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arXiv:1504.01544 · Axiomathes

Correspondence Truth and Quantum Mechanics

Vassilios Karakostas

Published Oct 25, 2013• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s10516-013-9226-3

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According to various no-go results in the foundations of quantum mechanics, for any system associated to a Hilbert space of dimension higher than two, it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to the system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton uniqueness theorem is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. On this basis, a perspectivist/contextual account of truth valuation in the quantum domain is produced that satisfies Tarski's criterion of material adequacy for a theory of truth. In light of the latter, perspectivist truth conforms to perspective or context-bound correspondence of a de re nature, designating locally an objectively existing state of affairs. Such an account derives by virtue of the microphysical nature of physical reality in displaying a context-dependence of facts; thus, it essentially opposes a non-perspectival, metaphysically fixed point of reference, or a panoptical standpoint from which to state all facts of nature.

quant-pharXiv:2604.11823•European Journal for Philosophy of Science•Apr 14, 2026•0 citations
According to various no-go results in the foundations of quantum mechanics, for any system associated to a Hilbert space of dimension higher than two, it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to the system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton uniqueness theorem is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. On this basis, a perspectivist/contextual account of truth valuation in the quantum domain is produced that satisfies Tarski's criterion of material adequacy for a theory of truth. In light of the latter, perspectivist truth conforms to perspective or context-bound correspondence of a de re nature, designating locally an objectively existing state of affairs. Such an account derives by virtue of the microphysical nature of physical reality in displaying a context-dependence of facts; thus, it essentially opposes a non-perspectival, metaphysically fixed point of reference, or a panoptical standpoint from which to state all facts of nature.