Unlike mathematics, in which the notion of truth might be abstract, in physics, the emphasis must be placed on algorithmic procedures for obtaining numerical results subject to the experimental verifiability. For, a physical science is exactly that: algorithmic procedures (built on a certain mathematical formalism) for obtaining verifiable conclusions from a set of basic hypotheses. By admitting non-constructivist statements, a physical theory loses its concrete applicability and thus verifiability of its predictions. Accordingly, the requirement of constructivism must be indispensable to any physical theory. Nevertheless, in at least some physical theories, and especially in quantum mechanics, one can find examples of non-constructive statements. The present paper demonstrates a couple of such examples dealing with macroscopic quantum states (i.e., with the applicability of the standard quantum formalism to macroscopic systems). As it is shown, in these examples the proofs of the existence of macroscopic quantum states are based on logical principles allowing one to decide the truth of predicates over an infinite number of things.
According to the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), effective formal behaviours can be simulated by Turing machines; this has naturally led to speculation that physical sys- tems can also be simulated computationally. But is this wider claim true, or do behaviours exist which are strictly hypercomputational? Several idealised computational models are known which suggest the possibility of hypercomputation, some Newtonian, some based on cosmology, some on quantum theory. While these models' physicality is debatable, they nonetheless throw into question the validity of extending CTT to include all physical systems. We consider the physicality of hypercomputational behaviour from first princi- ples, by showing that quantum theory can be reformulated in a way that explains why physical behaviours can be regarded as 'computing something' in the standard compu- tational state-machine sense. While this does not rule out the physicality of hypercomputation, it strongly limits the forms it can take. Our model also has physical consequences; in particular, the continuity of motion and arrow of time become theorems within the basic model.
We derive the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics from epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. An epistemic formalism is developed, where concepts like individual and collective knowledge are used, and knowledge may be actual or potential. The physical state
S corresponds to the collective potential knowledge. The state
S is a subset of a state space
S={Z}, such that
S always contains several elements
Z, which correspond to unattainable states of complete potential knowledge of the world. The evolution of
S cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements
Z, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of
S is described in terms of sequential time
n∈N, which is updated according to
n→n+1 each time potential knowledge changes. In certain experimental contexts
C, there is initial knowledge at time
n that a given series of properties
P,P′,… will be observed within a given time frame, meaning that a series of values
p,p′,… of these properties will become known. At time
n, it is just known that these values belong to predefined, finite sets
{p},{p′},…. In such a context
C, it is possible to define a complex Hilbert space
HC on top of
S, in which the elements are contextual state vectors
SˉC. Born's rule to calculate the probabilities to find the values
p,p′,… is derived as the only generally applicable such rule. Also, we can associate a self-adjoint operator
Pˉ with eigenvalues
{p} to each property
P observed within
C. These operators obey
[Pˉ,Pˉ′]=0 if and only if the precise values of
P and
P′ are simultaneoulsy knowable.
AbstractStandard quantum mechanics is formulated using complex Hilbert spaces, real-valued probabilities, continuous one-parameter dynamics, and—where particles and fields have continuous degrees of freedom —function spaces constructed over continua such as R3 . In that precise mathematical sense, the real and complex continua are deeply embedded in the standard theory. It does not follow, however, that experiments have demonstrated the physical existence of an uncountable set of exact real numbers, still less that individual quantum systems physically “store” infinitely many digits. Every preparation, control operation, and measurement has finite precision, and many quantum predictions can be approximated arbitrarily closely using countable or finite descriptions.This distinction matters because the continuum is sometimes blamed for quantum theory's conceptual strangeness. That diagnosis is mostly unsupported. Superposition, interference, uncertainty, noncommutativity, entanglement, contextuality, Bell-inequality violations, and no-cloning already occur in finite-dimensional quantum systems and do not depend in any straightforward way on continuous position space or arbitrary irrational numbers. Restricting a Hilbert space to rational, algebraic, computable, or finitely specified states therefore does not automatically produce classical physics. Indeed, dense restricted subsets can approximate ordinary quantum predictions to arbitrary finite accuracy, although turning such a subset into a complete physical theory requires much more: closed dynamics, a composition rule, a measurement theory, robustness, and new empirical predictions.A particularly developed contemporary alternative is Tim Palmer's Invariant Set Theory and its recent formulation as Rational Quantum Mechanics (RaQM). RaQM is not accurately described as simply “quantum mechanics with irrational numbers banned.” It restricts the bases in which states are physically defined through number-theoretic rationality conditions, represents admissible states using finite bit strings, invokes a fractal invariant state space equipped with a non-Euclidean, p-adic-like metric, and violates Bell measurement independence at the level of exact counterfactual settings. Palmer's 2026 proposal further predicts a finite qubit-information capacity and an eventual saturation of quantum computational advantage. These are genuine, potentially falsifiable proposals, but they remain speculative and have not displaced standard quantum theory.The strongest conclusion is consequently asymmetric. There is a serious foundational question about whether the continuum is an ontological feature of nature or an extraordinarily efficient mathematical completion. Finite precision prevents existing experiments from proving a literal continuum. But there is presently little evidence that continuum mathematics causes quantum phenomena. Any discrete replacement must still account quantitatively for interference, contextuality, Bell correlations, entanglement, spectroscopy, atomic structure, and quantum computation. Discreteness can change quantum physics only when it is accompanied by additional physical postulates—and those postulates, rather than discreteness alone, must ultimately face experiment.
We analyse quantum concepts in a constructive finite background. Introduction of continuum or other actual infinities into physics leads to non-constructivity without any need for them in description of empirical observations. We argue that quantum behavior is a natural consequence of symmetries of dynamical systems. It is a result of fundamental impossibility to trace identity of indistinguishable objects in their evolution — only information about invariant combinations of such objects is available. General mathematical arguments imply that any quantum dynamics can be reduced to a sequence of permutations. Quantum phenomena, such as interferences, arise in invariant subspaces of permutation representations of the symmetry group of a system. Observable quantities can be expressed in terms of the permutation invariants. We demonstrate that for description of quantum phenomena there is no need to use such non-constructive number system as complex numbers. It is sufficient to employ the cyclotomic numbers — a minimal extension of the natural numbers which is suitable for quantum mechanics.
We analyze the logical foundations of quantum mechanics (QM) by stressing non-objectivity of quantum observables, which is a consequence of the absence of logical atoms in QM. We argue that the matter of quantum non-objectivity is that, on the one hand, the formalism of QM constructed as a mathematical theory is self-consistent, but, on the other hand, quantum phenomena as results of experimenters' performances are not self-consistent. This self-inconsistency is an effect of the language of QM differing greatly from the language of human performances. The former is the language of a mathematical theory that uses some Aristotelian and Russellian assumptions (e.g., the assumption that there are logical atoms). The latter language consists of performative propositions that are self-inconsistent only from the viewpoint of conventional mathematical theory, but they satisfy another logic that is non-Aristotelian. Hence, the representation of quantum reality in linguistic terms may be different: the difference between a mathematical theory and a logic of performative propositions. To solve quantum self-inconsistency, we apply the formalism of non-classical self-referent logics.