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arXiv:1801.01471

Potentiality, Actuality and Non-Separability in Quantum and Classical Physics: Res Potentiae in the Macroscopic World

Bishop, Robert R., Joseph E. Brenner

Published Dec 20, 2017• 7 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

To help resolve stubborn aporias in quantum mechanics, Kastner, Kauffman and Epperson have recently proposed a new interpretation of Heisenbergs ontological duality of res extensa and res potentia. In related work, Khrennikov and Aerts and their respective associates have explored the intermediate domain of mesoscopic phenomena in which quantum-like behavior can be observed and formalized. We generalize this work to define a third domain, one of macroscopic, interactive processes to which quantum concepts, but not quantum formalism apply. We show that they follow the non-standard logic proposed in the last century by the FrancoRomanian thinker Stephane Lupasco. This logical system, grounded in the ontological dualities in nature, describes the evolution of complex processes and emergence at macroscopic levels of reality as chains of interacting actualities and potentialities. Without going outside the laws of physics, some new approaches to the problems of life, cognition and information can be made. The most appropriate formalism for describing this logic is under current scrutiny.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1801.01471

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To help resolve stubborn aporias in quantum mechanics, Kastner, Kauffman and Epperson have recently proposed a new interpretation of Heisenbergs ontological duality of res extensa and res potentia. In related work, Khrennikov and Aerts and their respective associates have explored the intermediate domain of mesoscopic phenomena in which quantum-like behavior can be observed and formalized. We generalize this work to define a third domain, one of macroscopic, interactive processes to which quantum concepts, but not quantum formalism apply. We show that they follow the non-standard logic proposed in the last century by the FrancoRomanian thinker Stephane Lupasco. This logical system, grounded in the ontological dualities in nature, describes the evolution of complex processes and emergence at macroscopic levels of reality as chains of interacting actualities and potentialities. Without going outside the laws of physics, some new approaches to the problems of life, cognition and information can be made. The most appropriate formalism for describing this logic is under current scrutiny.
It is argued that quantum theory is best understood as requiring an ontological duality of res extensa and res potentia, where the latter is understood per Heisenberg's original proposal, and the former is roughly equivalent to Descartes' 'extended substance.' However, this is not a dualism of mutually exclusive substances in the classical Cartesian sense, and therefore does not inherit the infamous 'mind-body' problem. Rather, res potentia and res extensa are proposed as mutually implicative ontological extants that serve to explain the key conceptual challenges of quantum theory; in particular, nonlocality, entanglement, null measurements, and wave function collapse. It is shown that a natural account of these quantum perplexities emerges, along with a need to reassess our usual ontological commitments involving the nature of space and time.
I build upon Heisenberg’s proposal in 1958 that quantum states are ontologically real “potentia.” On this view reality consists in ontologically real Possibles and ontologically real Actuals. Then measurement converts Possibles to Actuals. This ontological hypothesis, explicit in Heisenberg’s proposal, suggests a natural place for “mind.” Mind converts Possibles to Actuals. This role for mind is a scientific hypothesis open to test. Modest evidence now supports the hypothesis. If very well confirmed, such results alter the foundations of quantum mechanics and afford a role of mind in the becoming of the universe. More, the ontological proposal is not a substance dualism, for potentia are not substances. Thus, this proposal for the role of mind does not seem to inherit many of the problems raised in a substance dualism such as Descartes’ Res cogitans and Res extensa, (Descartes), or in a substance neutral monism such as Russell, (Russell). The proposal is radical. Far more evidence is needed.
Quantum mechanics has maintained over the years the reputation of being "the most obscure theory." It works perfectly well, but nobody seems to know why. It has been argued that the difficulty in understanding quantum theory is our failed attempt to force onto it a wrong conceptual scheme, wanting at all costs to think about the objects of the theory as, precisely, objects, i.e., entities having continuously actual spatiotemporal properties. This too restrictive spatiotemporal scheme is most probably at the heart of the problem, as also underlined by the Einsteinian revolution, but then what could be an alternative? Many thinkers have suggested that we must surrender to the fact that our physical world is one of immanent powers and potencies. Aristotle did so ante quantum litteram, followed by scholars like Heisenberg, Primas, Shimony, Piron, Kastner, Kauffman, de Ronde, just to name a few, including the authors, who were both students of Piron in Geneva. However, if on the one hand a potentiality ontology puts the accent on the processes of change, responsible for the incessant shifts between actual and potential properties, on the other hand it does not tell what these changes are all about. In other words, the metaphysical question remains of identifying the nature of the bearer of these potencies, or potentialities, and of the entities that can actualize them. It is the purpose of the present article to emphasize that the above question has found a possible answer in the recent Conceptuality Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, which we believe offers the missing ontology and metaphysics that can make the theory fully intelligible, and even intuitive.
We elaborate on a new interpretation of quantum mechanics which we introduced recently.The main hypothesis of this new interpretation is that quantum particles are entities interacting with matter conceptually, which means that pieces of matter function as interfaces for the conceptual content carried by the quantum particles.We explain how our interpretation was inspired by our earlier analysis of non-locality as non-spatiality and a specific interpretation of quantum potentiality, which we illustrate by means of the example of two interconnected vessels of water.We show by means of this example that philosophical realism is not in contradiction with the recent findings with respect to Leggett's inequalities and their violations.We explain our recent work on using the quantum formalism to model human concepts and their combinations and how this has given rise to the foundational ideas of our new quantum interpretation.We analyze the equivalence of meaning in the realm of human concepts and coherence in the realm of quantum particles, and how the duality of abstract and concrete leads naturally to a Heisenberg uncertainty relation.We illustrate the role played by interference and entanglement and show how the new interpretation explains the problems related to identity and individuality in quantum mechanics.We put forward a possible scenario for the emergence of the reality of macroscopic objects.
Abstract Heisenberg was a very dedicated Kantian, and viewed the discoveries of early twentieth century physics as disqualifying of the Kantian metaphysical worldview. He made an effort – not an especially successful one – to reconfigure the Kantian critique by replacing noumena with the quantum-level reality, and proposed a new entity as mediative between the quantum realm and the subject. The new entity, potentia (borrowed from Aristotle, and altered to serve Heisenberg’s purpose) fulfills that role by means of its hybrid nature: it’s partly mental, partly a reification of probabilities. This dual nature allows epistemic access to the probabilistic nature of quantum-level interactions, out of which our phenomenal world is realized when a measurement is made. How well this notion serves the purpose of rehabilitating the Kantian critique is questionable, as Heisenberg’s conception is problematic and, perhaps, internally inconsistent. My dissertation follows Heisenberg’s development of potentia, examines how well it addresses the failure of the Kantian problem, and asks whether his proposal is an obscurum per obscurius. Thereafter I introduce a number of other, similar proposals to potentia, consider them on their own merits, compare them to Heisenberg’s conception, and use this conjunction of potentia proposals to made a judgment regarding whether the use of potentia is a philosophically defensible way of addressing the recondite problems of quantum mechanics.
On the assumptions of completeness, conceptual economy, and universality of quantum mechanics, and taking into account the developments linked to decoherence, one concludes that physical reality has only an epistemic nature. It is fundamental then to make a distinction between ontological reality, constituted by everything that does not depend at all on the collectivity of human beings, nor on their decisions or limitations, nor on their existence, and empirical reality, constituted by everything that not being ontological is, however, intersubjective. The fact that the direct presence of consciousness is not required to complete a quantum phenomenon implies that quantum phenomena are not mere “appearances to consciousness”. Empirical reality, as conceived in this paper, is not reducible to mere “appearances to consciousness”. Complementarity, that was proposed by Niels Bohr as a conceptual framework to answer the problems presented by the interpretation of quantum mechanics, is considered here as a way of talking about the empirical reality that goes beyond the simple description of experimental results, or better still, the observer’s perceptions of such results. It aims to describe not ontological reality, but empirical reality. It is proposed that the state vector represents, in general, infinite potentialities that are actualized when a quantum phenomenon is completed. Such potentialities, unlike the Aristotelian and the one suggested by Heisenberg, are epistemic and not ontological. The infinite potentialities of empirical reality are taken as an argument to claim that ontological reality is infinite, complementarity being the manner in which infinite ontological reality is manifested to the finite mind. The possibility that complementarity constitutes a general framework that can be applied to other areas of knowledge is based on an analysis of the relationship between theory and observation. Two possible examples of the use of complementarity in areas different from quantum mechanics are presented, one in thermodynamics and another in biology. Given that logic does not impose the mutual exclusion of two complementary concepts, there isn’t any inconsistency implied by complementarity from the point of view of classical or ordinary logic: one uses ordinary logic in each experimentally defined context. Consequently, there is no need for any new logic.