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arXiv:1608.00548

QBism, FAPP and the Quantum Omelette. (Or, Unscrambling Ontological Problems from Epistemological Solutions in QM)

Christian DE RONDE

Published Aug 1, 2016• 3 citations
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Abstract

In this paper we discuss the so called "quantum omelette" created by Bohr and Heisenberg through the mix of (ontic) objective accounts and (epistemic) subjective ones within the analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM). We will begin by addressing the difficult relation between ontology and epistemology within the history of both physics and philosophy. We will then argue that the present "quantum omelette" is being presently cooked in two opposite directions: the first scrambling ontological problems with epistemological solutions and the second scrambling epistemic approaches with ontological questions. A good example of the former is a new type of argumentation strategy attempting to justify the use of decoherence, namely, the "For All Practical Purposes" (shortly known as FAPP) type of justification. We will argue that 'FAPP-type solutions' remain, at best, epistemological answers which not only escape the ontological questions at stake -regarding the quantum to classical limit- but also turn the original problem completely meaningless. The latter omelette can be witnessed in relation to some criticisms raised against the epistemic Bayesian approach to QM (shortly known as QBism). We will argue that QBists have produced a consistent scheme that might allow us to begin to unscramble -at least part of- the "quantum omelette". In this respect, we will show why the epistemic QBist approach is safe from several (ontological) criticisms it has recently received (see [42, 47, 48]). We end our paper with a discussion about the importance of ontological approaches within foundations of QM.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1608.00548

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In this paper we discuss the so called "quantum omelette" created by Bohr and Heisenberg through the mix of (ontic) objective accounts and (epistemic) subjective ones within the analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM). We will begin by addressing the difficult relation between ontology and epistemology within the history of both physics and philosophy. We will then argue that the present "quantum omelette" is being presently cooked in two opposite directions: the first scrambling ontological problems with epistemological solutions and the second scrambling epistemic approaches with ontological questions. A good example of the former is a new type of argumentation strategy attempting to justify the use of decoherence, namely, the "For All Practical Purposes" (shortly known as FAPP) type of justification. We will argue that 'FAPP-type solutions' remain, at best, epistemological answers which not only escape the ontological questions at stake -regarding the quantum to classical limit- but also turn the original problem completely meaningless. The latter omelette can be witnessed in relation to some criticisms raised against the epistemic Bayesian approach to QM (shortly known as QBism). We will argue that QBists have produced a consistent scheme that might allow us to begin to unscramble -at least part of- the "quantum omelette". In this respect, we will show why the epistemic QBist approach is safe from several (ontological) criticisms it has recently received (see [42, 47, 48]). We end our paper with a discussion about the importance of ontological approaches within foundations of QM.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. In the first part we will argue that a general confusion within the literature comes from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. The first one is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality, introduced by Bohr, which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of quantum measurements. The second, is related to an ontic notion of contextuality, exposed through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem, which focuses on the constraints to discuss about actual (definite valued) properties within the orthodox formalism of QM. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The outcome of the observable A when mea- sured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A,B] = [A,C] = 0, and [B,C] ̸= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and ontic perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the relation between ‘classical contexts’ and QM. We will show that three accepted presuppositions found within the orthodox literature are, in general, false. Namely: (i) that quantum contextuality does not preclude an objective description of physical reality, (ii) that the choice of a context (or basis) restores a classical description of reality, and (iii) that the choice of a (classical) context is a necessary condition for accounting for empirical statements in QM.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an interpretation of which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of certain measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of is related to a purely formal understanding of as exposed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an omelette of contextuality which has been fully widespread through a popularized epistemic explanation of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observable A when measured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A, B] = [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] /= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes.
QBism is currently one of the most widely discussed 'subjective' interpretations of quantum mechanics. Its key move is to say that quantum probabilities are personalist Bayesian probabilities and that the quantum state represents subjective degrees of belief. Even probability-one predictions are considered subjective assignments expressing the agent's highest possible degree of certainty about what they will experience next. For most philosophers and physicists this means that QBism is simply too subjective. Even those who agree with QBism that the wave function should not be reified and that we should look for alternatives to standard Psi-ontic interpretations often argue that QBism must be abandoned because it detaches science from objectivity. The problem is that from the QBist perspective it is hard to see how objectivity could enter science. In this paper, I introduce and motivate an interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes QBism as a starting point, is consistent with all its virtues, but allows objectivity to enter from the get-go. This is the view that quantum probabilities should be understood as objective degrees of epistemic justification.
This note presents a concise and non-polemical comparison of several major interpretations of quantum mechanics, with a particular emphasis on the distinction between FAPP-solutions ("For All Practical Purposes'') versus ontological solutions to the measurement problem. Building on this distinction, we argue that the Contexts-Systems-Modalities (CSM) framework, supplemented by the operator-algebraic description of macroscopic contexts, provides a conceptually complete, non-FAPP ontology that naturally incorporates irreversibility and the physical structure of measurement devices. This approach differs significantly from other ontological interpretations such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse, or many-worlds, and highlights the major role of contextual quantization in shaping quantum theory.