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arXiv:1606.06849 · Foundations of Physics

Pitowsky’s Kolmogorovian Models and Super-determinism

Jakob Kellner

Published Nov 21, 2016• 3 citations
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Abstract

In an attempt to demonstrate that local hidden variables are mathematically possible, Pitowsky constructed "spin-[Formula: see text] functions" and later "Kolmogorovian models", which employs a nonstandard notion of probability. We describe Pitowsky's analysis and argue (with the benefit of hindsight) that his notion of hidden variables is in fact just super-determinism (and accordingly physically not relevant). Pitowsky's first construction uses the Continuum Hypothesis. Farah and Magidor took this as an indication that at some stage physics might give arguments for or against adopting specific new axioms of set theory. We would rather argue that it supports the opposing view, i.e., the widespread intuition "if you need a non-measurable function, it is physically irrelevant".

DOI
10.1007/s10701-016-0049-0

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In an attempt to demonstrate that local hidden variables are mathematically possible, Pitowsky constructed "spin-[Formula: see text] functions" and later "Kolmogorovian models", which employs a nonstandard notion of probability. We describe Pitowsky's analysis and argue (with the benefit of hindsight) that his notion of hidden variables is in fact just super-determinism (and accordingly physically not relevant). Pitowsky's first construction uses the Continuum Hypothesis. Farah and Magidor took this as an indication that at some stage physics might give arguments for or against adopting specific new axioms of set theory. We would rather argue that it supports the opposing view, i.e., the widespread intuition "if you need a non-measurable function, it is physically irrelevant".
In the debate whether ‘hidden variables’ could exist underneath quantum probabilities, the ‘no hidden-variables’ position is at present favored. In this article I attempt to provide a more equilibrated verdict, by pointing towards the heuristic and explanatory power of the hidden-variables hypothesis, in particular in its deterministic form. I argue that this hypothesis can answer three foundational questions, whereas the opposing thesis (‘no hidden variables’) remains entirely silent for them. These questions are: 1) How to interpret probabilistic correlation ? (a question considered by Kolmogorov “one of the most important problems in the philosophy of the natural sciences”, and first analysed by Reichenbach); 2) How to interpret the Central Limit Theorem ?; and 3) Are there degrees of freedom that could unify quantum field theories and general relativity, and if so, can we (at least qualitatively) specify them ? It appears that only the hidden-variables hypothesis can provide coherent answers to these problems; answers which can be mathematically justified in the deterministic case. This suggests that the hidden-variables hypothesis should be considered a legitimate candidate as a guiding, unifying principle in the foundations of physics.
A recent proposal for a superdeterministic account of quantum mechanics, named Invariant-set theory, appears to bring ideas from several diverse fields like chaos theory, number theory and dynamical systems to quantum foundations. However, a clear cut hidden-variable model has not been developed, which makes it difficult to assess the Proposal from a quantum foundational perspective. In this article, we first build a hidden-variable model based on the Proposal, and then critically analyse several aspects of the Proposal using the model. We show that several arguments related to counter-factual measurements, nonlocality, non-commutativity of quantum observables, measurement independence etcetera that appear to work in the Proposal fail when considered in our model. We further show that our model is not only superdeterministic but also nonlocal, with an ontic quantum state. We argue that the bit string defined in the model is a hidden variable and that it contains redundant information. Lastly, we apply the analysis developed in a previous work (Sen I, Valentini A, 2020 Proc. R. Soc. A , 476 , 20200214) to illustrate the issue of superdeterministic conspiracy in the model. Our results lend further support to the view that superdeterminism is unlikely to solve the puzzle posed by the Bell correlations.
We demonstrate that the contextual approach to Kolmogorov probability model gives the possibility to unify this conventional model of probability with the quantum (Hilbert space) probability model. In fact, the Kolmogorov model can exhibit all distinguishing features of the quantum probability model. In particular, by using the contextual (interference) formula of total probability one can construct complex amplitudes of Kolmogorov probabilities. There exists a natural Hilbert space structure on the space of those complex amplitudes. Classical (Kolmogorovian) random variables are represented by in general noncommutative operators in the Hilbert space of complex amplitudes. The existence of such a contextual representation of the Kolmogorovian model looks very surprising in the view of the orthodox quantum tradition. Supported by EU-network “Quantum Probability and Applications”.
The concept of 'super-indeterminism' captures the notion that the free choice assumption of orthodox quantum mechanics necessitates only the following requirement: an agent's free-choice performance in the selection of measurement settings must not represent an exception to the rule of irreducible quantum indeterminism in the physical universe (i.e, "universal indeterminism"). Any additional metaphysical speculation, such as to whether quantum indeterminism, i.e., intrinsic randomness, implicates the reality of experimenter "freedom", "free will", or "free choice", is redundant in relation to the predictive success of orthodox quantum mechanics. Accordingly, super-indeterminism views as redundant also, from a technical standpoint, whether an affirmative or a negative answer is claimed in reference to universal indeterminism as a necessary precondition for experimenter freedom. Super-indeterminism accounts, for example, for the circular reasoning which is implicit in the free will theorem by Conway and Kochen [1,2]. The concept of super-indeterminism is of great assistance in clarifying the often misunderstood meaning of the concept of "free variables" as used by John Bell [3]. The present work argues that Bell sought an operational, effective free will theorem , one based upon the notion of "determinism without predetermination", i.e., one wherein "free variables" represent universally uncomputable variables. In conclusion, the standard interpretation of quantum theory does not answer, and does not need to answer in order to ensure the predictive success of orthodox theory, the question of whether either incompatibilism or compatibilism is valid in relation to free-will metaphysics and to the free-will phenomenology of experimenter agents in quantum mechanics.
It is shown that a main source of conflict between Einstein and the mainstream quantum physicists was his insistence that wave functions, like classical probability distributions, do not refer to individual particles and, in particular, do not describe individual systems completely. The EPR paper was written to argue for this position. By aiming at showing that wave functions are unsuitable as local hidden variables, the authors failed to see that a slight extension could have ruled out such local hidden variables in general. As background for this analysis of the EPR argument the notion of steering is described, and a version of the Bell argument is proved which emphasizes non-local signalling aspects. Finally, some background is given concerning a well-known paper by the present author, which is celebrating 25 years this year, and in which the first non-steering models were constructed. This article is part of a special issue of Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical devoted to '50 years of Bell's theorem'.