Abstract In quantum mechanics, pointer states are eigenstates of the observable of the measurement apparatus that represent the possible positions of the display pointer of the equipment. The origin of this concept lies in attempts to fill the blanks in Everett’s relative-state interpretation, and to make it a fully valid description of physical reality. To achieve this, it was necessary to consider not only the main system interacting with the measurement apparatus (like von Neumann and Everett did) but also the role of the environment in eliminating correlations between different possible measurements when interacting with the measurement apparatus. The interaction of the environment with the main system (and the measurement apparatus) is the core of the decoherence theory, which followed Everett’s thesis. In this article, we review the measurement process according to von Neumann, Everett’s relative state interpretation, the purpose of decoherence and some of its follow-up until Wojciech Zurek’s primordial paper that consolidated the concept of pointer states, previously presented by Heinz Dieter Zeh. Employing a simple physical model consisting of a pair of two-level systems—one representing the main system, the other the measurement apparatus—and a thermal bath—representing the environment—we show how pointer states emerge, explaining its contributions to the question of measurement in quantum mechanics, as well as its limitations. Finally, we briefly show some of its consequences. This paper is accessible to readers with elementary knowledge about quantum mechanics, on the level of graduate courses.
Abstract In quantum mechanics, pointer states are eigenstates of the observable of the measurement apparatus that represent the possible positions of the display pointer of the equipment. The origin of this concept lies in attempts to fill the blanks in Everett’s relative-state interpretation, and to make it a fully valid description of physical reality. To achieve this, it was necessary to consider not only the main system interacting with the measurement apparatus (like von Neumann and Everett did) but also the role of the environment in eliminating correlations between different possible measurements when interacting with the measurement apparatus. The interaction of the environment with the main system (and the measurement apparatus) is the core of the decoherence theory, which followed Everett’s thesis. In this article, we review the measurement process according to von Neumann, Everett’s relative state interpretation, the purpose of decoherence and some of its follow-up until Wojciech Zurek’s primordial paper that consolidated the concept of pointer states, previously presented by Heinz Dieter Zeh. Employing a simple physical model consisting of a pair of two-level systems—one representing the main system, the other the measurement apparatus—and a thermal bath—representing the environment—we show how pointer states emerge, explaining its contributions to the question of measurement in quantum mechanics, as well as its limitations. Finally, we briefly show some of its consequences. This paper is accessible to readers with elementary knowledge about quantum mechanics, on the level of graduate courses.
Quantum Mechanics represents one of the greatest triumphs of the scientific enterprise of the twentieth century. The stunning success of quantum theory has led to many revolutionary inventions and its extraordinary concepts describe the heart of several important real world applications like transistors and lasers. The theory makes accurate predictions about a wide range of physical phenomena and has historically withstood the tests and scrutiny of every experimental investigation. However, inspite of the fact that quantum theory is widely regarded by the scientific establishment as the fundamental theory of nature and is immensly successful and useful, its conceptual framework makes many predictions which are difficult to comprehend “classically. The theory is, pardoxically, powerful and confusing at the same time. Quantum theory’s unusual predictions originate from its basic formailsm which involves concepts like probability amplitudes and the linear superposition principle(Dirac, 1947). The quantum view appears abstract and counterintuitive and at odds with classical perceptions. Many of the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics are encompassed in what is known as the quantum measurement problem(Peres, 1986; von Neumann, 1932; Wheeler & Zurek, 1983). Conventionally, the measurement paradox is supposedly ’resolved’ by forcing a notion of a sudden collapse of the state vector of the system being measured. However, the nature of this mechanism is at odds with the basic tenets of quantum mechanics and hence may lie outside its realm thus questioning the validity of the theory it self. Closely related with the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is the question of its connection with the emergence of classicality and the elusive boundary between quantum and classical worlds. What is the connection between the ‘classical’ and the ‘quantum’ worlds? Is there a definite relationship? Are classical mechanics and quantum mechanics two mutually exclusive incompatible theories or are they two aspects of the same underlying philosophy? Classical objects are eventually composed of elements of the microworld which can be described quantum mechanically. So, how and where can there be a boundary between the two worlds? In the following section we begin by introducing the quantum measurement problem. In the next section we will discuss attempts to understand and explain away the underlying paradoxes in quantum theory as highlighted in the quantum measurement problem and the question of the quantum-classical connection. From among the various explanations that seek a resolution to the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics, we focus on the ‘environment induced decoherence theory’ an approach that employs the methods developed by several authors to analyse the quantum mechanics of Measurement in Quantum Mechanics: Decoherence and the Pointer Basis
The problem of measurement taken at face value shows clearly that there is an inconsistency inside the quantum formalism.The phenomenon of decoherence is often presented as a solution to it.A widely debated question is to decide between two different interpretations.The first one is to consider that the decoherence process has the effect to actually project a superposed state into one of its classically interpretable component, hence doing the same job as the reduction postulate.For the second one, decoherence is only a way to show why no macroscopic superposed state can be observed and so, to explain the classical appearance of the macroscopic world, while the quantum entanglement between the system, the apparatus and the environment never disappears.In this case, explaining why only one single definite outcome is observed remains to do.In this paper, we examine arguments for and against both interpretations and defend a position according to which the outcome that is observed is relative to the observer in close parallel to the Everett interpretation.
The decoherence approach to the measurement problem invokes dissipative interactions between a measuring apparatus and its environment to explain, within the context of ‘pure’ quantum mechanics (QM), why such devices appear to possess definite pointer readings. By ‘pure’ QM, I mean Schrödinger evolution with no wavefunction collapse. Several classes of interpretations of pure QM can rely on decoherence. One class is the ‘modal’ interpretations of van Fraassen (1979), Dieks (1989), Healey (1989), and others. Another class is the relative-state and many-world interpretations. I will argue that decoherence cannot help these interpretations address the general metaphysical challenges raised against them. But decoherence can help pick out a ‘special’ basis that determines which observables receive definite values. I'll explore to what extent decoherence rescues the modal (biorthogonal) basis-selection rule, and Zurek's (environmental interaction) basis-selection rule, from the basis degeneracy problem and the imperfect measurement problem.
The consensus regarding quantum measurements rests on two statements: (i) von Neumann’s standard quantum measurement theory leaves undetermined the basis in which observables are measured, and (ii) the environmental decoherence of the measuring device (the “meter”) unambiguously determines the measuring (“pointer”) basis. The latter statement means that the environment monitors (measures) selected observables of the meter and (indirectly) of the system. Equivalently, a measured quantum state must end up in one of the “pointer states” that persist in the presence of the environment. We find that, unless we restrict ourselves to projective measurements, decoherence does not necessarily determine the pointer basis of the meter. Namely, generalized measurements commonly allow the observer to choose from a multitude of alternative pointer bases that provide the same information on the observables, regardless of decoherence. By contrast, the measured observable does not depend on the pointer basis, whether in the presence or in the absence of decoherence. These results grant further support to our notion of Quantum Lamarckism, whereby the observer’s choices play an indispensable role in quantum mechanics.
The manner in which states of some quantum systems become effectively classical is of great significance for the foundations of quantum physics, as well as for problems of practical interest such as quantum engineering. In the past two decades it has become increasingly clear that many (perhaps all) of the symptoms of classicality can be induced in quantum systems by their environments. Thus decoherence is caused by the interaction in which the environment in effect monitors certain observables of the system, destroying coherence between the pointer states corresponding to their eigenvalues. This leads to environment-induced superselection or einselection, a quantum process associated with selective loss of information. Einselected pointer states are stable. They can retain correlations with the rest of the universe in spite of the environment. Einselection enforces classicality by imposing an effective ban on the vast majority of the Hilbert space, eliminating especially the flagrantly nonlocal ``Schr\"odinger-cat states.'' The classical structure of phase space emerges from the quantum Hilbert space in the appropriate macroscopic limit. Combination of einselection with dynamics leads to the idealizations of a point and of a classical trajectory. In measurements, einselection replaces quantum entanglement between the apparatus and the measured system with the classical correlation. Only the preferred pointer observable of the apparatus can store information that has predictive power. When the measured quantum system is microscopic and isolated, this restriction on the predictive utility of its correlations with the macroscopic apparatus results in the effective ``collapse of the wave packet.'' The existential interpretation implied by einselection regards observers as open quantum systems, distinguished only by their ability to acquire, store, and process information. Spreading of the correlations with the effectively classical pointer states throughout the environment allows one to understand ``classical reality'' as a property based on the relatively objective existence of the einselected states. Effectively classical pointer states can be ``found out'' without being re-prepared, e.g, by intercepting the information already present in the environment. The redundancy of the records of pointer states in the environment (which can be thought of as their ``fitness'' in the Darwinian sense) is a measure of their classicality. A new symmetry appears in this setting. Environment-assisted invariance or envariance sheds new light on the nature of ignorance of the state of the system due to quantum correlations with the environment and leads to Born's rules and to reduced density matrices, ultimately justifying basic principles of the program of decoherence and einselection.
The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.