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arXiv:1611.06999

An Efficient Quantum Algorithm for a Variant of the Closest Lattice-Vector Problem

Lior Eldar, Peter W. Shor

Published Nov 21, 2016• 10 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The Systematic Normal Form (SysNF) is a canonical form of lattices introduced in [Eldar,Shor '16], in which the basis entries satisfy a certain co-primality condition. Using a "smooth" analysis of lattices by SysNF lattices we design a quantum algorithm that can efficiently solve the following variant of the bounded-distance-decoding problem: given a lattice L, a vector v, and numbers b = λ_1(L)/n^{17}, a = λ_1(L)/n^{13} decide if v's distance from L is in the range [a/2, a] or at most b, where λ_1(L) is the length of L's shortest non-zero vector. Improving these parameters to a = b = λ_1(L)/\sqrt{n} would invalidate one of the security assumptions of the Learning-with-Errors (LWE) cryptosystem against quantum attacks.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1611.06999

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The Systematic Normal Form (SysNF) is a canonical form of lattices introduced in [Eldar,Shor '16], in which the basis entries satisfy a certain co-primality condition. Using a "smooth" analysis of lattices by SysNF lattices we design a quantum algorithm that can efficiently solve the following variant of the bounded-distance-decoding problem: given a lattice L, a vector v, and numbers b = λ_1(L)/n^{17}, a = λ_1(L)/n^{13} decide if v's distance from L is in the range [a/2, a] or at most b, where λ_1(L) is the length of L's shortest non-zero vector. Improving these parameters to a = b = λ_1(L)/\sqrt{n} would invalidate one of the security assumptions of the Learning-with-Errors (LWE) cryptosystem against quantum attacks.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant existential threat to current public-key cryptographic systems, most notably RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which rely on the presumed hardness of integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. Shor's algorithm, a quantum algorithm, can efficiently solve these problems, rendering classical asymmetric primitives insecure. This paper addresses the imperative need for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by exploring lattice-based constructs as robust alternatives for asymmetric primitives. We provide a comprehensive overview of the fundamental mathematical problems underlying lattice-based cryptography, such as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP), Closest Vector Problem (CVP), Learning With Errors (LWE), and Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE). The paper surveys prominent lattice-based schemes, including NTRU, CRYSTALS-Kyber, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, analyzing their security foundations, performance characteristics, and the extent to which they offer a viable "post-quantum RSA." We delve into the methodology of constructing these primitives, discuss their resilience against both classical and quantum attacks, and evaluate their practical implications for key sizes, computational efficiency, and deployment challenges. Our analysis highlights that lattice-based cryptography, particularly the NIST-standardized schemes, presents a strong candidate for securing digital communications in the quantum era, offering provable security rooted in worst-case to average-case reductions for lattice problems.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive overview of a recent debate over the quantum versus classical solvability of bounded distance decoding (BDD). Specifically, we review the work of Eldar and Hallgren [EH22], [Hal21] demonstrating a quantum algorithm solving λ12−Ω(klog⁡q)λ_1 2^{-Ω(\sqrt{k \log q})}λ1​2−Ω(klogq​)-BDD in polynomial time for lattices of periodicity qqq, finite group rank kkk, and shortest lattice vector length λ1λ_1λ1​. Subsequently, we prove the results of [DvW21a], [DvW21b] with far greater detail and elaboration than in the original work. Namely, we show that there exists a deterministic, classical algorithm achieving the same result.
We construct public-key cryptosystems that are secure assuming theworst-case hardness of approximating the minimum distance on n-dimensional lattices to within small Poly(n) factors. Prior cryptosystems with worst-case connections were based either on the shortest vector problem for a special class of lattices (Ajtai and Dwork, STOC 1997; Regev, J. ACM 2004), or on the conjectured hardness of lattice problems for quantum algorithms (Regev, STOC 2005). Our main technical innovation is a reduction from variants of the shortest vector problem to corresponding versions of the "learning with errors" (LWE) problem; previously, only a quantum reduction of this kind was known. As an additional contribution, we construct a natural chosen ciphertext-secure cryptosystem having a much simpler description and tighter underlying worst-case approximation factor than prior schemes.
The most important computational problem on lattices is the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). In this paper, we present new algorithms that improve the state-of-the-art for provable classical/quantum algorithms for SVP. We present the following results. 1) A new algorithm for SVP that provides a smooth tradeoff between time complexity and memory requirement. For any positive integer 4 ≤ q ≤ √n, our algorithm takes q^{13n+o(n)} time and requires poly(n)⋅ q^{16n/q²} memory. This tradeoff which ranges from enumeration (q = √n) to sieving (q constant), is a consequence of a new time-memory tradeoff for Discrete Gaussian sampling above the smoothing parameter. 2) A quantum algorithm that runs in time 2^{0.9533n+o(n)} and requires 2^{0.5n+o(n)} classical memory and poly(n) qubits. This improves over the previously fastest classical (which is also the fastest quantum) algorithm due to [Divesh Aggarwal et al., 2015] that has a time and space complexity 2^{n+o(n)}. 3) A classical algorithm for SVP that runs in time 2^{1.741n+o(n)} time and 2^{0.5n+o(n)} space. This improves over an algorithm of [Yanlin Chen et al., 2018] that has the same space complexity. The time complexity of our classical and quantum algorithms are expressed using a quantity related to the kissing number of a lattice. A known upper bound of this quantity is 2^{0.402n}, but in practice for most lattices, it can be much smaller and even 2^o(n). In that case, our classical algorithm runs in time 2^{1.292n} and our quantum algorithm runs in time 2^{0.750n}.
One attractive feature of lattice-based cryptosystems is the existence of security reductions relating the difficulty of breaking the cryptosystem to the difficulty of solving variants of the shortest vector problem (Regev, STOC 2005; Peikert, ePrint 2008). As there are no known polynomial-time algorithms which solve these lattice problems, this implies the asymptotic security of the cryptosystem. However, current lattice-based cryptosystems using the learning with errors (LWE) problem select parameters for which the reduction to the underlying lattice problem gives no meaningful assurance of concrete security. We analyze the runtime of the algorithm constructed in the reductions and select parameters for a cryptosystem under which the reductions give 128-bit security. While the resulting LWE-based cryptosystem is somewhat cumbersome, requiring a dimension of n = 1460, this is less than 2 times the dimension in the recently proposed Frodo cryptosystem (Bos et al., ACM CCS 2016), and could be implemented without catastrophic damage to communication times. We also investigate the runtime necessary for a reduction to give meaningful security assurances for current cryptosystems.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant existential threat to the security foundations of current public-key cryptography, most notably the widely adopted RSA algorithm. Shor's algorithm, specifically, can efficiently break the mathematical problems underlying RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, necessitating a paradigm shift towards quantum-resistant solutions. This paper explores lattice-based cryptography as the leading candidate for this post-quantum era. We delve into the fundamental mathematical principles of lattices, including hard problems like the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP), Closest Vector Problem (CVP), Short Integer Solution (SIS), and Learning With Errors (LWE), which form the bedrock of their security. The paper reviews prominent lattice-based schemes such as NTRU, CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and Falcon, highlighting their construction, security properties, and performance characteristics. We analyze their resilience against both classical and quantum attacks, discuss their progress in the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process, and evaluate their practical implications and implementation challenges. The discussion emphasizes the provable security, versatility, and efficiency of lattice-based methods, positioning them as the robust and essential successor to RSA for safeguarding digital communications and data in a quantum-enabled future.