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arXiv:1712.04334

EPR-Bell realism as a part of logic

I. Schmelzer

Published Dec 9, 2017• 3 citations
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Abstract

We argue that for the proof of Bell's theorem no assumptions about realism or free will are necessary. The key formula \[E(AB|a,b) = \int A(a,b,λ)B(a,b,λ)ρ(λ) dλ\] follows from the logic of plausible reasoning (the objective Bayesian interpretation of probability theory) taken alone, without any further assumptions about realism. The space $Λ$, usually interpreted as some space of `hidden variables', can be constructed for an arbitrary `field of discourse' using Stone's theorem. The rejection of superdeterminism follows from logical independence -- the non-existence of information which suggest a dependence -- of the free decisions of the experimenters from everything else. To prove the Bell inequality it is, then, sufficient to reduce this to \[E(AB|a,b) = \int A(a,λ)B(b,λ)ρ(λ) dλ.\] This follows for space-like separated measurements from Einstein causality alone. So, the consequence of the violation of Bell's inequality is that Einstein causality has been empirically falsified, without any loopholes left. We consider and reject the idea of weakening the logic of plausible reasoning could be used to create a loophole. Finally, we discuss what can be used to replace Einstein causality. While weak (signal) Einstein causality holds, it follows either from a notion of strong causality or from human inability to prepare states which violate quantum uncertainty, which makes it uninteresting for fundamental considerations. A notion of strong causality has either unacceptable causal loops or requires a hidden preferred frame. Given that a hidden preferred frame is completely compatible with modern physics, it is argued that this choice is preferable.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1712.04334

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We argue that for the proof of Bell's theorem no assumptions about realism or free will are necessary. The key formula [E(AB|a,b) = \int A(a,b,λ)B(a,b,λ)ρ(λ) dλ] follows from the logic of plausible reasoning (the objective Bayesian interpretation of probability theory) taken alone, without any further assumptions about realism. The space ΛΛΛ, usually interpreted as some space of hidden variables', can be constructed for an arbitrary field of discourse' using Stone's theorem. The rejection of superdeterminism follows from logical independence -- the non-existence of information which suggest a dependence -- of the free decisions of the experimenters from everything else. To prove the Bell inequality it is, then, sufficient to reduce this to [E(AB|a,b) = \int A(a,λ)B(b,λ)ρ(λ) dλ.] This follows for space-like separated measurements from Einstein causality alone. So, the consequence of the violation of Bell's inequality is that Einstein causality has been empirically falsified, without any loopholes left. We consider and reject the idea of weakening the logic of plausible reasoning could be used to create a loophole. Finally, we discuss what can be used to replace Einstein causality. While weak (signal) Einstein causality holds, it follows either from a notion of strong causality or from human inability to prepare states which violate quantum uncertainty, which makes it uninteresting for fundamental considerations. A notion of strong causality has either unacceptable causal loops or requires a hidden preferred frame. Given that a hidden preferred frame is completely compatible with modern physics, it is argued that this choice is preferable.
Bell's theorem is 50 years old. Still there is a controversy about its implications. Much of it has its roots in confusion regarding the premises from which the theorem can be derived. Some claim that a derivation of Bell's inequalities requires just locality assumption, and nothing more. Violations of the inequalities are then interpreted as ``nonlocality'' or ``quantum nonlocality''. We show that such claims are unfounded and that every derivation of Bell's inequalities requires a premise -- in addition to locality and freedom of choice -- which is either assumed tacitly, or unconsciously, or is embedded in a single compound condition (like Bell's ``local causality''). The premise is equivalent to the assumption of existence of additional variables which do not appear in the quantum formalism (in form of determinism, or joint probability for outcomes of all conceivable measurements, or ``additional causes`'', or ``hidden variables'', ``complete description of the state'' or counterfactual definiteness, etc.). A certain irony is that perhaps the main message of violation of Bell's inequalities is that our notion of locality should be based on an operationally well-defined no-signalling condition, rather than on local causality.
Bell's theorem shows that the reasonable relativistic causal principle known as "local causality" is not compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. It is not possible maintain a satisfying causal principle of this type while dropping any of the better-known assumptions of Bell's theorem. However, another assumption of Bell's theorem is the use of classical logic. One part of this assumption is the principle of "ontic definiteness", that is, that it must in principle be possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions treated in the theory. Once the logical setting is clarified somewhat, it can be seen that rejecting this principle does not in any way undermine the type of causal principle used by Bell. Without ontic definiteness, the deterministic causal condition known as Einstein Locality succeeds in banning superluminal influence (including signalling) whilst allowing correlations that violate Bell's inequalities. Objections to altering logic, and the consequences for operational and realistic viewpoints, are also addressed.
This work offers a foundational, ontological re-examination of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox and the violation of Bell inequalities. It argues that the apparent "nonlocality" in quantum mechanics stems not from a physical mechanism of interaction, but from an inadequate ontological premise shared by classical reasoning and many interpretations of quantum theory. Core Thesis: The paradox arises from the implicit assumption that measurement outcomes in entangled systems represent independent, local facts that pre-exist or can be defined separately. The work rejects this premise. Instead, it proposes that entangled states describe indivisible ontological structures, where correlated outcomes are not separate entities to be coordinated, but inseparable aspects of a single whole. Key Conceptual Innovations: The JED Postulate (Ontological Simultaneity): The cornerstone of the framework. It posits a global constraint on the co-realization of facts: for an entangled state, individual outcomes cannot exist as autonomous facts. They can only be realized as elements of an admissible pair (e.g., {Alice+, Bob-} or {Alice-, Bob+}). This is not a temporal or causal constraint, but a structural condition for existence. Formalism of Frames and Admissibility Relations: The ontology is formalized using "frames" (sets of co-existing facts) and an "admissibility relation" R, which encodes the structure of an entangled state (e.g., for a singlet: R = {(+, -), (-, +)}). The JED postulate ensures that a frame containing one element of a related pair must contain its counterpart. The "Broken Mirror" Metaphor: A central heuristic. Entanglement is likened to a mirror broken into two complementary halves. The halves do not "communicate" to match; their perfect fit is a consequence of their common origin in a single act of breaking. Asking "which half appeared first?" or "how does one half know about the other?" is ontologically meaningless—there is no process that produces only one isolated half. Resolution of the EPR Paradox: The paradox dissolves because its first step—treating Alice's local outcome as an independent fact—is invalid within the JED ontology. There is no independent fact for locality to protect, hence no contradiction between correlations and relativistic locality. Interpretation of Bell's Theorem: The work reframes Bell's theorem. Its violation is not proof of nonlocality, but empirical evidence against the ontology of independent local facts. Bell's mathematics is correct, but its physical significance depends on ontological axioms that may not hold. The JED ontology provides a local, realistic (but not fact-local) framework consistent with the correlations. Distinction from Hidden Variables: The approach is explicitly not a hidden-variable theory. It introduces no hidden parameters λ governing individual outcomes. The relation R is a structural definition of the entangled whole, not a hidden cause of correlations. Probabilities are treated as a descriptive layer over the admissible ontological structures. Methodology: The work is developed in the spirit of the "pencil-case" methodology, constructing minimal ontological models to analyze the logical roots of physical puzzles without adding new dynamical mechanisms. Scope and Intent: The present work should be read as a contribution to the philosophy of physics: it does not aim at proposing a new physical theory, but at clarifying the ontological assumptions underlying existing formalisms. It seeks to shift the discussion from "how do the parts communicate?" to "what kind of whole do the parts constitute?" The formalism is shown to be logically consistent with the standard quantum correlation function (e.g., E(θ,φ) = -cos(θ-φ)), without deriving it, thereby separating the ontological question of admissibility from the empirical-statistical question of probability distribution. Keywords: EPR Paradox, Bell's Theorem
This article contains a review of Nelson's analysis of Bell's theorem. It shows that Bell's inequalities can be violated with a theory of local random variables if one accepts that the outcomes of these variables are not predetermined prior to measurement. The article describes the relation between Bell's theorem and the Strong Free Will theorem of Conway and Kochen. Then, the original articles of Bell are analyzed in detail. Following an article of Faris, it is explained that Bell's work on the hidden variable question in fact describes two separate theorems. Bell's first theorem says that there can be no model for the singlet state where an outcome does not depend locally on the settings of the detector where the outcome was measured. Bell's second theorem shows that Bell's inequalities can be violated by a theory that is either not deterministic, or violates causality in the sense of relativity or the free will assumption of the experimenters. It is shown in detail where Bell implicitly makes the various locality assumptions that Nelson has shown to be necessary for deriving Bell's inequality. The article closes by relating the various assumptions needed to derive Bell's theorem with the reality criterion of EPR
Bell’s [Physics 1 (1964) 195–200] theorem is popularly supposed to establish the nonlocality of quantum physics. Violation of Bell’s inequality in experiments such as that of Aspect, Dalibard and Roger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 49 (1982) 1804–1807] provides empirical proof of nonlocality in the real world. This paper reviews recent work on Bell’s theorem, linking it to issues in causality as understood by statisticians. The paper starts with a proof of a strong, finite sample, version of Bell’s inequality and thereby also of Bell’s theorem, which states that quantum theory is incompatible with the conjunction of three formerly uncontroversial physical principles, here referred to as locality, realism and freedom. Locality is the principle that the direction of causality matches the direction of time, and that causal influences need time to propagate spatially. Realism and freedom are directly connected to statistical thinking on causality: they relate to counterfactual reasoning, and to randomisation, respectively. Experimental loopholes in state-of-the-art Bell type experiments are related to statistical issues of post-selection in observational studies, and the missing at random assumption. They can be avoided by properly matching the statistical analysis to the actual experimental design, instead of by making untestable assumptions of independence between observed and unobserved variables. Methodological and statistical issues in the design of quantum Randi challenges (QRC) are discussed. The paper argues that Bell’s theorem (and its experimental confirmation) should lead us to relinquish not locality, but realism.
Local realism is now revitalized as a fully viable causal explanation of physical reality including empirical Bell violations according to detailed arguments provided at the link below. Meanwhile, by denying local realism in its account of EPR experiments, quantum theory requires a physical causal signal that is physically discontinuous, leaping out of spacetime from one locality and landing in another, like a fish leaping out of water. Quantum theory thus invokes a physical domain outside spacetime through which its causal signal is logically required to travel -- unobservable, unstoppable, and at infinite speed. It might be tempting to conclude that such domains and such signals are some sort of magic, except that would be exactly wrong. Even magic obeys local realism. A master magician, however, can provide a compelling illusion to the contrary. The causally complete local realistic model given by the article below argues compellingly that the antilocality claims of quantum physics reduce to such illusions. Please see main article: ** http://vixra.org/abs/1704.0078 ** Local Realism Explains Bell Violations (author Andrew P. Yake) - Claims to demonstrate that all empirical evidence taken to support quantum theory over local realism plausibly does the reverse. The article comprises 8 pages, 4 figures, 6 equations, 32 references, 1 graph of testable predictions, and 2 paragraphs that purport to expose how the Bell inequality misrepresents the local realistic predictions for the EPR experiment. Thoughtful feedback appreciated (apyake@gmail.com).