The rate regions of many variations of the standard and wire-tap channels have been thoroughly explored. Secrecy capacity characterizes the loss of rate required to ensure that the adversary gains no information about the transmissions. Authentication does not have a standard metric, despite being an important counterpart to secrecy. While some results have taken an information-theoretic approach to the problem of authentication coding, the full rate region and accompanying trade-offs have yet to be characterized. In this paper, we provide an inner bound of achievable rates with an average authentication and reliability constraint. The bound is established by combining and analyzing two existing authentication schemes for both noisy and noiseless channels. We find that our coding scheme improves upon existing schemes.
The rate regions of many variations of the standard and wire-tap channels have been thoroughly explored. Secrecy capacity characterizes the loss of rate required to ensure that the adversary gains no information about the transmissions. Authentication does not have a standard metric, despite being an important counterpart to secrecy. While some results have taken an information-theoretic approach to the problem of authentication coding, the full rate region and accompanying trade-offs have yet to be characterized. In this paper, we provide an inner bound of achievable rates with an average authentication and reliability constraint. The bound is established by combining and analyzing two existing authentication schemes for both noisy and noiseless channels. We find that our coding scheme improves upon existing schemes.
This paper investigates the secret key authentication capacity region. Specifically, the focus is on a model where a source must transmit information over an adversary controlled channel where the adversary, prior to the source's transmission, decides whether or not to replace the destination's observation with an arbitrary one of their choosing (done in hopes of having the destination accept a false message). To combat the adversary, the source and destination share a secret key which they may use to guarantee authenticated communications. The secret key authentication capacity region here is then defined as the region of jointly achievable message rate, authentication rate, and key consumption rate (i.e., how many bits of secret key are needed). This is the first of a two part study, with the parts differing in how the authentication rate is measured. In this first study the authenticated rate is measured by the traditional metric of the maximum expected probability of false authentication. For this metric, we provide an inner bound which improves on those existing in the literature. This is achieved by adopting and merging different classical techniques in novel ways. Within these classical techniques, one technique derives authentication capability directly from the noisy communications channel, and the other technique derives its' authentication capability directly from obscuring the source.
This paper investigates the secret-key-authenticated-capacity region, where information-theoretic authentication is defined by the ability of the decoder to accept and decode messages originating from a valid encoder while rejecting messages from other invalid sources. The model considered here consists of a valid encoder-decoder pairing that can communicate through a channel controlled by an adversary who is also able to eavesdrop on the encoder’s transmissions. Over multiple rounds of communication, the adversary first decides whether or not to replace the decoder’s observation with an arbitrary one of the adversary’s choosing, with the goal of the adversary being to have the decoder accept and decode their observation as a valid message (different from that of the encoder). To combat the adversary, the encoder and decoder share a secret key. The secret-key-authenticated-capacity region here is then defined as the region of jointly achievable message rate, authentication rate (a to be defined per symbol measure that will generally represent the likelihood that an adversary can fool the decoder), and the key-consumption rate (how many bits of secret key are needed per symbol sent). This is the first of a two-part study, with the parts differing in their measure of the authentication rate. In this first study, the authentication rate is the exponent of blocklength-normalized exponent of the expected probability of false authentication. For this metric, we provide an inner bound which improves on those existing in the literature. This is achieved by adopting and merging different classical techniques in novel ways. Within these classical secret-key-based authentication techniques, one technique derives authentication capability from secure channel coding to send the secret key with the message, and the other technique derives its authentication capability directly from obscuring the source.
In this paper, we consider a scenario where a source node wishes to broadcast two confidential messages for two respective receivers, while a wire-tapper also receives the transmitted signal. This model is motivated by wireless communications, where individual secure messages are broadcast over open media and can be received by any illegitimate receiver. The secrecy level is measured by equivocation rate at the eavesdropper. We first study the general (non-degraded) broadcast channel with confidential messages. We present an inner bound on the secrecy capacity region for this model. The inner bound coding scheme is based on a combination of random binning and the Gelfand-Pinsker bining. This scheme matches the Marton's inner bound on the broadcast channel without confidentiality constraint. We further study the situation where the channels are degraded. For the degraded broadcast channel with confidential messages, we present the secrecy capacity region. Our achievable coding scheme is based on Cover's superposition scheme and random binning. We refer to this scheme as Secret Superposition Scheme. In this scheme, we show that randomization in the first layer increases the secrecy rate of the second layer. This capacity region matches the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel without security constraint. It also matches the secrecy capacity for the conventional wire-tap channel. Our converse proof is based on a combination of the converse proof of the conventional degraded broadcast channel and Csiszar lemma. Finally, we assume that the channels are Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) and show that secret superposition scheme with Gaussian codebook is optimal. The converse proof is based on the generalized entropy power inequality.
In this paper, we consider a scenario where a source node wishes to broadcast two confidential messages for two respective receivers, while a wire-tapper also receives the transmitted signal. This model is motivated by wireless communications, where individual secure messages are broadcast over open media and can be received by any illegitimate receiver. The secrecy level is measured by equivocation rate at the eavesdropper. We first study the general (non-degraded) broadcast channel with confidential messages. We present an inner bound on the secrecy capacity region for this model. The inner bound coding scheme is based on a combination of random binning and the Gelfand-Pinsker bining. This scheme matches the Marton's inner bound on the broadcast channel without confidentiality constraint. We further study the situation where the channels are degraded. For the degraded broadcast channel with confidential messages, we present the secrecy capacity region. Our achievable coding scheme is based on Cover's superposition scheme and random binning. We refer to this scheme as secret superposition scheme. In this scheme, we show that randomization in the first layer increases the secrecy rate of the second layer. This capacity region matches the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel without security constraint. It also matches the secrecy capacity for the conventional wire-tap channel. Our converse proof is based on a combination of the converse proof of the conventional degraded broadcast channel and Csiszar lemma.
In this paper, we first consider a scenario where a source node wishes to broadcast two confidential messages for two respective receivers, while a wire-taper also receives the transmitted signal. We assume that the signals are transmitted over additive white Gaussian noise channels. We characterize the secrecy capacity region of this channel. Our achievable coding scheme is based on superposition coding and the random binning. We refer to this scheme as secret superposition coding. The converse proof combines the converse proof for the conventional Gaussian broadcast channel and the perfect secrecy constraint. This capacity region matches the capacity region of the broadcast channel without security constraint. It also matches the secrecy capacity of the wire-tap channel. Based on the rate characterization of the secure Gaussian broadcast channel, we then use a multilevel coding approach for the slowly fading wire-tap. We assume that the transmitter only knows the eavesdropper's channel. In this approach, source node sends secure layered coding and the receiver viewed as a continuum ordered users. We derive optimum power allocation for the layers which maximizes the total average rate.
In this thesis, we consider a class of information protection problems requiring confidentiality (secrecy) from eavesdropping and integrity (reliability) from jamming in an information-theoretic context. For this purpose, we introduce the arbitrarily varying wire-tap channel (AVWTC) model consisting of a family of wiretap channels indexed by some state that is selected by the jammer in an arbitrary and time-varying manner. We study this model for traditional wiretap codes and randomized wiretap codes, and develop insights about the corresponding secrecy capacity and randomized-code secrecy capacity, respectively. We characterize a lower bound on the randomized-code secrecy capacity of the AVWTC that suggests the secrecy is mainly dictated by a worst-case scenario. Additionally, we establish two upper bounds on the randomized-code secrecy capacity that suggest a single bad ``averaged' state can preclude secure communication, while certain superiorities of the legitimate receiver over the eavesdropper in all ``averaged' states result in a positive secrecy capacity. Finally, we prove that the secrecy capacity of the AVWTC is either zero or equal to its randomized-code secrecy capacity. We show that a ``two-layer' wiretap code is appropriate for combatting the two non-colluding jamming and eavesdropping adversaries.