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arXiv:1801.07434 · Physical Review A

Continuous-variable quantum authentication of physical unclonable keys: Security against an emulation attack

Georgios M. Nikolopoulos

Published Jan 22, 2018• 23 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We consider a recently proposed entity authentication protocol in which a physical unclonable key is interrogated by random coherent states of light, and the quadratures of the scattered light are analyzed by means of a coarse-grained homodyne detection. We derive a sufficient condition for the protocol to be secure against an emulation attack in which an adversary knows the challenge-response properties of the key and moreover, he can access the challenges during the verification. The security analysis relies on Holevo's bound and Fano's inequality, and suggests that the protocol is secure against the emulation attack for a broad range of physical parameters that are within reach of today's technology.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.97.012324

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We consider a recently proposed entity authentication protocol in which a physical unclonable key is interrogated by random coherent states of light, and the quadratures of the scattered light are analyzed by means of a coarse-grained homodyne detection. We derive a sufficient condition for the protocol to be secure against an emulation attack in which an adversary knows the challenge-response properties of the key and moreover, he can access the challenges during the verification. The security analysis relies on Holevo's bound and Fano's inequality, and suggests that the protocol is secure against the emulation attack for a broad range of physical parameters that are within reach of today's technology.
Optical physical unclonable keys are currently considered to be rather promising candidates for the development of entity authentication protocols, which offer security against both classical and quantum adversaries. In this work, we investigate the robustness of a continuous-variable protocol, which relies on the scattering of coherent states of light from the key, against three different types of intercept–resend emulation attacks. The performance of the protocol is analyzed for a broad range of physical parameters, and our results are compared to existing security bounds.
We propose a scheme for authentication of physical keys that are materialized by optical multiple-scattering media. The authentication relies on the optical response of the key when probed by randomly selected coherent states of light, and the use of standard wavefront-shaping techniques that direct the scattered photons coherently to a specific target mode at the output. The quadratures of the electromagnetic field of the scattered light at the target mode are analysed using a homodyne detection scheme, and the acceptance or rejection of the key is decided upon the outcomes of the measurements. The proposed scheme can be implemented with current technology and offers collision resistance and robustness against key cloning.
Physical unclonable functions have been shown to be a useful resource of randomness for implementing various cryptographic tasks including entity authentication. All the related entity authentication protocols that have been discussed in the literature so far, either they are vulnerable to an emulation attack, or they are limited to short distances. Hence, quantum-safe remote entity authentication over large distances remains an open question. In the first part of this work, we discuss the requirements that an entity authentication protocol has to offer, to be useful for remote entity authentication in practice. Subsequently, we propose a protocol, which can operate over large distances, and offers security against both classical and quantum adversaries. The proposed protocol relies on standard techniques, it is fully compatible with the infrastructure of existing and future photonic networks, and it can operate in parallel with other quantum protocols, including QKD protocols.
Authentication of persons and objects is a crucial aspect of security. We experimentally demonstrate quantum-secure authentication (QSA) of a classical multiple-scattering key. The key is authenticated by illuminating it with a light pulse containing fewer photons than spatial degrees of freedom and verifying the spatial shape of the reflected light. Quantum-physical principles forbid an attacker to fully characterize the incident light pulse. Therefore, he cannot emulate the key by digitally constructing the expected optical response, even if all information about the key is publicly known. QSA uses a key that cannot be copied due to technological limitations and is quantum-secure against digital emulation. Moreover, QSA does not depend on secrecy of stored data, does not depend on unproven mathematical assumptions, and is straightforward to implement with current technology.
We provide a security analysis for continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols based on the transmission of two-mode squeezed vacuum states measured via homodyne detection. We employ a version of the entropic uncertainty relation for smooth entropies to give a lower bound on the number of secret bits which can be extracted from a finite number of runs of the protocol. This bound is valid under general coherent attacks, and gives rise to keys which are composably secure. For comparison, we also give a lower bound valid under the assumption of collective attacks. For both scenarios, we find positive key rates using experimental parameters reachable today.
The continuous-variable quantum key distribution with entanglement in the middle, a semi-device-independent protocol, places the source at the untrusted third party between Alice and Bob, and thus has the advantage of high levels of security with the purpose of eliminating the assumptions about the source device. However, previous works considered the collective-attack analysis, which inevitably assumes that the states of the source has an identical and independently distributed (i.i.d) structure, and limits the application of the protocol. To solve this problem, we modify the original protocol by exploiting an energy test to monitor the potential high energy attacks an adversary may use. Our analysis removes the assumptions of the light source and the modified protocol can therefore be called source-device-independent protocol. Moreover, we analyze the security of the continuous-variable source-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol with a homodyne-homodyne structure against general coherent attacks by adapting a state-independent entropic uncertainty relation. The simulation results indicate that, in the universal composable security framework, the protocol can still achieve high key rates against coherent attacks under the condition of achievable block lengths.