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arXiv:1705.10595

(Quantum) Min-Entropy Resources

Christopher Portmann

Published May 30, 2017• 4 citations
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Abstract

We model (interactive) resources that provide Alice with a string $X$ and a guarantee that any Eve interacting with her interface of the resource obtains a (quantum) system $E$ such that the conditional (smooth) min-entropy of $X$ given $E$ is lower bounded by some $k$. This (abstract) resource specification encompasses any setting that results in the honest players holding such a string (or aborting). For example, it could be constructed from, e.g., noisy channels, quantum key distribution (QKD), or a violation of Bell inequalities, which all may be used to derive bounds on the min-entropy of $X$. As a first application, we use this min-entropy resource to modularize key distribution (KD) schemes by dividing them in two parts, which may be analyzed separately. In the first part, a KD protocol constructs a min-entropy resource given the (physical) resources available in the specific setting considered. In the second, it distills secret key from the min-entropy resource---i.e., it constructs a secret key resource. We prove security for a generic key distillation protocol that may use any min-entropy resource. Since the notion of resource construction is composable---security of a composed protocol follows from the security of its parts--- this reduces proving security of a KD protocol (e.g., QKD) to proving that it constructs a min-entropy resource. As a second application, we provide a composable security proof for the recent Fehr-Salvail protocol [EUROCRYPT 2017] that authenticates classical messages with a quantum message authentication code (Q-MAC), and recycles all the key upon successfully verifying the authenticity of the message. This protocol uses (and recycles) a non-uniform key, which we model as consuming and constructing a min-entropy resource.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1705.10595

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We model (interactive) resources that provide Alice with a string XXX and a guarantee that any Eve interacting with her interface of the resource obtains a (quantum) system EEE such that the conditional (smooth) min-entropy of XXX given EEE is lower bounded by some kkk. This (abstract) resource specification encompasses any setting that results in the honest players holding such a string (or aborting). For example, it could be constructed from, e.g., noisy channels, quantum key distribution (QKD), or a violation of Bell inequalities, which all may be used to derive bounds on the min-entropy of XXX. As a first application, we use this min-entropy resource to modularize key distribution (KD) schemes by dividing them in two parts, which may be analyzed separately. In the first part, a KD protocol constructs a min-entropy resource given the (physical) resources available in the specific setting considered. In the second, it distills secret key from the min-entropy resource---i.e., it constructs a secret key resource. We prove security for a generic key distillation protocol that may use any min-entropy resource. Since the notion of resource construction is composable---security of a composed protocol follows from the security of its parts--- this reduces proving security of a KD protocol (e.g., QKD) to proving that it constructs a min-entropy resource. As a second application, we provide a composable security proof for the recent Fehr-Salvail protocol [EUROCRYPT 2017] that authenticates classical messages with a quantum message authentication code (Q-MAC), and recycles all the key upon successfully verifying the authenticity of the message. This protocol uses (and recycles) a non-uniform key, which we model as consuming and constructing a min-entropy resource.
In quantum Shannon theory, various kinds of quantum entropies are used to characterize the capacities of noisy physical systems. Among them, min-entropy and its smooth version attract wide interest especially in the field of quantum cryptography as they can be used to bound the information obtained by an adversary. However, calculating the exact value or nontrivial bounds of min-entropy are extremely difficult because the composite system dimension may scale exponentially with the dimension of its subsystem. Here, we develop a one-shot lower bound calculation technique for the min-entropy of a classical-quantum state that is applicable to both finite and infinite dimensional reduced quantum states. Moreover, we show our technique is of practical interest in at least three situations. First, it offers an alternative tight finite-data analysis for the BB84 quantum key distribution scheme. Second, it gives the best finite-key bound known to date for a variant of device independent quantum key distribution protocol. Third, it provides a security proof for a novel source-independent continuous-variable quantum random number generation protocol. These results show the effectiveness and wide applicability of our approach.
Any key-generation session contains a finite number of quantum-state messages, and it is there-fore important to understand the fundamental restrictions imposed on the minimal length of a string required to obtain a secret key with a specified length. The entropy uncertainty relations for smooth min and max entropies considerably simplify and shorten the proof of security. A proof of security of quantum key distribution with phase-temporal encryption is presented. This protocol provides the maximum critical error compared to other protocols up to which secure key distribution is guaranteed. In addition, unlike other basic protocols (of the BB84 type), which are vulnerable with respect to an attack by “blinding” of avalanche photodetectors, this protocol is stable with respect to such an attack and guarantees key security.
We obtain estimates for Eve's forgery probability, namely the probability that she is able to forge a message which Alice or Bob mistakenly accept over a noisy Quantum channel for generating a shared Quantum secret key. This probability is related to Eve's success probability obtained in a previous work due to Renner and Wolf, which was obtained from assumptions on the min-entropy for characterizing asymmetric security. To demonstrate that protocols over noisy Quantum channels are dependent upon a single, unified security threshold in comparison to multiple security parameters in the Renner-Wolf interactive authentication protocol framework we upper bound Eve's forgery probability with a Holevo-type quantity that can be made negligibly small. By leveraging estimates for Eve's false acceptance probability that have previously been obtained by the author, we obtain the desired security threshold by bounding the false acceptance probability with a suitably chosen two-universal function which serves as a counterpart to two-universal hashing functions that have previously been examined for cryptographic protocols in Quantum key distribution. As a result the protocol is not only εεε-secure, for some ε>0ε>0ε>0, but also composable against forgery and key leakage.
Entropic uncertainty relations are underpinning to compute the quantitative security bound in quantum cryptographic applications, such as quantum random number generation (QRNG) and quantum key distribution (QKD). All security proofs derive a relation between the information accessible to the legitimate group and the maximum knowledge that an adversary may have gained, Eve, which exploits entropic uncertainty relations to lower bound Eve's uncertainty about the raw key generated by one party, Alice. The standard entropic uncertainty relations is to utilize the smooth min- and max-entropies to show these cryptographic applications' security by computing the overlap of two incompatible measurements or positive-operator valued measures (POVMs). This paper draws one case of the POVM-versioned standard entropic uncertainty relation yielding the trivial bound since the maximum overlap in POVMs always produces the trivial value, "one." So, it fails to tie the smooth min-entropy to show the security of the quantum cryptographic application.
LetX1,…,XnX_1, \ldots, X_nX1​,…,Xn​be a sequence ofnnnclassical random variables and consider a sampleXs1,…,XsrX_{s_1}, \ldots, X_{s_r}Xs1​​,…,Xsr​​ofr≤nr \leq nr≤npositions selected at random. Then, except with (exponentially inrrr) small probability, the min-entropyHmin⁡(Xs1⋯Xsr)H_{\min}(X_{s_1} \cdots X_{s_r})Hmin​(Xs1​​⋯Xsr​​)of the sample is not smaller than, roughly, a fractionrn{r\over n}nr​of the overall entropyHmin⁡(X1⋯Xn)H_{\min}(X_1 \cdots X_n)Hmin​(X1​⋯Xn​), which is optimal. Here, we show that this statement, originally proved in [S. Vadhan, LNCS 2729, Springer, 2003] for the purely classical case, is still true if the min-entropyHmin⁡H_{\min}Hmin​is measured relative to a quantum system. Because min-entropy quantifies the amount of randomness that can be extracted from a given random variable, our result can be used to prove the soundness of locally computable extractors in a context where side information might be quantum-mechanical. In particular, it implies that key agreement in the bounded-storage model—using a standard sample-and-hash protocol—is fully secure against quantum adversaries, thus solving a long-standing open problem.
A natural measure for the amount of quantum information that a physical system E holds about another system A = A1, .. . , Anis given by the min-entropy Hmin(A|E). In particular, the min-entropy measures the amount of entanglement between E and A, and is the relevant measure when analyzing a wide variety of problems ranging from randomness extraction in quantum cryptography, decoupling used in channel coding, to physical processes such as thermalization or the thermodynamic work cost (or gain) of erasing a quantum system. As such, it is a central question to determine the behavior of the minentropy after some process M. is applied to the system A. Here, we introduce a new generic tool relating the resulting min-entropy to the original one, and apply it to several settings of interest. A simple example of such a process is the one of sampling, where a subset S of the systems A1, ... , An is selected at random. Our tool allows us to quantify the entanglement that E has with the selected systems AS, i.e., Hmin(AS|ES) as a function of the original Hmin(A|E). We give two applications of this result. First, it directly provides the first local quantum-to-classical randomness extractors for use in quantum cryptography, as well as decoupling operations acting on only a small fraction AS of the input A. Moreover, it gives lower bounds on the dimension of k-out-of-n fully quantum random access encodings. Another natural example of such a process is a measurement in, e.g., BB84 bases commonly used in quantum cryptography. We establish the first entropic uncertainty relations with quantum side information that are nontrivial whenever E is not maximally entangled with A. As a consequence, we are able to prove optimality of quantum cryptographic schemes in the noisy-storage model. This model allows for the secure implementation of two-party cryptographic primitives under the assumption that the adversary cannot store quantum information perfectly. A special case is the bounded-quantum-storage model (BQSM), which assumes that the adversary's quantum memory device is noise free but limited in size. Ever since the inception of the BQSM, it has been a vexing open question to determine whether the security is possible as long as the adversary can only.