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arXiv:1609.07721 · International Journal of Theoretical Physics

Testing Quantum Models of Conjunction Fallacy on the World Wide Web

Diederik Aerts, Jonito Aerts Arguëlles, Lester Beltran, Lyneth Beltran, Massimiliano Sassoli de Bianchi, Sandro Sozzo, Tomas Veloz

Published Jan 28, 2017• 17 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s10773-017-3288-8

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Human agents happen to judge that a conjunction of two terms is more probable than one of the terms, in contradiction with the rules of classical probabilities—this is the conjunction fallacy. One of the most discussed accounts of this fallacy is currently the quantum-like explanation, which relies on models exploiting the mathematics of quantum mechanics. The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical adequacy of major quantum-like models which represent beliefs with quantum states. We first argue that they can be tested in three different ways, in a question order effect configuration which is different from the traditional conjunction fallacy experiment. We then carry out our proposed experiment, with varied methodologies from experimental economics. The experimental results we get are at odds with the predictions of the quantum-like models. This strongly suggests that this quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy fails. Future possible research paths are discussed.
The conjunction fallacy refers to situations when a person judges a conjunction to be more likely than one of the individual conjuncts, which is a violation of a key property of classical probability theory. Recently, quantum probability (QP) theory has been proposed as a coherent account of these and many other findings on probability judgment "errors" that violate classical probability rules, including the conjunction fallacy. Tentori, Crupi, and Russo (2013) presented an alternative account of the conjunction fallacy based on the concept of inductive confirmation. They presented new empirical findings consistent with their account, and they also claimed that these results were inconsistent with the QP theory account. This comment proved that our QP model for the conjunction fallacy is completely consistent with the main empirical results from Tentori et al. (2013). Furthermore, we discuss experimental tests that can distinguish the 2 alternative accounts.
Social tagging systems are shown to evidence a well known cognitive heuristic, the guppy effect, which arises from the combination of different concepts. We present some empirical evidence of this effect, drawn from a popular social tagging Web service. The guppy effect is then described using a quantum inspired formalism that has been already successfully applied to model conjunction fallacy and probability judgement errors. Key to the formalism is the concept of interference, which is able to capture and quantify the strength of the guppy effect.