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arXiv:1702.00923

An All-Or-Nothing Flavor to the Church-Turing Hypothesis

Stefan Wolf

Published Feb 3, 2017• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Landauer's principle claims that "Information is Physical." It is not surprising that its conceptual antithesis, Wheeler's "It from Bit," has been more popular among computer scientists --- in the form of the Church-Turing hypothesis: All natural processes can be computed by a universal Turing machine; physical laws then become descriptions of subsets of observable, as opposed to merely possible, computations. Switching back and forth between the two traditional styles of thought, motivated by quantum-physical Bell correlations and the doubts they raise about fundamental space-time causality, we look for an intrinsic, physical randomness notion and find one around the second law of thermodynamics. Bell correlations combined with complexity as randomness tell us that beyond-Turing computations are either physically impossible, or they can be carried out by "devices" as simple as individual photons.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1702.00923

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Landauer's principle claims that "Information is Physical." It is not surprising that its conceptual antithesis, Wheeler's "It from Bit," has been more popular among computer scientists --- in the form of the Church-Turing hypothesis: All natural processes can be computed by a universal Turing machine; physical laws then become descriptions of subsets of observable, as opposed to merely possible, computations. Switching back and forth between the two traditional styles of thought, motivated by quantum-physical Bell correlations and the doubts they raise about fundamental space-time causality, we look for an intrinsic, physical randomness notion and find one around the second law of thermodynamics. Bell correlations combined with complexity as randomness tell us that beyond-Turing computations are either physically impossible, or they can be carried out by "devices" as simple as individual photons.
Some of the philosophical questions raised by the theory of quantum computation are discussed. First it is considered whether the possibility of exponential speed-up in quantum computation provides an argument for a more substantive notion of quantum information than so far allowed. It is concluded that this is not so. Then some questions regarding the status of the Church-Turing hypothesis in the light of quantum computation are considered. In particular, Deutsch’s claim that a physical principle, the Turing Principle, underlies the Church-Turing hypothesis is rebutted. Finally, the question of whether the Church-Turing hypothesis might serve as a constraint on the laws of physics is briefly considered.
Abstract It is argued that underlying the Church–Turing hypothesis there is an implicit physical assertion. Here, this assertion is presented explicitly as a physical principle: ‘every finitely realizible physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means’. Classical physics and the universal Turing machine, because the former is continuous and the latter discrete, do not obey the principle, at least in the strong form above. A class of model computing machines that is the quantum generalization of the class of Turing machines is described, and it is shown that quantum theory and the 'universal quantum computer’ are compatible with the principle. Computing machines resembling the universal quantum computer could, in principle, be built and would have many remarkable properties not reproducible by any Turing machine. These do not include the computation of non-recursive functions, but they do include ‘quantum parallelism’, a method by which certain probabilistic tasks can be performed faster by a universal quantum computer than by any classical restriction of it. The intuitive explanation of these properties places an intolerable strain on all interpretations of quantum theory other than Everett’s. Some of the numerous connections between the quantum theory of computation and the rest of physics are explored. Quantum complexity theory allows a physically more reasonable definition of the ‘complexity’ or ‘knowledge’ in a physical system than does classical complexity theory.
In the search for a precise definition of the notion of effective calculability, Turing’s computability has proven to be more convincing than other definitions proposed almost simultaneously. Turing does not define a particular class of “calculable functions”, but which processes can be carried out in computing. His conceptual analysis brings about an intimate and inescapable link between computability and “measurability”, hence between mechanical procedures and physical processes. The full significance of this link is captured in Deutsch’s physical version of the Church-Turing thesis, namely, his claim that every physical system can be simulated by a universal quantum Turing machine. Quantum physics supports more efficient forms of computation, even though quantum computation remains within Turing’s limits. Why? This chapter explores how logical principles and physical processes coalesce into the notion of computation.
The physical laws of the universe dictate what can and what cannot be computed. The Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) is based on the assumption that the Turing machine is the ultimate computing device and according to the CTT something is computable only if it can be computed by a Turing machine. However, the CTT has not been proved and it can be definitely proved in a universe with specific properties. Whether our universe is such a universe is an open problem as it is an open problem whether the universe behaves like a machine. A broader approach that rejects the CTT and shows that the mechanistic universe and the CTT are incompatible is proposed and discussed thoroughly.
Church-Turing Thesis as saying something about the scope and limitations of physical computing machines. Although this was not the intention of Church or Turing, the Physical Church Turing thesis is interesting in its own right. Consider, for example, Wolfram’s formulation: One can expect in fact that universal computers are as powerful in their computational capabilities as any physically realizable system can be, that they can simulate any physical system...Nophysically implementable procedure could then shortcut a computationally irreducible process. (Wolfram 1985) Wolfram’s thesis consists of two parts: (a) Any physical system can be simulated (to any degree of approximation) by a universal Turing machine (b) Complexity bounds on Turing machine simulations have physical significance. For example, suppose that the computation of the minimum energy of some system of n particles takes at least exponentially (in n) many steps. Then the relaxation time of the actual physical system to its minimum energy state will also take exponential time. An even more extreme formulation of (more or less) the same thesis is due to Aharonov (1998): A probabilistic Turing machine can simulate any reasonable physical device in polynomial cost. She calls this The Modern Church Thesis. Aharonov refers here to probabilistic Turing machines that use random numbers in addition to the usual deterministic table of steps. It seems that such machines are capable to perform certain tasks faster than fully deterministic machines. The most famous randomized algorithm of that kind concerns the decision whether a given natural number is prime. A probabilistic algorithm that decides primality in a number of
It is possible in principle to construct quantum mechanical observables and unitary operators which, if implemented in physical systems as measurements and dynamical evolution, would contradict the Church-Turing thesis, which lies at the foundation of computer science. Elsewhere we have argued that the quantum measurement problem implies a finite, computational model of the measurement and evolution of quantum states. If correct, this approach helps to identify the key feature that can reconcile quantum mechanics with the Church-Turing thesis: finitude of the degree of fine-graining of Hilbert space. This suggests that the Church-Turing thesis constrains the physical universe and thereby highlights a surprising connection between purely logical and algorithmic considerations on the one hand and physical reality on the other.