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arXiv:1712.01030 · Physical Review Research

No-go theorem for device-independent security in relativistic causal theories

Roberto Salazar, Michał Kamon, Karol Horodecki, Dardo Goyeneche, Debashis Saha, Ravishankar Ramanathan, Paweł Horodecki

Published Aug 13, 2021• 4 citations
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Abstract

A fundamental question in device-independent quantum cryptography is to determine the minimal physical principle upon which the security of such a cryptographic protocol (such as for key distribution or for randomness generation) may be based. Since the seminal work on device-independent quantum key distribution by J. Barrett, L. Hardy, and A. Kent [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 010503 (2005)], a conjectured candidate for certification of device-independent security has been the principle of relativistic causality, namely the disallowance of causal loops. While this principle has thus far been equated with the no-signaling constraints, it has been shown recently that in multiparty Bell scenarios, the no-signaling constraints are sufficient but not necessary for relativistic causality, and a refined set of constraints has been proposed that more precisely capture the notion of relativistic causality. In this paper, we build upon this finding to show that, in contrast to the no-signaling constraints, the constraints of relativistic causality are not sufficient for certification of device-independent security. More specifically, we show that there exist correlations allowed by the causality principle that allow an adversary to gain complete information about the measurement outcomes of honest parties in any device-independent cryptographic protocol, thereby rendering the protocol completely insecure. As a tool to develop this adversarial attack strategy, we fully characterize the set of correlations allowed by relativistic causality in the tripartite Bell scenario of three parties, each performing two binary measurements, that may be of independent interest. We also demonstrate the difference between the relativistic causal correlations and those allowed by the usual no-signaling constraints by presenting explicit communication tasks wherein the two sets exhibit striking difference in their respective winning probabilities.

DOI
10.1103/physrevresearch.3.033146

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A fundamental question in device-independent quantum cryptography is to determine the minimal physical principle upon which the security of such a cryptographic protocol (such as for key distribution or for randomness generation) may be based. Since the seminal work on device-independent quantum key distribution by J. Barrett, L. Hardy, and A. Kent [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 010503 (2005)], a conjectured candidate for certification of device-independent security has been the principle of relativistic causality, namely the disallowance of causal loops. While this principle has thus far been equated with the no-signaling constraints, it has been shown recently that in multiparty Bell scenarios, the no-signaling constraints are sufficient but not necessary for relativistic causality, and a refined set of constraints has been proposed that more precisely capture the notion of relativistic causality. In this paper, we build upon this finding to show that, in contrast to the no-signaling constraints, the constraints of relativistic causality are not sufficient for certification of device-independent security. More specifically, we show that there exist correlations allowed by the causality principle that allow an adversary to gain complete information about the measurement outcomes of honest parties in any device-independent cryptographic protocol, thereby rendering the protocol completely insecure. As a tool to develop this adversarial attack strategy, we fully characterize the set of correlations allowed by relativistic causality in the tripartite Bell scenario of three parties, each performing two binary measurements, that may be of independent interest. We also demonstrate the difference between the relativistic causal correlations and those allowed by the usual no-signaling constraints by presenting explicit communication tasks wherein the two sets exhibit striking difference in their respective winning probabilities.
The ubiquitous no-signaling constraints state that the probability distributions of outputs of any subset of parties in a Bell experiment are independent of remaining parties' inputs. These constraints are considered to form ultimate limits for physical correlations and led to the fields of post-quantum cryptography, randomness generation besides identifying information-theoretic principles underlying quantum theory. Here we show that while these constraints are sufficient, they are not necessary to enforce relativistic causality in multi-party correlations, i.e., the rule that correlations do not allow casual loops. Depending on the space-time coordinates of the measurement events, causality only imposes a subset of no-signaling conditions. We first consider the n-party Bell experiment (n > 2) and identify all configurations where subsets of the constraints suffice. Secondly, we examine the implications for device-independent cryptography against an eavesdropper constrained only by relativity, detailing among other effects explicit attacks on well-known randomness amplification and key distribution protocols.
The characterization of non-local correlations with respect to the causal order of events in spacetime is still an open question. We systematically investigate the polytope of relativistic causal boxes in the three-party Bell scenario and compute the complete set of extremal boxes in the (3,2,2) scenario with three parties each performing two binary measurements. We highlight the difference with the usual no-signaling polytope by computing the dimension of the RC polytope and contrasting the RC bounds for some well-known multi-player games. We show that no two-party Bell inequality obeys a monogamy relation when constrained only by causality as opposed to the no-signaling conditions. We identify multi-party Bell inequalities and measurement configurations where trade-off relations do exist, showing that device-independent cryptography against adversaries constrained only by relativistic causality is still not excluded.
Relativistic causality in certain spacetime configurations permits jamming - superluminal causal influences that nevertheless do not enable superluminal signaling. We fully characterize the correlations compatible with relativistic causality (RC) by extending the operator framework of PRL 104, 140404. When the underlying state is required to be quantum, we prove that any nontrivial jamming - whether state-independent or state-dependent - necessarily leads to hidden superluminal signaling. Thus, the only consistent possibilities are standard quantum correlations without jamming or the full relativistically causal correlation set, with intermediate jamming extensions of quantum correlations leading to signaling. As an application of our characterization, we investigate the security of device-independent (DI) cryptographic primitives against adversaries constrained only by relativistic causality. We construct explicit RC attacks that break DI bit commitment and DI secret sharing in jamming geometries, even when these protocols remain secure against no-signaling adversaries. Our results show that security against relativistic adversaries requires behaviors to be specified together with the spacetime locations of their measurement events; input-output statistics alone are insufficient.
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In this thesis, we study two approaches to achieve device-independent quantum key distribution: in the first approach, the adversary can distribute any system to the honest parties that cannot be used to communicate between the three of them, i.e., it must be non-signalling. In the second approach, we limit the adversary to strategies which can be implemented using quantum physics. For both approaches, we show how device-independent quantum key distribution can be achieved when imposing an additional condition. In the non-signalling case this additional requirement is that communication is impossible between all pairwise subsystems of the honest parties, while, in the quantum case, we demand that measurements on different subsystems must commute. We give a generic security proof for device-independent quantum key distribution in these cases and apply it to an existing quantum key distribution protocol, thus proving its security even in this setting. We also show that, without any additional such restriction there always exists a successful joint attack by a non-signalling adversary.
Quantum communication has demonstrated its usefulness for quantum cryptography far beyond quantum key distribution. One domain is two-party cryptography, whose goal is to allow two parties who may not trust each other to solve joint tasks. Another interesting application is position-based cryptography whose goal is to use the geographical location of an entity as its only identifying credential. Unfortunately, security of these protocols is not possible against an all powerful adversary. However, if we impose some realistic physical constraints on the adversary, there exist protocols for which security can be proven, but these so far relied on the knowledge of the quantum operations performed during the protocols. In this work we improve the device-independent security proofs of Kaniewski and Wehner [New J. Phys. 18, 055004 (2016)] for two-party cryptography (with memoryless devices) and we add a security proof for device-independent position verification (also memoryless devices) under different physical constraints on the adversary. We assess the quality of the devices by observing a Bell violation, and, as for Kaniewski and Wehner [New J. Phys. 18, 055004 (2016)], security can be attained for any violation of the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne inequality.