Methods of quantum mechanics promise information-theoretic security for various protocols in cryptography. However, impossibility of some cryptographic applications such as standard bit commitment, oblivious transfer, multiparty secure computations and ideal coin tossing in quantum regime leaves an obvious question on the completeness of quantum cryptography. Instead of using wide range of rules and techniques for a variety of cryptographic applications, we demonstrate here a unified structure for quantum cryptography based on quantum non-local correlations. The unified framework achieves same goals in information-theoretic way as classical cryptography does with computational hardness. To cover the broad range of cryptographic applications, we show that the framework (i) assures secrecy by providing encryption completely unintelligible to eavesdroppers, (ii) guarantees that input from distant parties is concealed unless they are willing to reveal, (iii) assures binding, (iv) allows splitting information between several parties securely and more generally, (v) evades both quantum and classical attacks from internal as well as external eavesdropping.
Methods of quantum mechanics promise information-theoretic security for various protocols in cryptography. However, impossibility of some cryptographic applications such as standard bit commitment, oblivious transfer, multiparty secure computations and ideal coin tossing in quantum regime leaves an obvious question on the completeness of quantum cryptography. Instead of using wide range of rules and techniques for a variety of cryptographic applications, we demonstrate here a unified structure for quantum cryptography based on quantum non-local correlations. The unified framework achieves same goals in information-theoretic way as classical cryptography does with computational hardness. To cover the broad range of cryptographic applications, we show that the framework (i) assures secrecy by providing encryption completely unintelligible to eavesdroppers, (ii) guarantees that input from distant parties is concealed unless they are willing to reveal, (iii) assures binding, (iv) allows splitting information between several parties securely and more generally, (v) evades both quantum and classical attacks from internal as well as external eavesdropping.
Quantum cryptography promises secure communication protocols that surpass the limitations of classical cryptography. By leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics, particularly the phenomenon of quantum entanglement and the uncertainty principle, quantum cryptography protocols offer provable security guarantees against eavesdropping attacks. In this paper, we provide an overview of quantum cryptography, discussing its theoretical foundations, key protocols such as quantum key distribution (QKD), and experimental implementations. We highlight the advantages of quantum cryptography over classical cryptographic techniques and explore its potential applications in secure communication networks, financial transactions, and data privacy. Furthermore, we discuss ongoing research efforts and challenges in the practical deployment of quantum cryptography systems, including the development of robust quantum hardware and the integration of quantum cryptographic protocols into existing communication infrastructures. Overall, quantum cryptography holds great promise for enabling secure communication channels that are resilient to quantum attacks, paving the way for a new era of ultra-secure information exchange.
This paper explores the foundational principles and practical implications of achieving information-theoretic security through quantum entanglement. Information-theoretic security, independent of computational complexity assumptions, offers unparalleled privacy and integrity. Classical cryptography relies on unproven mathematical hardness, making it vulnerable to future quantum computers. Quantum mechanics, specifically entanglement, provides a novel paradigm for cryptographic protocols with unconditional security, guaranteed by the laws of physics. We detail how entanglement enables certain eavesdropping detection and generates truly random shared secret keys. The discussion encompasses key protocols, the role of Bell inequalities, and theoretical security proofs underpinning these quantum systems. We also address current challenges and future prospects for deploying entanglement-based secure communication networks, highlighting its transformative potential for a future-proof global communication infrastructure. This work synthesizes how quantum entanglement shifts cryptographic assurance from computational assumptions to fundamental physical laws, setting the stage for truly uncompromisable communication. We further acknowledge the ethical considerations and societal implications of such robust encryption.
Here we propose a general relativistic quantum framework for cryptography that exploits the fascinating connection of quantum non-locality and special theory of relativity with cryptography. The underlying principle of unconditional security is causality and two-fold quantum non-local correlations: first entanglement swapping and then teleportation over causally independent entangled systems. We show that the proposed framework has following remarkable and novel features in mistrustful cryptography: (i) It helps in defining a new notion of oblivious transfer where both the data transferred and the transfer position remains oblivious. (ii) The authenticity and integrity of the data transferred is guaranteed by the fundamental principles of quantum theory instead of computational complexity. (iii) It directly leads to unconditionally secure and deterministic two-sided two-party computation which is currently considered to be impossible. (iv) the proposed framework turns out to be asynchronous ideal coin tossing with zero bias which has not been achieved previously. (v) The same framework also implies unconditionally secure bit commitment. Finally, the combination of quantum non-locality and theory of relativity as discussed here can easily be generalized to multiparty setting that could be used to solve other mistrustful cryptographic tasks such as secret sharing and key agreement securely.
Quantum Cryptography aims at solving the everlasting problem of unconditional security in private communication. Every time we send personal information over a telecom channel, like when we buy something on the web, a sophisticated protocol protects our privacy making our data unintelligible to unauthorised receivers. These protocols resulted from the long history of cryptography. The security of modern cryptographic systems is guaranteed by complexity: the computational power that would be needed for gaining info on the code key largely exceeds the available one. Security of actual crypto systems is not “by principle” but “practical”. On the contrary, quantum technology promises to make possible to realise provably secure protocols. Quantum cryptology exploits paradigmatic aspects of quantum mechanics, like superposition principle and uncertainty relations, for realising protocols whose security is intrinsic. In this contribution, after a brief historical introduction, we aim to provide a survey on the physical principles underlying the quantum approach to cryptography. Then, in the second part, we analyse in more detail two of the possible protocols and glance over the state of art of the research in the field.
A significant branch of classical cryptography deals with the problems which arise when mistrustful parties need to generate, process, or exchange information. As Kilian showed a while ago, mistrustful classical cryptography can be founded on a single protocol, oblivious transfer, from which general secure multiparty computations can be built. The scope of mistrustful quantum cryptography is limited by no-go theorems, which rule out, inter alia, unconditionally secure quantum protocols for oblivious transfer or general secure two-party computations. These theorems apply even to protocols which take relativistic signaling constraints into account. The best that can be hoped for, in general, are quantum protocols which are computationally secure against quantum attack. Here a method is described for building a classically certified bit commitment, and hence every other mistrustful cryptographic task, from a secure coin-tossing protocol. No security proof is attempted, but reasons are sketched why these protocols might resist quantum computational attack.
In cryptographic protocols, honest parties would prefer that their security is assured even in presence of adversarial parties who have unbounded computational power. Information theoretic secure realization of cryptographic primitives provides such guarantees; but for most tasks such strong security guarantees cannot be provided for any reasonable notion of security. The standard technique used in cryptography is to assume the existence of some puzzle, whose hard instances are easy to generate but no efficient algorithm can solve them. Such assumptions, which define intractable problems for efficient algorithms, are called computational intractability assumptions.
In this work, we motivate a study of computational intractability assumptions which is goal driven and lends support to the fundamental nature of some of the traditional assumptions beyond being historical accidents. Secure multi-party computation deals with the study of constructing secure protocols for general cryptographic tasks which conform to various notions of security. Inspired by complexity theory, we use the notion of reduction to further our understanding of computational intractability assumptions. Our framework explores the hardness of natural assumptions of the form: “Task F can be securely computed given an ideally secure facility for computing G ”.
Formally, we characterize the minimal computational intractability assumption which is sufficient to securely realize a functionality using trusted copies of some other functionality. A functionality F reduces to G , similar to the complexity-theoretic notion of reduction, if F can be securely realized when parties can access trusted copies of G . Thus, if F does not reduce to G information-theoretically, we are interested in characterizing the minimal assumption, which is sufficient, to securely realize the reduction of F to G .
In our framework, we explore the relative strengths of these minimal computational assumptions. The fundamental problem, then, is to establish relations, like implication, equivalence and separation, among the assumptions which correspond to various reductions. In this work, we further our understanding of the minimal computational assumptions corresponding to such reductions by showing the following results:
1. We identify a spectrum for the set of assumptions that correspond to reduction between a pair of tasks under different security notions. These reductions are implied by the computational intractability assumption: “semi-honest secure protocol for oblivious transfer exists” (sh-OT assumption). Additionally, the information theoretically impossible reductions considered in this thesis imply the assumption: “one-way functions exist” (OWF assumption). We conjecture that OWF assumption is necessary for these reductions. In fact, the reductions considered in this thesis are either information theoretically true, false, equivalent to OWF assumption or equivalent to sh-OT assumption [MPR10a].
We expand our study to encompass reductions involving randomized functionalities and study the consequences of providing parties with a trusted source of common unbiased coins. For a strong notion of security they turn out to be useless and unless sh-OT assumption holds these randomness sources are not useful [MOPR11, MP11].
2. We [MPS10] seek to lend additional support to the widely believed premise that “non-trivial cryptography entails the existence of one-way functions”. We show that (constant round) weak coin-tossing protocols, imply OWF assumption. For the general problem, i.e. secure weak coin-tossing protocols with polynomial round complexity, we show a slightly weaker implication NP n BPP.
3. Finally, we indicate the possibility of a wide range of intractability assumptions in our spectrum, intermediate to OWF assumption and sh-OT assumption. We show that a class of natural assumptions corresponding to reductions that are relativistically separated from OWF assumption. Similar techniques have been used to show their separation from the assumption that “public-key encryption exists” (PKE assumption) [MMP11]; but these assumptions are not known to imply sh-OT assumption. We conjecture that, in fact, sh-OT assumption is relativistically separated from these assumptions.