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arXiv:1805.01651

On the security of two-way quantum key distribution

Jesni Shamsul Shaari, Mancini, Stefano, Stefano Pirandola, Marco Lucamarini

Published May 4, 2018• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

An author (arXiv:1709.09262 [quant-ph] (2017), Nanoscale Research Letters (2017) 12:552) has recently questioned the security of two-way quantum key distribution schemes by referring to attack strategies which leave no errors in the (raw) key shared by the legitimate parties. We argue that the article is based on a flawed understanding of the actual workings of a two-way protocol, thus the erroneous conclusions drawn thereof.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1805.01651

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An author (arXiv:1709.09262 [quant-ph] (2017), Nanoscale Research Letters (2017) 12:552) has recently questioned the security of two-way quantum key distribution schemes by referring to attack strategies which leave no errors in the (raw) key shared by the legitimate parties. We argue that the article is based on a flawed understanding of the actual workings of a two-way protocol, thus the erroneous conclusions drawn thereof.
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Quantum key distribution protocols typically make use of a one-way quantum channel to distribute a shared secret string to two distant users. However, protocols exploiting a two-way quantum channel have been proposed as an alternative route to the same goal, with the potential advantage of outperforming one-way protocols. Here we provide a strategy to prove security for two-way quantum key distribution protocols against the most general quantum attack possible by an eavesdropper. We utilize an entropic uncertainty relation, and only a few assumptions need to be made about the devices used in the protocol. We also show that a two-way protocol can outperform comparable one-way protocols.
Secure and efficient communication between two parties always incents scholars for further research. Creation of such a means of communication yields commercial benefits for our society. With the creation of a quantum computer, some classical protocols used for secure communication is no longer secure. Quantum key distribution is created to solve this problem. Although a quantum key distribution protocol is in theory guaranteed to be secure, there has been ways to breach its security in real life application. Since the creation of the first quantum key distribution protocol, there has been a rival between the defending and attacking side of quantum key distribution. In this paper, we first seek to discuss the basics of the first quantum key distribution protocol. Secondly, we discuss about the attacks against that protocol and the modifications made to the protocol in response to these attacks. Currently, researchers have permanently closed one side of the implementation loophole that could give rise to potential means of hacking of the protocol.
Abstract Entity authentication and key exchange are fundamental prerequisites for ensuring the security of various emerging smart networks. However, most existing classical schemes are vulnerable to attacks from quantum computers. Recently, Prateek et al proposed a privacy-preserving mutual authentication scheme for smart metering infrastructure in smart grids. The authors claimed that their scheme is unconditionally secure and could resist various known security attacks, including impersonation attacks, eavesdropping attacks, and replay attacks. However, in this article, we demonstrate that there are serious security flaws in the proposed scheme. First, the scheme fails to ensure that two legitimate parties can reliably share a common session key, leading to a potential authentication failure. Second, an eavesdropper can exploit entangle-measure attacks to obtain partial information about the shared session key. Additionally, due to the inherent randomness of quantum measurements, the session key shared between two entities in each session is unpredictable. Consequently, the session keys distributed across different sessions may not be identical, further contributing to authentication failure. Finally, we provide an improvement to address these security flaws while preserving the original scheme’s advantageous features.