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arXiv:1504.00939 · Quantum Information Processing

On the security of semi-device-independent QKD protocols

Anubhav Chaturvedi, Maharshi Ray, Ryszard Veynar, Marcin Pawłowski

Published Apr 21, 2018• 21 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

While fully device-independent security in (BB84-like) prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution (QKD) is impossible, it can be guaranteed against individual attacks in a semi-device-independent (SDI) scenario, wherein no assumptions are made on the characteristics of the hardware used except for an upper bound on the dimension of the communicated system. Studying security under such minimal assumptions is especially relevant in the context of the recent quantum hacking attacks wherein the eavesdroppers can not only construct the devices used by the communicating parties but are also able to remotely alter their behavior. In this work, we study the security of a SDIQKD protocol based on the prepare-and-measure quantum implementation of a well-known cryptographic primitive, the random access code (RAC). We consider imperfect detectors and establish the critical values of the security parameters (the observed success probability of the RAC and the detection efficiency) required for guaranteeing security against eavesdroppers with and without quantum memory. Furthermore, we suggest a minimal characterization of the preparation device in order to lower the requirements for establishing a secure key.

DOI
10.1007/s11128-018-1892-z

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While fully device-independent security in (BB84-like) prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution (QKD) is impossible, it can be guaranteed against individual attacks in a semi-device-independent (SDI) scenario, wherein no assumptions are made on the characteristics of the hardware used except for an upper bound on the dimension of the communicated system. Studying security under such minimal assumptions is especially relevant in the context of the recent quantum hacking attacks wherein the eavesdroppers can not only construct the devices used by the communicating parties but are also able to remotely alter their behavior. In this work, we study the security of a SDIQKD protocol based on the prepare-and-measure quantum implementation of a well-known cryptographic primitive, the random access code (RAC). We consider imperfect detectors and establish the critical values of the security parameters (the observed success probability of the RAC and the detection efficiency) required for guaranteeing security against eavesdroppers with and without quantum memory. Furthermore, we suggest a minimal characterization of the preparation device in order to lower the requirements for establishing a secure key.
While fully device-independent security in BB84-like one way QKD is impossible, it can be guaranteed against individual attacks in a semi device-independent scenario, where no assumptions on the characteristics of the hardware used are made except for the communication channel for which an upper bound on capacity is put. This approach is meaningful especially in the context of recent {\it quantum hacking} attacks in which the eavesdroppers are able to remotely alter the behaviour of the devices used by the communicating parties. They are however unable to change the capacity of the channel. In this work we study a semi device-independent protocol wherein the knowledge of success probability of the associated dimension witness and the observed efficiency of the detectors (ηavg\eta_{avg}ηavg​) are sufficient to determine the security. We consider practically possible, individual attacks with and without eavesdropper having access to quantum memory. We find critical detection efficiencies required for security in both cases.
By testing nonlocality, the security of entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) can be enhanced to being ``device-independent.'' Here we ask whether such a strong form of security could also be established for one-way (prepare and measure) QKD. While fully device-independent security is impossible, we show that security can be guaranteed against individual attacks in a semi-device-independent scenario. In the latter, the devices used by the trusted parties are noncharacterized, but the dimensionality of the quantum systems used in the protocol is assumed to be bounded. Our security proof relies on the analogies between one-way QKD, dimension witnesses, and random-access codes.
Similar to device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD), semi-device-independent quantum key distribution (SDI-QKD) provides secure key distribution without any assumptions about the internal workings of the QKD devices. The only assumption is that the dimension of the Hilbert space is bounded. But SDI-QKD can be implemented in a one-way prepare-and-measure configuration without entanglement compared with DI-QKD. We propose a practical SDI-QKD protocol with four preparation states and three measurement bases by considering the maximal violation of dimension witnesses and specific processes of a QKD protocol. Moreover, we prove the security of the SDI-QKD protocol against collective attacks based on the min-entropy and dimension witnesses. We also show a comparison of the secret key rate between the SDI-QKD protocol and the standard QKD.
The device-independent (DI) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol requires minimal assumptions about the devices and its security relies on the violation of Bell inequalities, making it hard to realize in real world. Semi-device-independent (SDI) QKD protocol confines quantum state within finite dimensional Hilbert space, thus easier for implementation with existing experimental technology. In this paper, we propose a practical SDI prepare-and-measure BB84 protocol. By introducing min entropy for security proof, we obtain a security bound under the practical condition with finite resources. Numerical simulations imply the finite-key effect can not be ignored in the forthcoming SDI QKD experiment.
Semi-device-independent quantum key distribution (SDI-QKD) has been proposed by applying the quantum dimension correlation, and the security relies on the violation of quantum dimension witness inequalities. We prove the security of the SDI-QKD protocol under the depolarization channel by considering the quantum dimension witness inequalities and minimum entropy and the specific process of the QKD protocol, combining with a four-quantum-state preparation and three measurement bases. We also provide the relationship between the dimension witness value, the error rate and the security key rate by the numerical simulation.
The security of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is fundamentally constrained by vulnerabilities of single-photon detectors. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) was proposed to remove this limitation by allowing all measurements to be performed by a completely untrusted party, under the assumption that the measurement node can be treated as adversarial but does not compromise the security guarantees of the protocol. Here we show that this assumption is insufficient under realistic adversarial control of the measurement device. We present an attack in which an adversary exploits active control of the measurement node (Charlie) to obtain significant information about the secret key. The attack enables recovery of up to 70\% of the sifted key while introducing only 5.6\% quantum bit error rate. Unlike previously reported attacks targeting specific implementations of MDI-QKD, our results demonstrate a limitation of the standard security model underlying the protocol. These findings indicate that additional constraints on the measurement-device independence assumption, or refined security analyses incorporating stronger adversarial capabilities, are required to ensure the security of MDI-QKD in realistic scenarios.