After a discussion of the Frauchiger-Renner argument that no 'single- world' interpretation of quantum mechanics can be self-consistent, I propose a 'Bohrian' alternative to many-worlds or QBism as the rational option.
Frauchiger and Renner have recently claimed to prove that “Single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent”. This is contradicted by a construction due to Bell, inspired by Bohmian mechanics, which shows that any quantum system can be modelled in such a way that there is only one “world” at any time, but the predictions of quantum theory are reproduced. This Bell–Bohmian theory is applied to the experiment proposed by Frauchiger and Renner, and their argument is critically examined. It is concluded that it is their version of “standard quantum theory”, incorporating state vector collapse upon measurement, that is not self-consistent.
This is an analysis of the recently published article `Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself' by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner~\cite{1}. Here I decipher the paradox and analyze it from the point of view of de Broglie-Bohm hidden variable theory (i.e., Bohmian mechanics). I also analyze the problem from the perspective obtained by the Copenhagen interpretation (i.e., the Bohrian interpretation) and show that both views are self consistent and do not lead to any contradiction with a `single-world' description of quantum theory.
A recent paper "Single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent" [arXiv:1604.07422] by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner has attracted a considerable interest of a broader physics audience and shortly elicited a number of replies. In spite of the objections that ensued, we find that significant part of the controversial initial claim has not been refuted - on the contrary, arguments presented both in the initial paper and in the replies seem to leave no longer room for the basic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. We revisit the controversy trying to pinpoint the exact phenomenon that lies in its core, pointing out to some aspects of the problem that seem to have been mostly overlooked. Taking all conclusions into account, we here propose novel ways to approach the ostensible paradox, in which the Copenhagen interpretation is naturally preserved. Whereas arguments presented in Frauchiger and Renner paper and the replies that followed revolve over whether Wigner's friend would perceive only one or both of the possible outcomes, we offer the third, pretty obvious solution - namely, that Wigner's friend, in the well known setup, would subjectively perceive {\it none} of the potentially conflicting outcomes. As a side note, we also argue that, contrary to the often stated beliefs, hypothetical real experimental realization of Wigner's friend thought experiment actually would not provide us with any new insight into the quantum mechanics.