Several quantum process algebras have been proposed and successfully applied in verification of quantum cryptographic protocols. All of the bisimulations proposed so far for quantum processes in these process algebras are state-based, implying that they only compare individual quantum states, but not a combination of them. This paper remedies this problem by introducing a novel notion of distribution-based bisimulation for quantum processes. We further propose an approximate version of this bisimulation that enables us to prove more sophisticated security properties of quantum protocols which cannot be verified using the previous bisimulations. In particular, we prove that the quantum key distribution protocol BB84 is sound and (asymptotically) secure against the intercept-resend attacks by showing that the BB84 protocol, when executed with such an attacker concurrently, is approximately bisimilar to an ideal protocol, whose soundness and security are obviously guaranteed, with at most an exponentially decreasing gap.
Several quantum process algebras have been proposed and successfully applied in verification of quantum cryptographic protocols. All of the bisimulations proposed so far for quantum processes in these process algebras are state-based, implying that they only compare individual quantum states, but not a combination of them. This paper remedies this problem by introducing a novel notion of distribution-based bisimulation for quantum processes. We further propose an approximate version of this bisimulation that enables us to prove more sophisticated security properties of quantum protocols which cannot be verified using the previous bisimulations. In particular, we prove that the quantum key distribution protocol BB84 is sound and (asymptotically) secure against the intercept-resend attacks by showing that the BB84 protocol, when executed with such an attacker concurrently, is approximately bisimilar to an ideal protocol, whose soundness and security are obviously guaranteed, with at most an exponentially decreasing gap.
t is recognized that security verification of cryptographic protocols tends to be difficult and in fact, some flaws on protocol designs or security proofs were found after they had been presented. The use of formal methods is a way to deal with such complexity. Especially, process calculi are suitable to describe parallel systems. Bisimilarity, which denotes that two processes behave indistinguishably from the outside, is a key notion in process calculi. However, by-hand verification of bisimilarity is often tedious when the processes have many long branches in their transitions. We developed a software tool to automatically verify bisimulation relation in a quantum process calculus qCCS and applied it to Shor and Preskill's security proof of BB84. The tool succeeds to verify the equivalence of BB84 and an EDP-based protocol, which are discussed in their proof.
Quantum cryptographic systems have been commercially available, with a striking advantage over classical systems that their security and ability to detect the presence of eavesdropping are provable based on the principles of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, quantum protocol designers may commit much more faults than classical protocol designers since human intuition is much better adapted to the classical world than the quantum world. To offer formal techniques for modeling and verification of quantum protocols, several quantum extensions of process algebra have been proposed. One of the most serious issues in quantum process algebra is to discover a quantum generalization of the notion of bisimulation, which lies in a central position in process algebra, preserved by parallel composition in the presence of quantum entanglement, which has no counterpart in classical computation. Quite a few versions of bisimulation have been defined for quantum processes in the literature, but in the best case they are only proved to be preserved by parallel composition of purely quantum processes where no classical communications are involved. Many quantum cryptographic protocols, however, employ the LOCC (Local Operations and Classical Communications) scheme, where classical communications must be explicitly specified. So, a notion of bisimulation preserved by parallel composition in the circumstance of both classical and quantum communications is crucial for process algebra approach to verification of quantum cryptographic protocols. In this paper we introduce a novel notion of bisimulation for quantum processes and prove that it is congruent with respect to various process algebra combinators including parallel composition even when both classical and quantum communications are present. We also establish some basic algebraic laws for this bisimulation. In particular, we prove uniqueness of the solutions to recursive equations of quantum processes, which provides a powerful proof technique for verifying complex quantum protocols.
Quantum cryptographic systems have been commercially available, with a striking advantage over classical systems that their security and ability to detect the presence of eavesdropping are provable based on the principles of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, quantum protocol designers may commit more faults than classical protocol designers since human intuition is poorly adapted to the quantum world. To offer formal techniques for modeling and verification of quantum protocols, several quantum extensions of process algebra have been proposed. An important issue in quantum process algebra is to discover a quantum generalization of bisimulation preserved by various process constructs, in particular, parallel composition, where one of the major differences between classical and quantum systems, namely quantum entanglement, is present. Quite a few versions of bisimulation have been defined for quantum processes in the literature, but in the best case they are only proved to be preserved by parallel composition of purely quantum processes where no classical communication is involved. Many quantum cryptographic protocols, however, employ the LOCC (Local Operations and Classical Communication) scheme, where classical communication must be explicitly specified. So, a notion of bisimulation preserved by parallel composition in the circumstance of both classical and quantum communication is crucial for process algebra approach to verification of quantum cryptographic protocols. In this article we introduce novel notions of strong bisimulation and weak bisimulation for quantum processes, and prove that they are congruent with respect to various process algebra combinators including parallel composition even when both classical and quantum communication are present. We also establish some basic algebraic laws for these bisimulations. In particular, we show the uniqueness of the solutions to recursive equations of quantum processes, which proves useful in verifying complex quantum protocols. To capture the idea that a quantum process approximately implements its specification, and provide techniques and tools for approximate reasoning, a quantified version of strong bisimulation, which defines for each pair of quantum processes a bisimulation-based distance characterizing the extent to which they are strongly bisimilar, is also introduced.
Our objective in this thesis is to perform formal specification and automated validation of the class of protocols associated with quantum cryptography. Current analyses and proofs regarding quantum cryptographic protocols and their security are information-theoretic and also require in--depth understanding of the underlying physics. The alternative approach presented here involves the use of computer modelling languages and verification software. In particular, the logical model checker SPIN and the probabilistic model checker PRISM are used to analyse quantum key distribution, entanglement and quantum teleportation. The value of our approach lies not only in the fact that it is conceptually simpler than existing proofs, but in that it allows us to disambiguate protocol definitions and to assess their properties in various circumstances. By varying the values of certain parameters, different attacks on the protocols can be attempted and implementation-specific attributes can be analysed. The quantum key distribution protocol BB84 has been proved to be unconditionally secure against all types of eavesdropping. Although a general proof of this result is extremely hard to generate automatically, it is possible to develop specific protocol attacks and validate the protocol by computer. Assuming two types of eavesdropping attack (intercept-resend and random-substitute), we have used the PRISM tool to compute exactly the probability of successful eavesdropping, and found it to diminish as the number of transmitted qubits is increased. This result is linked to Mayers' security criteria for BB84. Also, we briefly describe a new quantum protocol definition language, named qSpec. The recent CQP process algebra, due to Nagarajan and Gay, is reviewed and examples of its application are provided. Alternative formalisms and validation tools are discussed, including QPAlg, PROBMELA and probUSM, the logic of knowledge and time for quantum systems due to Van der Meyden, and the QCSim simulator.
Quantum cryptographic systems have been commercially available, with a striking advantage over classical systems that their security and ability to detect the presence of eavesdropping are provable based on the principles of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, quantum protocol designers may commit much more faults than classical protocol designers since human intuition is much better adapted to the classical world than the quantum world. To offer formal techniques for modeling and verification of quantum protocols, several quantum extensions of process algebra have been proposed. One of the most serious issues in quantum process algebra is to discover a quantum generalization of the notion of bisimulation, which lies in a central position in process algebra, preserved by parallel composition in the presence of quantum entanglement, which has no counterpart in classical computation. Quite a few versions of bisimulation have been defined for quantum processes in the literature, but in the best case they are only proved to be preserved by parallel composition of purely quantum processes where no classical communications are involved.
Abstract One important application of quantum process algebras is to formally verify quantum communication protocols. With a suitable notion of behavioural equivalence and a decision method, one can determine if an implementation of a protocol is consistent with its specification. Ground bisimulation is a convenient behavioural equivalence for quantum processes because of its associated coinduction proof technique. We exploit this technique to design and implement two on-the-fly algorithms for the strong and weak versions of ground bisimulation to check if two given processes in quantum CCS are equivalent. We then develop a tool that can verify interesting quantum protocols such as the BB84 quantum key distribution scheme.