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arXiv:1804.10030 · Entropy

New Forms of Quantum Value Indefiniteness Suggest That Incompatible Views on Contexts Are Epistemic

Karl Svozil

Published May 24, 2018• 14 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Extensions of the Kochen-Specker theorem use quantum logics whose classical interpretation suggests a true-implies-value indefiniteness property. This can be interpreted as an indication that any view of a quantum state beyond a single context is epistemic. A remark by Gleason about the ad hoc construction of probability measures in Hilbert spaces as a result of the Pythagorean property of vector components is interpreted platonically. Unless there is a total match between preparation and measurement contexts, information about the former from the latter is not ontic, but epistemic. This is corroborated by configurations of observables and contexts with a truth-implies-value indefiniteness property.

DOI
10.3390/e20060406

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Extensions of the Kochen-Specker theorem use quantum logics whose classical interpretation suggests a true-implies-value indefiniteness property. This can be interpreted as an indication that any view of a quantum state beyond a single context is epistemic. A remark by Gleason about the ad hoc construction of probability measures in Hilbert spaces as a result of the Pythagorean property of vector components is interpreted platonically. Unless there is a total match between preparation and measurement contexts, information about the former from the latter is not ontic, but epistemic. This is corroborated by configurations of observables and contexts with a truth-implies-value indefiniteness property.
The Kochen-Specker theorem proves the inability to assign, simultaneously, noncontextual definite values to all (of a finite set of) quantum mechanical observables in a consistent manner. If one assumes that any definite values behave noncontextually, one can nonetheless only conclude that some observables (in this set) are value indefinite. In this paper, we prove a variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem showing that, under the same assumption of noncontextuality, if a single one-dimensional projection observable is assigned the definite value 1, then no one-dimensional projection observable that is incompatible (i.e., non-commuting) with this one can be assigned consistently a definite value. Unlike standard proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem, in order to localise and show the extent of value indefiniteness, this result requires a constructive method of reduction between Kochen-Specker sets. If a system is prepared in a pure state ψ, then it is reasonable to assume that any value assignment (i.e., hidden variable model) for this system assigns the value 1 to the observable projecting onto the one-dimensional linear subspace spanned by ψ, and the value 0 to those projecting onto linear subspaces orthogonal to it. Our result can be interpreted, under this assumption, as showing that the outcome of a measurement of any other incompatible one-dimensional projection observable cannot be determined in advance, thus formalising a notion of quantum randomness.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. In the first part we will argue that a general confusion within the literature comes from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. The first one is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality, introduced by Bohr, which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of quantum measurements. The second, is related to an ontic notion of contextuality, exposed through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem, which focuses on the constraints to discuss about actual (definite valued) properties within the orthodox formalism of QM. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The outcome of the observable A when mea- sured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A,B] = [A,C] = 0, and [B,C] ̸= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and ontic perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the relation between ‘classical contexts’ and QM. We will show that three accepted presuppositions found within the orthodox literature are, in general, false. Namely: (i) that quantum contextuality does not preclude an objective description of physical reality, (ii) that the choice of a context (or basis) restores a classical description of reality, and (iii) that the choice of a (classical) context is a necessary condition for accounting for empirical statements in QM.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an interpretation of which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of certain measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of is related to a purely formal understanding of as exposed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an omelette of contextuality which has been fully widespread through a popularized epistemic explanation of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observable A when measured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A, B] = [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] /= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes.
We examine the relationship between quantum contextuality (in both the standard Kochen-Specker sense and in the generalized sense proposed by Spekkens) and models of quantum theory in which the quantum state is maximally epistemic. We find that preparation noncontextual models must be maximally epistemic, and these in turn must be Kochen-Specker noncontextual. This implies that the Kochen-Specker theorem is sufficient to establish both the impossibility of maximally epistemic models and the impossibility of preparation noncontextual models. The implication from preparation noncontextual to maximally epistemic then also yields a proof of Bell's theorem from an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-like argument.
Strong OOO-valued contextuality: ruling out discrete nondeterministic alternatives to quantum theory
Gleason's theorem identifies the Born rule via non-contextuality over an infinite continuous lattice of projectors, while its corollary the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem rules out the specific class of deterministic ({0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}-valued) noncontextual models using finite sets of projectors. Gleason's theorem also indicates the existence of KS-type finite vector constructions to rule out other discrete nondeterministic alternatives to quantum theory beyond the {0,1}\{0, 1\}{0,1} case. Here, we construct finite measurement configurations to rule out noncontextual empirical models with outcome probabilities drawn from an arbitrary finite subset O⊂[0,1]O \subset [0,1]O⊂[0,1]. We do this by two means: (i) constructing a family of experimentally feasible state-dependent Hardy-type tests, and (ii) proving a generalized KS theorem for a broad class of OOO that includes prior results as special cases. In the sheaf-theoretic framework of Abramsky and Brandenburger, a hierarchy of probabilistic-possibilistic-strong contextuality has been established quantifying contextuality as a resource. We extend this framework by introducing strong OOO-valued contextuality, showing that quantum theory evades global sections of all finite-valued presheaves. We also discuss the implications of the result on finite many-valued logics as viable ontological models for quantum theory and for contextuality-based (semi)-device-independent protocols.
The semantics underlying the propositional structure of Hilbert space quantum mechanics involves an inherent ambiguity concerning the impossibility of assigning definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. Although the preceding Kochen-Specker result forbids a global, absolute assignment of truth values to quantum mechanical propositions, it does not exclude ones that are contextual. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton “uniqueness theorem” is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a suitable “preferred” observable. It is suggested that the most natural choice of the latter, especially for confronting the problem of truth valuation in quantum mechanics, results in the determinateness of the observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The resulting account of truth is compatible with a realist conception of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a universal context of reference or an Archimedean standpoint from which to evaluate logically the totality of facts of nature.