We show that it is possible to hide information perfectly within a photograph. The proposed protocol works by selecting each pixel value from two images that differ only by shot noise. Pixel values are never modified, but only selected, making the resulting stego image provably indistinguishable from an untampered image, and the protocol provably secure. We demonstrate that a perfect steganographic protocol is also a perfectly secure cryptographic protocol, and therefore has at least the same requirements: a truly random key as long as the message. In our system, we use a second image as the key, satisfying length requirements, and the randomness is provided by the naturally occurring quantum noise which is dominant in images taken with modern sensors. We conclude that, given a photograph, it is impossible to tell whether it contains any hidden information.
We show that it is possible to hide information perfectly within a photograph. The proposed protocol works by selecting each pixel value from two images that differ only by shot noise. Pixel values are never modified, but only selected, making the resulting stego image provably indistinguishable from an untampered image, and the protocol provably secure. We demonstrate that a perfect steganographic protocol is also a perfectly secure cryptographic protocol, and therefore has at least the same requirements: a truly random key as long as the message. In our system, we use a second image as the key, satisfying length requirements, and the randomness is provided by the naturally occurring quantum noise which is dominant in images taken with modern sensors. We conclude that, given a photograph, it is impossible to tell whether it contains any hidden information.
Steganography is the art and science of hiding the fact that communication is taking place. Steganographic systems can hide messages inside of images or other digital objects. To a casual observer inspecting these images, the messages are invisible. The security of a classical steganographic system relies on the secrecy of the encoding system. Once the encoding system is known, the steganographic system is defeated. However, modern steganography should be detectable only if secret information is known, namely, asecret key. Because of their invasive nature, steganographic systems leave detectable traces within a medium's characteristics. This allows an eavesdropper to detect modified media, revealing that secret communication is taking place. Although the secret content is not exposed, its existence is revealed, which defeats the mainpurpose of steganography. This work has as purpose to expand the field of applicability of the steganography from the classical informatics to the quantum one.
Steganography is the technique of hiding secret information by embedding it in a seemingly ``innocent'' message. We present protocols for hiding quantum information by disguising it as noise in a codeword of a quantum error-correcting code. The sender (Alice) swaps quantum information into the codeword and applies a random choice of unitary operation, drawing on a secret random key she shares with the receiver (Bob). Using the key, Bob can retrieve the information, but an eavesdropper (Eve) with the power to monitor the channel, but without the secret key, cannot distinguish the message from channel noise. We consider two types of protocols: one in which the hidden quantum information is stored locally in the codeword, and another in which it is embedded in the space of error syndromes. We analyze how difficult it is for Eve to detect the presence of secret messages, and estimate rates of steganographic communication and secret key consumption for specific protocols and examples of error channels. We consider both the case where there is no actual noise in the channel (so that all errors in the codeword result from the deliberate actions of Alice), and the case where the channel is noisy and not controlled by Alice and Bob.
Steganography is a technique hiding secret information within innocent-looking information (e.g., text, audio, image, video, and so on). In this paper, we propose a quantum steganography protocol using plain text as innocent-looking information called cover data. Our steganograpy protocol has three features. First, we can use any plain text that is inde-pendent of any secret message sent between parties. When we make stego data, we do not need to change the content of plain text at all. Second, embedded messages are not included in opened information (innocent-looking messages), but are included as phases of the entangled states. Finally, in quantum states shared between parties in advance, i.e., as quantum keys used when the parties recover secret messages from stego data, neither innocent-looking information nor the information of any secret message is included.
We are building a highly secure way of sending messages by combining the use of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) to produce encryption keys and encrypting messages with a variant of AES-256 (a substitution cipher) and Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography or hiding them in images. We are employing the BB84 protocol to produce these keys based on the quantum properties of the photonic (light) particles; we can detect any third parties attempting to intercept the key and measure it by the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER). Once we have produced a secure key, we then use it to encrypt the actual message with AES-256, and we hide that in a digital image (the cover image) with LSB steganography. Thus, if a third party were to capture the Stego image (the digital image containing the hidden encrypted message), they would not be able to decrypt the hidden message without the key that was produced using quantum cryptography. An analytics dashboard monitors the success of the key generation, the QBER value, and other performance metrics, giving a high degree of transparency and trustworthiness of the whole process.
Steganography, the hiding of covert messages inside innocuous communication, is an active area of cryptographic research. Recent research has shown that provably undetectable steganography is possible in a wide variety of settings. We believe that the existence of such undetectable steganography will have far reaching implications. In this thesis, we investigate the impact of steganography on the design of cryptographic protocols. In particular, we show that all existing cryptographic protocols allow malicious players to collude and coordinate their actions by steganographicly hiding covert messages inside legitimate protocol traffic. Such collusion is devastating in many settings, and thus we argue that its elimination is an important direction for cryptographic research.
Defeating such steganographic collusion requires not only new cryptographic protocols, but also a new notion of protocol security. Traditional notions of protocol security attempt to minimize the injuries to privacy and correctness inflicted by malicious participants who collude during run-tune. They do not, however, prevent malicious parties from colluding and coordinating their actions in the first place! We therefore put forward the notion of a collusion-free protocol which guarantees that no set of players can use the protocol to maliciously coordinate their actions. As should be expected, such a strong notion of security is very difficult to achieve. We show that achieving collusion-free security is impossible in a model with only broadcast communication and that even with physically private communication (e.g. physical envelopes) there are still many ideal functionalities that have no collusion-free protocols.
Fortunately, under natural assumptions collusion-free protocols exist for an interesting class of ideal functionalities. Assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations, we construct collusion-free protocols, in a model with both broadcast messages and physical envelopes, for every finite ideal functionality in which all actions are public.
Several approaches and techniques exist to make communication via the internet secure, one of these approaches is steganography. Computer steganography is a technique used to conceal data within cover media, ensuring that its presence remains undetected by others. We investigate the steganography potential applications in quantum communication and assess its benefits in the context of secret information transmission. Quantum computers, built on the principles of quantum physics, have introduced new possibilities for researchers in security and computer science. This paper explores the possibilities of realizing a quantum steganography communication, the challenges and its achievements of quantum steganography to tackle a wide range of security and privacy challenges. The article deals with the steganography system which hides text inside images and after that realize quantum communication. The secret message is hidden in the cover image using Least Significant Bit (LSB) algorithm. The paper proposes an information transmission scheme with a quantum channel enabled and visualization of quantum steganography protocol.