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arXiv:1601.00993 · IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics

Testing Random-Detector-Efficiency Countermeasure in a Commercial System Reveals a Breakable Unrealistic Assumption

Anqi Huang, Shihan Sajeed, Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Mathilde Soucarros, Matthieu Legre, Vadim Makarov

Published Sep 19, 2016• 83 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However, certain countermeasures are not as robust as would be expected. In this paper, we present a concrete example of ID Quantique's random-detector-efficiency countermeasure against detector blinding attacks. As a third-party tester, we have found that the first industrial implementation of this countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack, but not immune to a modified blinding attack. Then, we implement and test a later full version of this countermeasure containing a security proof [C. C. W. Lim et al., IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, 21, 6601305 (2015)]. We find that it is still vulnerable against the modified blinding attack, because an assumption about hardware characteristics on which the proof relies fails in practice.

DOI
10.1109/jqe.2016.2611443

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In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However, certain countermeasures are not as robust as would be expected. In this paper, we present a concrete example of ID Quantique's random-detector-efficiency countermeasure against detector blinding attacks. As a third-party tester, we have found that the first industrial implementation of this countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack, but not immune to a modified blinding attack. Then, we implement and test a later full version of this countermeasure containing a security proof [C. C. W. Lim et al., IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, 21, 6601305 (2015)]. We find that it is still vulnerable against the modified blinding attack, because an assumption about hardware characteristics on which the proof relies fails in practice.
In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating region whereby only certain target detectors are sensitive to detections. Crucially, the adversary can use this loophole to learn everything about the secret key without introducing any error to the quantum channel. In this paper, as a step toward overcoming detector blinding attacks, we focus on an experimentally convenient countermeasure, where the efficiency of the detectors is randomly varied.
In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector control attacks have been successfully launched on several QKD systems, and attracted widespread concerns. Here, we propose a robust countermeasure against these attacks just by introducing a variable attenuator in front of the detector. This countermeasure is not only effective against the attacks with blinding light, but also robust against the attacks without blinding light which are more concealed and threatening. Different from previous technical improvements, the single photon detector in our countermeasure model is treated as a blackbox, and the eavesdropper can be detected by statistics of the detection and error rates of the QKD system. Besides theoretical proof, the countermeasure is also supported by an experimental demonstration. Our countermeasure is general in sense that it is independent of the technical details of the detector, and can be easily applied to the existing QKD systems.
The physical imperfections of quantum key distribution systems compromise their information-theoretic security. By exploiting the imperfections on the detection unit, an eavesdropper can launch various detector-control attacks to steal the secret key. Recently, in Optica 6 , 1178 ( 2019 ) OPTIC8 2334-2536 10.1364/OPTICA.6.001178 entitled “Robust countermeasure against detector control attack in a practical quantum key distribution system,” Qian et al. proposed a countermeasure using variable attenuators in the detection unit that was claimed to be effective against detector-control attacks with or without blinding light. We comment on this paper, disputing this countermeasure by showing that their assumptions for proving this effectiveness are unrealistic.
We developed a countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with a background-noise-cancellation scheme in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Background-noise cancellation includes self-differencing and balanced avalanche photon diode (APD) schemes and is considered a promising solution for low-noise APDs, which are critical components in high-performance QKD systems. However, its vulnerability to blinding attacks has been recently reported. In this work, we propose a countermeasure that prevents this potential security loophole from being used in detector blinding attacks. An experimental QKD setup is implemented and various tests are conducted to verify the feasibility and performance of the proposed method. The obtained measurement results show that the proposed scheme successfully detects occurring blinding-attack-based hacking attempts.
Quantum technologies are driving more and more interest both in academia and industry thanks to their promising performances in terms of security. In reality, practical systems suffer from imperfections compared to theoretical models which could be exploited by an eavesdropper if no protection is implemented. Bridging the gap between theory and practice is therefore one of the main challenges of this field today. During this thesis, I worked on different aspects of the practical security of quantum technologies. This ranges from the modeling of the entropy source of a quantum random number generator (QNRG) to the study of the vulnerabilities of quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations against hacking. In the first part, I focus on the modeling of a commercial QRNG chip from ID Quantique. More specifically, I present the model we developed for the quantum entropy source of the device. We estimate that this fully integrated device can provide a quantum min-entropy of 0.98 per bit. Importantly, this near-unity quantum entropy is achievable without post-processing reducing the power consumption of the chip, making it suitable for mobile devices. Moreover, we show that this high-quality entropy is robust against imperfections. On the side of QKD security, I begin by studying the behavior of negative-feedback avalanche diode (NFAD) detectors under a blinding attack. After showing their vulnerability to this attack and testing the resilience of a countermeasure based on the monitoring of the mean photocurrent, I present an improved countermeasure. This allows Bob to detect more advanced blinding strategies where Eve modulates her blinding power to reduce her impact on the mean photocurrent. In the last part of this thesis, I present a novel method to prevent the blinding attack based on statistical measurements with a multi-pixel detector. Through this approach, we can estimate an upper bound on Eve's information on the key exchanged. An analysis of the finite-key effects estimates that this countermeasure can be effective for distances up to 250km. The applicability of this countermeasure with current technology is shown with a 2-pixel superconducting detector.
In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns and has been addressed both by technical means as well as advanced protocols. In this work, we present a countermeasure against such attacks based on self-testing of detectors to confirm their intended operation without relying on specific aspects of their inner working and to reveal any manipulation attempts. We experimentally demonstrate this countermeasure with a typical InGaAs avalanche photodetector, but the scheme can be easily implemented with any single photon detector.