We consider a setup in which the channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than the channel from Eve to Bob. We show that there exist encoding and decoding which accomplish error correction and authentication simultaneously; that is, Bob is able to correctly decode a message coming from Alice and reject a message coming from Eve with high probability. The system does not require any secret key shared between Alice and Bob, provides information theoretic security, and can safely be composed with other protocols in an arbitrary context.
We consider a setup in which the channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than the channel from Eve to Bob. We show that there exist encoding and decoding which accomplish error correction and authentication simultaneously; that is, Bob is able to correctly decode a message coming from Alice and reject a message coming from Eve with high probability. The system does not require any secret key shared between Alice and Bob, provides information theoretic security, and can safely be composed with other protocols in an arbitrary context.
Several protocols are presented that allow two parties Alice and Bob not sharing any secret information initially (except possibly a short key to be used for authentication) to generate a long shared secret key such that even an enemy Eve with unlimited computing power is unable to obtain a non-negligible amount of information (in Shannon's sense) about this key. Two different models are considered. In a first model we assume that Alice can send information to Bob over a noisy main channel but that Eve is able to receive the same information over a parallel independent noisy channel from Alice to Eve. In a second, more general model we assume that Alice, Bob and Eve receive the output of a random source (e.g., a satellite broadcasting random bits) over three independent individual channels. The condition that the channels be independent can be replaced by the condition that they be independent only to a known, arbitrarily small degree. We demonstrate that even when Eve's channel is sup...
If Alice must communicate with Bob over a channel shared with the adversarial Eve, then Bob must be able to validate the authenticity of the message. In particular we consider the model where Alice and Eve share a discrete memoryless multiple access channel with Bob, thus allowing simultaneous transmissions from Alice and Eve. By traditional random coding arguments, we demonstrate an inner bound on the rate at which Alice may transmit, while still granting Bob the ability to authenticate. Furthermore this is accomplished in spite of Alice and Bob lacking a pre-shared key, as well as allowing Eve prior knowledge of both the codebook Alice and Bob share and the messages Alice transmits.
An authentication protocol is a procedure by which a sender tries to convey n bits of information, which we call an input message, to a receiver. An adversary controls the network over which the sender and the receiver talk and may change any message before it reaches its destination. This paper deals with the simple scenario where two parties, Alice and Bob, communicate and want to assure that the message received by Bob is the one sent by Alice. Unconditional cryptographic security cannot be generated simply from scratch, but must be based on some given primitive to start with. In this paper, we introduce a message authentication protocol with unconditional cryptographic security. More precisely, we give protocols using a weakly secret key allowing for the exchange of authenticated messages.
In this paper, a novel message authentication model using the same key over wiretap channel is proposed to achieveinformation-theoretic security. Specifically, in the proposed model, there is a discrete memoryless channelW1:X→Ybetween transmitter Alice and receiver Bob, while an attacker Oscar is connected with Alice via discrete memoryless channelW2:X→Z. Alice encodes messageMto codeword (S,Xn), using an encoding function with secret keyK. Then,Sis sent to Bob over a one-way noiseless channel (fully controlled by Oscar), andXnis sent over the wiretap channel, sayX→(Y,Z). Building on this model, a new message authentication scheme is proposed. The scheme incorporates a secure channel coding, which uses random coding techniques to detect man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. The authentication channel capacity is studied in a specific channel model whenW2is not less noisy thanW1. We theoretically demonstrate that the authentication channel capacity is much larger than the secrecy capacity, since Bob does not need to recover information transmitted over the noisy channel.
Message authentication is an interactive procedure that allows a legitimate sender Alice to send and authenticate a message M to a legitimate receiver Bob. To prevent the attacks from an adversary Eve, Alice and Bob usually share a secret key K. In this paper, we study a novel authentication framework as follows. Firstly, Alice sends a message M to Bob over a noiseless channel; Secondly, Alice generates an authentication tag with the message M and secret key K; Thirdly, Alice encodes the tag into a codeword Xn; Finally, Alice transmits the codeword Xn to Bob over a wiretap channel. This paper defines an authentication channel capacity under a fixed tag rate, and show that it equals to H(X|Z). Specifically, we prove that the authentication protocol proposed in Ref. [15] is capacity-achievable under our authentication model.
Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender A and a receiver B sharing a classical secret key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified or replaced by a dishonest party with control of the communication line. In this paper we study the authentication of messages composed of quantum states. We give a formal definition of authentication in the quantum setting. Assuming A and B have access to an insecure quantum channel and share a secret, classical random key, we provide a non-interactive scheme that enables A to both encrypt and authenticate an m qubit message by encoding it into m+s qubits, where the error probability decreases exponentially in the security parameter s. The scheme requires a secret key of size 2m+O(s). To achieve this, we give a highly efficient protocol for testing the purity of shared EPR pairs. It has long been known that learning information about a general quantum state will necessarily disturb it. We refine this result to show that such a disturbance can be done with few side effects, allowing it to circumvent cryptographic protections. Consequently, any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt them. In contrast, no such constraint exists classically. This reasoning has two important consequences: It allows us to give a lower bound of 2m key bits for authenticating m qubits, which makes our protocol asymptotically optimal. Moreover, we use it to show that digitally signing quantum states is impossible.