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arXiv:1510.05836 · IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology

Quantum Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis

Marc Kaplan, Gaëtan Leurent, Anthony Leverrier, María Naya‐Plasencia

Published Dec 1, 2016• 56 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum computers, that may become available one day, would impact many scientific fields, most notably cryptography since many asymmetric primitives are insecure against an adversary with quantum capabilities. Cryptographers are already anticipating this threat by proposing and studying a number of potentially quantum-safe alternatives for those primitives. On the other hand, symmetric primitives seem less vulnerable against quantum computing: the main known applicable result is Grover’s algorithm that gives a quadratic speed-up for exhaustive search. In this work, we examine more closely the security of symmetric ciphers against quantum attacks. Since our trust in symmetric ciphers relies mostly on their ability to resist cryptanalysis techniques, we investigate quantum cryptanalysis techniques. More specifically, we consider quantum versions of differential and linear cryptanalysis. We show that it is usually possible to use quantum computations to obtain a quadratic speed-up for these attack techniques, but the situation must be nuanced: we don’t get a quadratic speed-up for all variants of the attacks. This allows us to demonstrate the following non-intuitive result: the best attack in the classical world does not necessarily lead to the best quantum one. We give some examples of application on ciphers LAC and KLEIN. We also discuss the important difference between an adversary that can only perform quantum computations, and an adversary that can also make quantum queries to a keyed primitive.

DOI
10.46586/tosc.v2016.i1.71-94

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Quantum computers, that may become available one day, would impact many scientific fields, most notably cryptography since many asymmetric primitives are insecure against an adversary with quantum capabilities. Cryptographers are already anticipating this threat by proposing and studying a number of potentially quantum-safe alternatives for those primitives. On the other hand, symmetric primitives seem less vulnerable against quantum computing: the main known applicable result is Grover’s algorithm that gives a quadratic speed-up for exhaustive search. In this work, we examine more closely the security of symmetric ciphers against quantum attacks. Since our trust in symmetric ciphers relies mostly on their ability to resist cryptanalysis techniques, we investigate quantum cryptanalysis techniques. More specifically, we consider quantum versions of differential and linear cryptanalysis. We show that it is usually possible to use quantum computations to obtain a quadratic speed-up for these attack techniques, but the situation must be nuanced: we don’t get a quadratic speed-up for all variants of the attacks. This allows us to demonstrate the following non-intuitive result: the best attack in the classical world does not necessarily lead to the best quantum one. We give some examples of application on ciphers LAC and KLEIN. We also discuss the important difference between an adversary that can only perform quantum computations, and an adversary that can also make quantum queries to a keyed primitive.
Quantum computers, that may become available one day, would impact many scientific fields, most notably cryptography since many asymmetric primitives are insecure against an adversary with quantum capabilities. Cryptographers are already anticipating this threat by proposing and studying a number of potentially quantum-safe alternatives for those primitives. On the other hand, symmetric primitives seem less vulnerable against quantum computing: the main known applicable result is Grover's algorithm that gives a quadratic speed-up for exhaustive search. In this work, we examine more closely the security of symmetric ciphers against quantum attacks. Since our trust in symmetric ciphers relies mostly on their ability to resist cryptanalysis techniques, we investigate quantum cryptanalysis techniques. More specifically, we consider quantum versions of differential and linear cryptanalysis. We show that it is usually possible to use quantum computations to obtain a quadratic speed-up for these attack techniques, but the situation must be nuanced: we don't get a quadratic speed-up for all variants of the attacks. This allows us to demonstrate the following non-intuitive result: the best attack in the classical world does not necessarily lead to the best quantum one. We give some examples of application on ciphers LAC and KLEIN. We also discuss the important difference between an adversary that can only perform quantum computations, and an adversary that can also make quantum queries to a keyed primitive.
The security of a significant proportion of cryptography in use today depends directly or indirectly on the presumed difficulty of either factoring or extracting discrete logarithms in polynomial time on quantum computers. This paper discusses a quantum version of differential cryptanalysis which propounds quadratic speedup over the existing classical one. Linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis are general form cryptanalysis which is primarily applicable to block cipher, but also to stream ciphers and cryptographic hash functions. Linear cryptanalysis is a known-plaintext attack, in which attacker studies probabilistic linear relations known as linear approximations between some bits of plaintext, some bits of cipher text and some bits of cipher key. And in differential cryptanalysis the role of attacker is to analyze how differences in input information can affect the resulting difference at the output. Differential Cryptanalysis is a chosen-plaintext attack. However, differential cryptanalysis is more compelling so in this paper we are proposing a quantum version of the same. The computational complexity of classical differential cryptanalysis reaches O(NK). But by applying variations of Grover's search that is either full or partial Quantum Search the number of queries required to find the cipher key will be reduced.
The general context Cryptography is a computer discipline that aims to protect messages through encryption systems. In symmetric cryptography, a secret parameter, called a key, is used both to encrypt and to decrypt messages. The security provided by a symmetric encryption system is evaluated using cryptanalysis techniques which aim, for example, to find the secret key. Quantum computer arrival could impact the cryptographic field. Indeed, in 1994, Shor exhibited that quantum computers could be used to improve assymetric cryptanalysis [17]. With the recent breakthrough in quantum computer, the security of cryptographic primitives against quantum adversary can not be taken as guaranteed. The NIST launched a competition for new primitives that are safe even against adversaries that has access to a quantum computer. To estimate the quantum security of a cryptographic scheme, it is necessary to perform its quantum cryptanalysis. Quantum cryptanalysis techniques sometimes are quantum adaptation of classical cryptanalysis techniques. This transformation is called quantizing. Let's note that an attack is valid if and only if it is more efficient than the naive attack. In the classical setting, the naive attack is the generic exhaustive search, in the quantum setting, it is the Grover search algorithm [14].
Motivated by Shor’s algorithm and its attractive features, the milestone results in quantum cryptanalysis were the discovery of quantum differential and linear cryptanalysis. In quantum cryptanalysis, quantum distinguishers imitate the classical setting. Details differ; however, as the distinguisher in the quantum setting can take maximum coset superposition of all possible subsets of plaintext pairs. Using quantum measurements, the winning gap of the game is exploited so that a distinguisher can still guess the secret key perfectly with a constant probability. Symmetric primitives also suffer reduced ideal security in the quantum world, but this security reduction is less drastic than for most asymmetric primitives. Stream ciphers, block ciphers, and cryptographic hash functions are primitives that are believed to resist quantum attacks. Analogs to Shor’s algorithm may say how hard it is to build a quantum computer, but devising quantum algorithms to outperform the best classical attacks for widely-used cryptographic primitives is probably outside the reach of current even if exponentially growing noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) computers.
Traditional cryptography is suffering a huge threat from the development of quantum computing. While many currently used public-key cryptosystems would be broken by Shor's algorithm, the effect of quantum computing on symmetric ones is still unclear. The security of symmetric ciphers relies heavily on the development of cryptanalytic tools. Thus, in order to accurately evaluate the security of symmetric primitives in the post-quantum world, it is significant to improve classical cryptanalytic methods using quantum algorithms. In this paper, we focus on two variants of differential cryptanalysis: truncated differential cryptanalysis and impossible differential cryptanalysis. Based on the fact that Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm can be used to find the linear structures of Boolean functions, we propose two quantum algorithms that can be used to find high-probability truncated differentials and impossible differentials of block ciphers, respectively. We rigorously prove the validity of the algorithms and analyze their complexity. Our algorithms treat all rounds of the reduced cipher as a whole and only concerns the input and output differences at its both ends, instead of specific differential characteristics. Therefore, to a certain extent, they alleviate the weakness of conventional differential cryptanalysis, namely the difficulties in finding differential characteristics as the number of rounds increases.
The security of symmetric cryptography is completely based on cryptanalysis: we only gain confidence in the security of a symmetric primitive through extensive and continuous scrutiny. It is therefore not possible to determine whether a symmetric primitive might be secure or not in a post-quantum world without first understanding how a quantum adversary could attack it. In this talk I will provide an overview of the subject and present some recent results on symmetric quantum cryptanalysis: a new efficient quantum collision search algorithm (joint work with A. Chailloux and A. Schrottenloher) and an extensive analysis of the use of modular additions on symmetric primitives (joint work with X. Bonnetain). We will discuss some implications of these results in quantum-safe symmetric cryptography.