We present a randomized quantum algorithm for polynomial factorization over finite fields. For polynomials of degree n over a finite field F_q, the average-case complexity of our algorithm is an expected O(n^{1 + o(1)} \log^{2 + o(1)}q) bit operations. Only for a negligible subset of polynomials of degree $n$ our algorithm has a higher complexity of O(n^{4/3 + o(1)} \log^{2 + o(1)}q) bit operations. This breaks the classical 3/2-exponent barrier for polynomial factorization over finite fields \cite{guo2016alg}.
We present a randomized quantum algorithm for polynomial factorization over finite fields. For polynomials of degree n over a finite field F_q, the average-case complexity of our algorithm is an expected O(n^{1 + o(1)} \log^{2 + o(1)}q) bit operations. Only for a negligible subset of polynomials of degree n our algorithm has a higher complexity of O(n^{4/3 + o(1)} \log^{2 + o(1)}q) bit operations. This breaks the classical 3/2-exponent barrier for polynomial factorization over finite fields \cite{guo2016alg}.
How many quantum queries are required to determine the coefficients of a degree- d polynomial in n variables? We present and analyse quantum algorithms for this multivariate polynomial interpolation problem over the fields F q , R and C . We show that k C and 2 k C queries suffice to achieve probability 1 for C and R , respectively, where k C = ⌈ ( 1 / ( n + 1 ) ) ( n + d d ) ⌉ except for d =2 and four other special cases. For F q , we show that ⌈( d /( n + d ))( n + d d ) ⌉ queries suffice to achieve probability approaching 1 for large field order q . The classical query complexity of this problem is ( n + d d ) , so our result provides a speed-up by a factor of n +1, ( n +1)/2 and ( n + d )/ d for C , R and F q
In this work, we propose a new way to (non-interactively, verifiably) demonstrate quantum advantage by solving the average-case NP search problem of finding a solution to a system of (underdetermined) constant degree multivariate equations over the finite field F2 drawn from a specified distribution. In particular, for any d≥2, we design a distribution of degree up to d polynomials {pi(x1,…,xn)}i∈[m] for m<n over F2 for which we show that there is an expected polynomial-time quantum algorithm that provably simultaneously solves {pi(x1,…,xn)=yi}i∈[m] for a random vector (y1,…,ym). On the other hand, while solutions exist with high probability, we conjecture that for constant d>2, it is classically hard to find one based on a thorough review of existing classical cryptanalysis. Our work thus posits that degree three functions are enough to instantiate the random oracle to obtain non-relativized quantum advantage.
We study the approximation of the number of solutions of Laurent polynomials over finite fields. For a Laurent polynomial f(x)=∑j=1sajxuj∈Fq[x1±1,…,xn±1], let U be its augmented support matrix whose columns are (1,uj) with rank ρ and N(f):=#{x∈(Fq×)n∣f(x)=0} be its torus point count. Our first main result is a quantum algorithm that outputs N(f) satisfying ∣N(f)−N(f)∣≤εqn+s/2−ρ with success probability 1−δ. Provided that ρ and ∥U∥∞ are bounded, the algorithm runs in both classical bit and quantum gate complexity poly(n,s,logq,1/ε,log(1/δ)). It provides finer resolution than relative-error approximations in general settings. To the best of our knowledge, in the explicit finite-field input model considered here, no previous algorithm achieves this additive accuracy with running time polynomial in logq. Van Dam (arXiv:quant-ph/0405081) conjectured the existence of such an algorithm under the assumption of an oracle reflecting the algebraic properties of the polynomial. In contrast, by exploiting a point-counting formula derived from character sums over finite fields, we develop an alternative approach that efficiently approximates the number of points without assuming the existence of such an oracle. As a second main result, we prove that the same approximation problem becomes #P-hard under randomized polynomial-time Turing reductions when the support matrix U varies freely as part of the input. Thus, taken together, our results clarify how the effectiveness of the quantum approach depends on the tradeoff between the accuracy scale and the support parameters of the input polynomial.
We consider the number of quantum queries required to determine the coefficients of a degree-d polynomial over GF(q). A lower bound shown independently by Kane and Kutin and by Meyer and Pommersheim shows that d/2+1/2 quantum queries are needed to solve this problem with bounded error, whereas an algorithm of Boneh and Zhandry shows that d quantum queries are sufficient. We show that the lower bound is achievable: d/2+1/2 quantum queries suffice to determine the polynomial with bounded error. Furthermore, we show that d/2+1 queries suffice to achieve probability approaching 1 for large q. These upper bounds improve results of Boneh and Zhandry on the insecurity of cryptographic protocols against quantum attacks. We also show that our algorithm's success probability as a function of the number of queries is precisely optimal. Furthermore, the algorithm can be implemented with gate complexity poly(log q) with negligible decrease in the success probability. We end with a conjecture about the quantum query complexity of multivariate polynomial interpolation.
Abstract Primitive polynomials over finite fields are crucial resources with broad applications across various domains in computer science, including classical pseudo‐random number generation, coding theory, and post‐quantum cryptography. Nevertheless, the pursuit of an efficient classical algorithm for generating random primitive polynomials over finite fields remains an ongoing challenge. In this work, it shows how this problem can be solved efficiently with the help of quantum computers. Moreover, the designs of specific quantum circuits to implement them are also presented. The research paves the way for the rapid and real‐time generation of random primitive polynomials in diverse quantum communication and computation applications.
We study two problems: Local Leakage Resilience (LLR) for Shamir secret sharing, and worst-case Optimal Polynomial Intersection (OPI), over a prime field Fp. For a polynomial Q(X) of degree less than k, LLR for Shamir secret sharing asks what a few leaked bits from each of the n shares Q(α1),…,Q(αn) reveal about Q(0). Given (worst-case) input lists S1,…,Sn⊂Fp, OPI seeks a polynomial Q(X) so that Q(αi)∈Si for as many i as possible. Leveraging recent connections between these two problems due to (Sun, Wootters 2026), we improve the state-of-the-art for both problems.
For LLR, we show that there is some constant δ>0 so that Shamir secret-sharing is one-bit LLR (only a negligible amount about Q(0) is learned) whenever R:=k/n≥1/2−δ. This is the first result to break the so-called ``one-half barrier'' for LLR, and improves over the previous best known result, requiring R≥0.668 (Kasser, 2025).
For OPI, we give a quantum algorithm that finds a polynomial Q(X) that agrees with at least a SCLρ(R)−ε fraction of the lists, for every fixed ε>0, where SCLρ is the \emph{semicircle law} of (Jordan et al., 2025). This improves previous algorithmic (and existential) results of (Jo, 2026) and (Horinaga, Yamakawa, 2026). We also give further improved existential results for all OPI instances; and when the evaluation points αi are chosen at random, for every rate R>0 we show that, with high probability, for worst-case Si there exists \emph{perfect} solution. Finally, we adapt the hardness result of (Yamakawa, Zhandry, 2024) to apply to OPI (rather than a folded version); this gives an unconditional separation between the quantum and classical hardness of OPI relative to a membership oracle.