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arXiv:1601.04892

TIME, CHANCE AND QUANTUM THEORY

ANTHONY SUDBERY

Published Jul 24, 2016• 4 citations
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Abstract

I propose an understanding of Everett and Wheeler's relative-state interpretation of quantum mechanics, which restores the feature of indeterminism to the theory. This incorporates a theory of probability as truth values in a many-valued logic for future statements, and a contextual theory of truth which gives objective and subjective perspectives equal validity.

DOI
10.1142/9789813146280_0014

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I propose an understanding of Everett and Wheeler's relative-state interpretation of quantum mechanics, which restores the feature of indeterminism to the theory. This incorporates a theory of probability as truth values in a many-valued logic for future statements, and a contextual theory of truth which gives objective and subjective perspectives equal validity.
I discuss the meaning of probability in the Everett‐Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics, together with the problem of defining histories. To resolve these, I propose an understanding of probability arising from a form of temporal logic: the probability of a future‐tense proposition is identified with its truth value in a many‐valued and context‐dependent logic. In short, probability is degree of truth. These ideas relate to traditional naive ideas of time and chance. Indeed, I argue that Everettian quantum mechanics is the only form of scientific theory that truly incorporates the perception that the future is open.
I discuss the problems of probability and the future in the Everett-Wheeler understanding of quantum theory. To resolve these, I propose an understanding of probability arising from a form of temporal logic: the probability of a future-tense proposition is identified with its truth value in a many-valued and context-dependent logic. I construct a lattice of tensed propositions, with truth values in the interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], and derive logical properties of the truth values given by the usual quantum-mechanical formula for the probability of histories.
I discuss the meaning of probability in the Everett‐Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics, together with the problem of defining histories. To resolve these, I propose an understanding of probability arising from a form of temporal logic: the probability of a future‐tense proposition is identified with its truth value in a many‐valued and context‐dependent logic. In short, probability is degree of truth. These ideas relate to traditional naive ideas of time and chance. Indeed, I argue that Everettian quantum mechanics is the only form of scientific theory that truly incorporates the perception that the future is open.
According to quantum mechanics, statements about the future made by sentient beings like us are, in general, neither true nor false; they must satisfy a many-valued logic. I propose that the truth value of such a statement should be identified with the probability that the event it describes will occur. After reviewing the history of related ideas in logic, I argue that it gives an understanding of probability which is particularly satisfactory for use in quantum mechanics. I construct a lattice of future-tense propositions, with truth values in the interval [0, 1], and derive logical properties of these truth values given by the usual quantum-mechanical formula for the probability of a history.
Probabilities may be subjective or objective; we are concerned with both kinds of probability, and the relationship between them. The fundamental theory of objective probability is quantum mechanics: it is argued that neither Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, nor the pilot-wave theory, nor stochastic state-reduction theories, give a satisfactory answer to the question of what objective probabilities are in quantum mechanics, or why they should satisfy the Born rule; nor do they give any reason why subjective probabilities should track objective ones. But it is shown that if probability only arises with decoherence, then they must be given by the Born rule. That further, on the Everett interpretation, we have a clear statement of what probabilities are, in terms of purely categorical physical properties; and finally, along lines laid out by Deutsch and Wallace, that there is a clear basis in the axioms of decision theory as to why subjective probabilities should track these objective ones. These results hinge critically on the absence of hidden-variables or any other mechanism (such as state-reduction) from the physical interpretation of the theory. The account of probability has traditionally been considered the principal weakness of the Everett interpretation; on the contrary it emerges as one of its principal strengths.
Current literature presents about a dozen probability (P) interpretations: frequentist, Bayesian etc. Each one illustrates a partial aspect of indeterminism and turns out to be incompatible with the others on the logical plane. Basically, every model of P deals with a specific relation of P with the world and this fragmentary theorization inevitably has negative impact on quantum physics which is intrinsically indeterministic. Popper believed that the base issues of quantum mechanics cannot be untangled unless the unified probability theory is set up. So, we have conducted an attempt to integrate all the probability models and used the theoretical results to interpret quantum duality, wave collapse and measurement. The entire work, published in a recent book, exceeds the limits of this paper. Here we put forward a summary that concisely recalls the main definitions and five theorems out fifteen that have been proved. Finally, these theoretical tools will be used to discuss a thought experiment of Einstein and the Wheeler experiment. This proposal has the following features: (1) It addresses classical and quantum issues using the same theorems; (2) It develops a quantum interpretation that agrees with intuition and refutes disputable and bizarre views.