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arXiv:1704.02587

On the Incompatibility of Special Relativity and Quantum Mechanics

Marco Mamone Capria

Published Apr 9, 2017• 11 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Some of the strategies which have been put forward in order to deal with the inconsistency between quantum mechanics and special relativity are examined. The EPR correlations are discussed as a simple example of quantum mechanical macroscopic effects with spacelike separation from their causes. It is shown that they can be used to convey information, whose reliability can be estimated by means of Bayes' theorem. Some of the current reasons advanced to deny that quantum mechanics contradicts special relativity are refuted, and an historical perspective is provided on the issue.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1704.02587

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Some of the strategies which have been put forward in order to deal with the inconsistency between quantum mechanics and special relativity are examined. The EPR correlations are discussed as a simple example of quantum mechanical macroscopic effects with spacelike separation from their causes. It is shown that they can be used to convey information, whose reliability can be estimated by means of Bayes' theorem. Some of the current reasons advanced to deny that quantum mechanics contradicts special relativity are refuted, and an historical perspective is provided on the issue.
It has been debated whether quantum mechanics and special relativity are incompatible and whether there is a preferred Lorentz frame if they are incompatible. Bell's theorem is an important cornerstone, but it does not give us a definite positive answer due to the existence of supplementary assumptions or theoretical loopholes; there are unitary quantum theories which evade Bell's theorem and claim that they are compatible with special relativity. In this paper, I address the important issue of whether unitary quantum theories are compatible with special relativity. I propose a new Gedankenexperiment, a variant of the EPR-Bohm experiment with a superobserver who can undo a measurement. In this experiment, there is a stronger correlation (between the results of two spacelike separated measurements) than the correlation investigated in Bell's theorem. Based on an analysis of the correlations in different Lorentz frames, I prove that unitary single-world theories are incompatible with special relativity, and in order to avoid the incompatibility, there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame in these theories. Moreover, I argue that the incompatibility proof also applies to a proper version of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. This closes the major theoretical loopholes of Bell's theorem, including relationalism, retrocausality, and superdeterminism. Finally, I argue that the stronger correlation found in the Gedankenexperiment cannot be explained by retrocausal processes or even the common causes in the past, but only be explained by nonlocal processes or actions at a distance. This provides a test of unitary quantum theories, as well as a further support for the new incompatibility proof beyond Bell's theorem.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
This article presents a general discussion of several aspects of our present understanding of quantum mechanics. The emphasis is put on the very special correlations that this theory makes possible: They are forbidden by very general arguments based on realism and local causality. In fact, these correlations are completely impossible in any circumstance, except for very special situations designed by physicists especially to observe these purely quantum effects. Another general point that is emphasized is the necessity for the theory to predict the emergence of a single result in a single realization of an experiment. For this purpose, orthodox quantum mechanics introduces a special postulate: the reduction of the state vector, which comes in addition to the Schrödinger evolution postulate. Nevertheless, the presence in parallel of two evolution processes of the same object (the state vector) may be a potential source for conflicts; various attitudes that are possible to avoid this problem are discussed in this text. After a brief historical introduction, recalling how the very special status of the state vector has emerged in quantum mechanics, various conceptual difficulties are introduced and discussed. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) theorem is presented with the help of a botanical parable, in a way that emphasizes how deeply the EPR reasoning is rooted into what is often called “scientific method.” In another section the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger argument, the Hardy impossibilities, as well as the Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem are introduced in simple terms. The final two sections attempt to give a summary of the present situation: One section discusses nonlocality and entanglement as we see it presently, with brief mention of recent experiments; the last section contains a (nonexhaustive) list of various attitudes that are found among physicists, and that are helpful to alleviate the conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics.
As the previous chapter made clear, in the present interpretation quantum mechanics gives a rather specific account of EPR-type correlations and what underlies them. In the present chapter I argue that this account is genuinely explanatory (rather than merely an idle overlay on a simple description of the observed correlations), and that this constitutes a significant advantage of the present interpretation over certain rival interpretations, on which quantum mechanics is unable to offer an adequate explanation of the observed correlations. In order to make this argument it will prove necessary to examine the character of causal explanation in theoretical science, and in particular to develop a coherent metaphysics of a kind of holistic, nonseparable, causal explanation. I take the development of such a coherent metaphysics to constitute a significant task independent of the details of the present interpretation of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is a mine of metaphysical insights, and I hope here at least to have exposed a rich seam. The first task is to defend the adequacy of the present account of EPR-type correlations as at least a coherent description of what may underlie the observed correlations. I foresee three main challenges to its descriptive adequacy. The first is to claim that the account is incompatible with the relativistic requirement that there can be no direct causal connection between spacelike-separated events, and must therefore be rejected. A weaker version of this challenge is to claim that although the incompatibility just mentioned may not by itself entail rejection of the account, it does seriously undermine its claim to be genuinely explanatory.
In this paper we introduce the three main notions of probability used by physicists and discuss how these are to be used when invoking spacelike separated observers in a relativistic format. We discuss a standard EPRB experiment and concentrate upon problems of the interpretation of probabilities. We promote a particularly conservative interpretation of this experiment (which need not invoke an objective notion of collapse) where probabilities are, tentatively, passively Lorentz invariant. We also argue that the Heisenberg picture is preferable in relativistic situations due to a conflict between the Schrodinger picture and passive Lorentz transformations of probabilities. Throughout most of this paper we discuss the relative frequency interpretation of probability as this is most commonly used. We also introduce the logically necessary notion of `prior-frequency' in discussing whether the choice by an observer can have any causal effect upon the measurement results of another. We also critically examine the foundational use of relative frequency in no-signalling theorems. We argue that SQT and SR are probabilistically compatible, although we do not discuss whether they are compatible on the level of individual events.
We compare quantum mechanics as a theory involving probabilities to the framework of Kolmogorov's probability theory with emphasis on the connections of these theories to actual experiments. We find crucial differences in the way incompatible experiments are defined and treated in these two approaches and show that these differences are the origin for difficulties and apparent contradictions that are encountered when considering so called no-go proofs particularly that of John Bell. For example, Bell was convinced that in a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to determine the results of individual measurements, violations of Einstein-locality must occur. Based on our comparative study, we show that rather the opposite is true and that a precise space-time treatment based on relativity uncovers contradictions in the assumptions for Bell's no-go proof and resolves the difficulties.