Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We analyze games quantized within the EWL framework [Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein, Phys Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. We solve for the Nash equilibria of a variety of two-player quantum games and compare the results to the solutions of the corresponding classical games. We then analyze Bayesian games where there is uncertainty about the player types in two-player conflicting interest games. The solutions to the Bayesian games are found to have a phase diagram-like structure where different equilibria exist in different parameter regions, depending both on the amount of uncertainty and the degree of entanglement. We find that in games where a Pareto-optimal solution is not a Nash equilibrium, it is possible for the quantized game to have an advantage over the classical version. In addition, we analyze the behavior of the solutions as the strategy choices approach an unrestricted operation. We find that some games have a continuum of solutions, bounded by the solutions of a simpler restricted game. A deeper understanding of Bayesian quantum game theory could lead to novel quantum applications in a multi-agent setting.
In classical (standard) game theory, a useful algorithm for searching Nash equilibrium in games of two players, is to determine the best response functions. For each strategy S1 of player 1 player 2 finds a best response function F2(S1), and vice versa. If the two response functions intersect, the intersection point (S1*, S2*) is a candidate for Nash equilibrium. This method is especially useful when the strategy space of each player is determined by a single variable (discrete or continuous). In the last decade, the concept of quantum games has been developed (hence we distinguish between classical and quantum games). In a quantum game with two players the strategy space of each player is composed of 2 × 2 complex unitary matrices with unit determinant. That is the group SU(2). The corresponding strategy space is characterized by three continuous variables represented by angles: 0 ≤ α ≤ 2π, 0 ≤ β ≤ 2π, 0 ≤ θ ≤ π. That turns the use of response functions impractical. In the present contribution we suggest a method for alleviating this problem by discretizing the variables as: {αi, βj, θk}, i= 1, 2, ..., I; j = 1, 2, ..., J; k = 1, 2, ... K. This enables the representation of every such triple by a single discrete variable, (αi, βj, θk) → xijk. Thereby, the strategy space is characterized by a single discrete variable taking I × J × K values and the method of response functions is feasible. We use it to show the following two results: 1) A two players quantum game with partially entangled initial state has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 2) A two player quantum Bayesian game with fully entangled initial state has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
We present a general two-player quantum game simulator that can simulate any two-player quantum game described by a 2times2 payoff matrix (two strategy games).The user can determine the payoff matrices for both players, their strategies and the amount of entanglement between their initial strategies. The outputs of the simulator are the expected payoffs of each player as a function of the other player's strategy parameters and the amount of entanglement. The simulator also produces contour plots that divide the strategy spaces of the game in regions in which players can get larger payoffs if they choose to use a quantum strategy against any classical one. We also apply the simulator to two well known quantum games, the Battle of Sexes and the Chicken game.
Game theory is a well established field with applications in many areas including the social sciences, biology, and computer science [6]. Recently, however, researchers in quantum computation have begun to study the implications of games set in the quantum domain (i.e. game theoretical situations where either one or more players have quantum computational power or where the implementation of strategies uses some form of quantum information). Such a setting allows for entanglement and superpositions of strategies and evaluation of payoffs using quantum measurement. This approach to game theory, according to some scholars in the field, could help us understand certain physical systems, improve economic markets, and develop quantum algorithms. I have conducted an investigation into quantum game theory. I have constructed simulation tools using Maple that, along with research into related work, have helped gain some insight into this new field. The important solutions in classical game theory are usually Nash equilibria. What do they look like in the quantum realm? In what
Quantum games, like quantum algorithms, exploit quantum entanglement to establish strong correlations between strategic player actions. This paper introduces quantum game-theoretic models applied to trading and demonstrates their implementation on an ion-trap quantum computer. The results showcase a quantum advantage, previously known only theoretically, realized as higher-paying market Nash equilibria. This advantage could help uncover alpha in trading strategies, defined as excess returns compared to established benchmarks. These findings suggest that quantum computing could significantly influence the development of financial strategies.
Strategic decision-making among many agents under incomplete information is central to economics, security, and multi-agent artificial intelligence (AI). Computing equilibria in such settings is challenging because the joint type-action space grows exponentially with the number of players. In binary-type, binary-action Bayesian games with
n players, an explicit representation over type-action profiles requires
O(22n) entries, making direct linear-programming (LP) formulations increasingly costly as
n grows. We propose a hybrid quantum-classical framework for approximating Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) using a parameterized quantum circuit (PQC). The PQC represents the conditional distribution over joint actions using
O(nL) trainable parameters, where
L denotes the circuit depth; for the largest trained setting,
n=8 and
L=2, this corresponds to
48 trainable angles. Each player count is trained independently by maximizing expected social welfare with a penalty on positive aggregated BCE obedience violations. On a strategically coupled Bayesian congestion game with
n=2,4,6,8 players, feasible PQC solutions attain higher welfare than MCCFR and DCFR product-strategy baselines while satisfying
εmax≤10−3, where
εmax denotes the maximum positive aggregated BCE obedience violation. Across five independent runs per setting, all runs are feasible for
n=2,4,6, while four of five are feasible for
n=8. PQC welfare remains below the exact LP optimum, with the absolute gap increasing with
n, while classical state-vector simulation prevents PQC training beyond eight players. These results demonstrate the use of a compact PQC parameterization for approximate equilibrium computation and quantify its welfare, feasibility, and classical simulation scaling on the studied benchmark.