsoever of particle metaphysics, escaping the need to make reference to space-time separability or the restriction to certain predictions of definite valued binary properties. Our paper ends up concluding the essential need to redefine the notion of quantum entanglement, at least in the cases of: i) non-collapse interpretations of QM; or, ii) any other interpretation which abandons the idea that QM makes reference to "small particles".
In this paper we we will argue against the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement which has been implicitly grounded on several widespread (metaphysical) presuppositions which have no relation whatsoever to the formalism of QM. We will show how these presuppositions have been introduced through a naive interpretation of the quantum mathematical structure which assumes dogmatically that the theory talks about "small particles" represented by pure states (in general, superpositions) which suddenly "collapse" when a measurement takes place. In the second part of this paper we will present a non-collapse approach to QM which makes no use whatsoever of particle metaphysics, escaping the need to make reference to space-time separability or the restriction to certain predictions of definite valued binary properties. Our paper ends up concluding the essential need to redefine the notion of quantum entanglement, at least in the cases of: i) non-collapse interpretations of QM; or, ii) any other interpretation which abandons the idea that QM makes reference to "small particles".
In this paper we argue against the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement which has been explicitly grounded on several "common sense" (metaphysical) presuppositions and presents today serious formal and conceptual drawbacks. This interpretation which some researchers in the field call "minimal", has ended up creating a narrative according to which QM talks about "small particles" represented by pure states (in general, superpositions) which --each time someone attempts to observe what is going on-- suddenly "collapse" to a single measurement outcome. After discussing the consequences of applying 'particle metaphysics' within the definition of entanglement we turn our attention to two recent approaches which might offer an interesting way out of this metaphysical conundrum. Both approaches concentrate their efforts in going beyond the notion of 'system'. While the first, called device-independent approach, proposes an operational anti-metaphysical scheme in which language plays an essential role; the second approach, takes an essentially metaphysical path which attempts to present a new non-classical representation grounded on intensive relations which, in turn, imposes the need to reconsider the definition and meaning of quantum entanglement.
The postulate of the collapse of the wave-function stands between the microscopic, quantum world, and the macroscopic world. Because of this intermediate position, the collapse process cannot be examined with the formalism of the quantum mechanics (QM), neither with that of classical mechanics. This fact makes some physicists propose interpretations of QM, which avoid this postulate. However, the common procedure used in that is making assumptions incompatible with the QM formalism. The present work discusses the most popular interpretations. It is shown that because of such assumptions those interpretations fail, i.e. predict for some experiments results which differ from the QM predictions. Despite that, special attention is called to a proposal of S. Gao, the only one which addresses and tries to solve an obvious and major contradiction. A couple of theorems are proved for showing that the collapse postulate is necessary in the QM. Although non-explainable with the quantum formalism, this postulate cannot be denied, otherwise one comes to conclusions which disagree with the QM. It is also proved here that the idea of “collapse at a distance” is problematic especially in relativistic cases, and is a misunderstanding. Namely, in an entanglement of two quantum systems, assuming that the measurement of one of the systems (accompanied by collapse of that system on one of its states) collapses the other systems, too without the second system being measured, which leads to a contradiction.
In this paper we consider the notion of quantum entanglement from the perspective of the logos categorical approach [26, 27]. Firstly, we will argue that the widespread distinctions, on the one hand, between pure states and mixed states, and on the other, between separable states and entangled states, are completely superfluous when considering the orthodox mathematical formalism of QM. We will then argue that the introduction of these distinctions within the theory of quanta is due to another two completely unjustified metaphysical presuppositions, namely, the idea that there is a "collapse" of quantum states when being measured and the idea that QM talks about "elementary particles". At distance from these distinctions and taking the logos approach as a standpoint, we will propose an objective formal account of the notion of entanglement in terms of potential coding which introduces the necessary distinction between intensive relations and effective relations. We will also discuss how this new definition of entanglement provides an anschaulich content to this --supposedly "spooky"-- quantum relational feature.
In this paper we analyze the definition of quantum superpositions within orthodox Quantum Mechanics (QM) and their relation to physical reality. We will begin by discussing how the metaphysical presuppositions imposed by Bohr on the interpretation of QM have become not only interpretational dogmas which constrain the limits of the present Orthodox Line of Research (OLR), but also how these desiderata implicitly preclude the possibility of developing a physical representation of quantum superpositions. We will then continue analyzing how most interpretations of QM argue against the existence of superpositions. Firstly, we will focus on those interpretations which attempt to recover a classical representation about "what there is", and secondly, we will concentrate on the arguments provided by Dieks and Griffiths who, staying close to the orthodox formalism, also attempt to "get rid of the ghost of Schrodinger's cat". Contrary to the OLR, we will argue -based on our definition of Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS)- that from a representational realist perspective which stays close to the orthodox Hilbert space formalism, quantum superpositions are not only the key to the most important -present and future- technological and experimental developments in quantum information processing but also, they must be considered as the kernel of any interpretation of QM that attempts to provide a physical representation of reality. We will also argue that the price to pay for such representational realist development must be the abandonment of the (dogmatic) idea that 'Actuality = Reality'.
This paper aims to clarify the true physical relation of photon pairs and to falsify the "entanglement collapse" hypothesis that standard quantum mechanics imposes upon them. Bell experiments violating Bell's inequality only rule out "local independent hidden variables," and are not a sufficient condition for proving "superposition plus wave-function collapse." The physical definition of entanglement in standard quantum mechanics is: subsystems are strongly correlated, the system is inseparable, and the individual subsystem has no definite independent physical state; its mathematical expressions are the non-factorizability of pure-state wave functions and the non-convex-combination of mixed-state density matrices. The physical definition and mathematical expressions are fully aligned: the individual subsystem cannot be written as a separate expression and has no definite independent physical state. Operationally, it is also absolutely impossible to realize an individual measurement of the subsystem. However, in Bell experiments, photon pairs are separately and individually measured on spatially separated detectors, which directly falsifies the premise that "the photon pair is in an entangled state." Stripping away mysticism, the true relation of two photons is a linear equation with two unknowns (independent particles under an initial-state constraint); the three-photon logic (a linear equation with three unknowns) proves that after measuring one photon, the other two still have not collapsed into definite values and must still be measured individually to obtain their states—"wave-function collapse into a definite value" is purely fictitious in algebraic logic.