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arXiv:1510.03843

Dirac canonical idea as an alternative to the approach of Bohr. A toy model

Artur Szczepański

Published Oct 13, 2015• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Classical objects have been excluded as subjects of the observed quantum properties, and the related problem of quantum objects nature has been suspended since the early days of Quantum Theory. Recent experiments show that the problem could be reasonably revisited. The outlined model indicates new issues, which could result from following and exploring the canonical idea of Dirac. Topological defects in solids are considered as an example. The aim is helping to grasp the underlying pre-theoretical new intuitions, which should replace the old ones attached to the background of classical physics.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1510.03843

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Complementarity and Deconstruction: Plotnitsky's Analysis and Beyond Makoto Katsumori Akita University The philosophical thought of the modern physicist Niels Bohr (1885–1962), which revolves around the concept of complementarity, has long been a major subject of historical and philosophical inquiry. Many prior studies of Bohr's complementarity, however, seem to be limited by the fact that they largely proceed within the conceptual frames of the "mainstream" philosophy of science. This being the case, his radical questioning of traditional scientific and philosophical notions—such as the unambiguity of concepts and words—has not been adequately addressed, insofar as these notions are uncritically presupposed by the commentators themselves. In other words, Bohr's thought has often been interpreted under certain tacit premises of scientific rationality that are precisely of the kind targeted by his epistemological critique. In recent years, however, there have emerged new approaches to Bohr's idea of complementarity that place it in different, less conventional, philosophical contexts. Among the most notable of these is Arkady Plotnitsky's endeavor to connect Bohr's complementarity with Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. In the present article, based on my recent doctoral dissertation,1 I take up this contribution by Plotnitsky as a suitable point of reference from which to [End Page 435] explore anew Bohr's thought with its radical philosophical implications. After outlining Bohr's complementarity argument and Plotnitsky's reading thereof (in the first and second sections, respectively), I will examine a series of problems that seem to face, or to be left unsolved by, Plotnitsky's account (in the third section). This critical appraisal will finally lead me to sketch a new interpretive approach of my own (in the fourth section), which both extends and delimits the intersections between complementarity and deconstruction. As regards the historical development of Bohr's complementarity, I will largely restrict myself to the period between 1927 and 1950, in which the most crucial of his innovative ideas seem to have been presented. I. Bohr's Idea of Complementarity In his 1927 lecture delivered in Como, Italy, entitled "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," Niels Bohr introduced the concept and framework of complementarity as a pivotal idea in his interpretation of quantum theory. From then on, he continually developed the idea of complementarity with regard not only to quantum theory but to other fields of knowledge as well. In what follows, I will first outline his complementarity argument in its "early" period, stretching from 1927 to the mid-thirties,—or, more precisely, until just before his 1935 debate with EPR.2 Bohr starts by noting that "our usual description of physical phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be observed without disturbing them appreciably."3 This notion of physical phenomena as undisturbed by observation underlies all of classical physics and is still maintained in the theory of relativity. However, Bohr continues, a new situation has arisen with the development of quantum theory, specifically with "the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories"; this "individuality" implies that "any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the [End Page 436] agency of observation not to be neglected" (PWNB, 1: 53–54.). In more specific terms, any observation aimed at space-time coordination brings about an exchange of momentum and energy with the measuring rods and clocks. It is crucial here that this interaction between the object and the instrument of observation is not simply unavoidable, but "uncontrollable," which represents a "feature of irrationality" brought into the description of nature (PWNB, 1: 68, 91). For insofar as the measuring instruments are to fulfill their purpose, the interaction itself cannot be taken into account, and thus the magnitude of the disturbance always remains unknown. It follows, in Bohr's view, that "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation...

Configurations•Sep 1, 2004•0 citations
Classical objects have been excluded as subjects of the observed quantum properties, and the related problem of quantum objects nature has been suspended since the early days of Quantum Theory. Recent experiments show that the problem could be reasonably revisited. The outlined model indicates new issues, which could result from following and exploring the canonical idea of Dirac. Topological defects in solids are considered as an example. The aim is helping to grasp the underlying pre-theoretical new intuitions, which should replace the old ones attached to the background of classical physics.
The relationship between physical notions and the structures expressing them is an issue of primary importance the history and philosophy of pre-modern natural philosophy and of modern science. Historical evidence suggests that, when investigating the relationship between physics and mathematics, one should pay attention to the material, sensually perceivable forms mediating it: spoken or written words, drawings, artefacts, descriptions of experimental set-ups or, as the case discussed the present paper, symbolic notation. The reason for this is that, historically, physical notions and their expressions have very often been developed as one, and only distinguished from each other at a later stage. This was for example the case with what we today regard as mathematical and classical mechanics, which were developed the course of the eighteenth century as the discipline of the analysis of motion. When considered from a later point of view, both the physical notions and the concepts involved historical developments appear as being in flux, vague, and, as far as the side is concerned, non-rigorous. In such cases, verbal description, mechanical artefacts or symbols do not simply mediate between physical notions and structures, as might be the case at a later stage, but represent both of them one, allowing the historical actors to construct and manipulate physical-mathematical meaning by following, at times, their physical reasoning and, at times, their criteria of rigour. The history of quantum mechanics offers many examples of how new physics and new mathematics can emerge as one, with symbolic notation playing a central role shaping both. Among the many creators of quantum theory, Paul Dirac was particularly sensitive to questions of notation:
Abstract 1. In the general synthesis of classical dynamics with the quantum theory, the Uncertainty Principle plays a most useful part. It is of course only one aspect of the new mechanics, but it is a very helpful one since by its means it becomes easy to see where the old classical ideas broke down. The state of affairs in the quantum theory is not unlike that of the early days of relativity, when most of those who studied the subject felt the need of supporting the formal theory by seeing how the old ideas failed in specific cases. Here the formal theory is very abstract and is not easy to follow intuitively, and the Uncertainty Principle plays much the same rôle as did the examples of clocks and rods in relativity theory. For this reason it is more appropriate for illustrative examples, than for any extreme generality, and though a number of examples have been already given by Heisenberg and Bohr, it may not be amiss to have some more. There are probably some who will have shared my experience that it is often by no means easy to detect how the uncertainty enters into a given experiment, though once detected the arguments are usually very simple. In a recent conversation Professor Bohr criticised some rather careless remarks that I had made, and the present work was undertaken to clear matters up. It may be shortly described as a study of the Uncertainty Principle in connection with electrometers and magnetometers. It may be of interest to point out that the Uncertainty Principle can be regarded from a rather different aspect. The "resolving power" of optical instruments was discussed very fully by Rayleigh on wave principles, but as long as matter was regarded in the classical manner, a mechanical instrument could be considered as capable of measuring quantities with absolute accuracy. Now that we know that matter also has wave properties, there is need of a theory of the resolving power of mechanical instruments, and this is exactly what the Uncertainty Principle supplies.
In these continuation papers (VI and VII) we are interested in approach the problem of spin from a classical point of view. In this first paper we will show that the spin is neither basically relativistic nor quantum but reflects just a simmetry property related to the Lie algebra to which it is associated. The classical approach will be paraleled with the usual quantum one to stress their formal similarities and epistemological differences. The important problem of Einstein-Bose condensation for fermions will also be addressed.
Complementarity and Deconstruction: Plotnitsky's Analysis and Beyond Makoto Katsumori Akita University The philosophical thought of the modern physicist Niels Bohr (1885–1962), which revolves around the concept of complementarity, has long been a major subject of historical and philosophical inquiry. Many prior studies of Bohr's complementarity, however, seem to be limited by the fact that they largely proceed within the conceptual frames of the "mainstream" philosophy of science. This being the case, his radical questioning of traditional scientific and philosophical notions—such as the unambiguity of concepts and words—has not been adequately addressed, insofar as these notions are uncritically presupposed by the commentators themselves. In other words, Bohr's thought has often been interpreted under certain tacit premises of scientific rationality that are precisely of the kind targeted by his epistemological critique. In recent years, however, there have emerged new approaches to Bohr's idea of complementarity that place it in different, less conventional, philosophical contexts. Among the most notable of these is Arkady Plotnitsky's endeavor to connect Bohr's complementarity with Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. In the present article, based on my recent doctoral dissertation,1 I take up this contribution by Plotnitsky as a suitable point of reference from which to [End Page 435] explore anew Bohr's thought with its radical philosophical implications. After outlining Bohr's complementarity argument and Plotnitsky's reading thereof (in the first and second sections, respectively), I will examine a series of problems that seem to face, or to be left unsolved by, Plotnitsky's account (in the third section). This critical appraisal will finally lead me to sketch a new interpretive approach of my own (in the fourth section), which both extends and delimits the intersections between complementarity and deconstruction. As regards the historical development of Bohr's complementarity, I will largely restrict myself to the period between 1927 and 1950, in which the most crucial of his innovative ideas seem to have been presented. I. Bohr's Idea of Complementarity In his 1927 lecture delivered in Como, Italy, entitled "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," Niels Bohr introduced the concept and framework of complementarity as a pivotal idea in his interpretation of quantum theory. From then on, he continually developed the idea of complementarity with regard not only to quantum theory but to other fields of knowledge as well. In what follows, I will first outline his complementarity argument in its "early" period, stretching from 1927 to the mid-thirties,—or, more precisely, until just before his 1935 debate with EPR.2 Bohr starts by noting that "our usual description of physical phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be observed without disturbing them appreciably."3 This notion of physical phenomena as undisturbed by observation underlies all of classical physics and is still maintained in the theory of relativity. However, Bohr continues, a new situation has arisen with the development of quantum theory, specifically with "the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories"; this "individuality" implies that "any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the [End Page 436] agency of observation not to be neglected" (PWNB, 1: 53–54.). In more specific terms, any observation aimed at space-time coordination brings about an exchange of momentum and energy with the measuring rods and clocks. It is crucial here that this interaction between the object and the instrument of observation is not simply unavoidable, but "uncontrollable," which represents a "feature of irrationality" brought into the description of nature (PWNB, 1: 68, 91). For insofar as the measuring instruments are to fulfill their purpose, the interaction itself cannot be taken into account, and thus the magnitude of the disturbance always remains unknown. It follows, in Bohr's view, that "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation...