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arXiv:1411.5000

Simulation Quantization: An Application of Physical Versions of the Church-Turing Thesis

Abel Wolman

Published Nov 15, 2014• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

An integrable anharmonic oscillator is presumably simulable by a classical computer and therefore by a quantum computer. An integrable anharmonic oscillator whose Hamiltonian is of normal type and quartic in the canonical coordinates is not quantizable. If, as argued here, quantum simulation of a finitely realizable classical physical system entails quantization of that system, then either there exist nonsimulable, integrable anharmonic oscillators or there are no obstructions to quantization by simulation. Simulation quantization implies further that any obstructions to quantization arise entirely within the quantum domain.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1411.5000

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An integrable anharmonic oscillator is presumably simulable by a classical computer and therefore by a quantum computer. An integrable anharmonic oscillator whose Hamiltonian is of normal type and quartic in the canonical coordinates is not quantizable. If, as argued here, quantum simulation of a finitely realizable classical physical system entails quantization of that system, then either there exist nonsimulable, integrable anharmonic oscillators or there are no obstructions to quantization by simulation. Simulation quantization implies further that any obstructions to quantization arise entirely within the quantum domain.
An integrable anharmonic oscillator is presumably simulable by a classical computer and therefore by a quantum computer. An integrable anharmonic oscillator whose Hamiltonian is of normal type and quartic in the canonical coordinates is not quantizable. If, as argued here, quantum simulation of a finitely realizable classical physical system entails quantization of that system, then either there exist nonsimulable, integrable anharmonic oscillators or there are no obstructions to quantization by simulation. Simulation quantization implies further that any obstructions to quantization arise entirely within the quantum domain.
Abstract It is argued that underlying the Church–Turing hypothesis there is an implicit physical assertion. Here, this assertion is presented explicitly as a physical principle: ‘every finitely realizible physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means’. Classical physics and the universal Turing machine, because the former is continuous and the latter discrete, do not obey the principle, at least in the strong form above. A class of model computing machines that is the quantum generalization of the class of Turing machines is described, and it is shown that quantum theory and the 'universal quantum computer’ are compatible with the principle. Computing machines resembling the universal quantum computer could, in principle, be built and would have many remarkable properties not reproducible by any Turing machine. These do not include the computation of non-recursive functions, but they do include ‘quantum parallelism’, a method by which certain probabilistic tasks can be performed faster by a universal quantum computer than by any classical restriction of it. The intuitive explanation of these properties places an intolerable strain on all interpretations of quantum theory other than Everett’s. Some of the numerous connections between the quantum theory of computation and the rest of physics are explored. Quantum complexity theory allows a physically more reasonable definition of the ‘complexity’ or ‘knowledge’ in a physical system than does classical complexity theory.
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In the paper we interpret the Church Turing thesis of Computation Algorithm and how it differs from the strong Church Turing thesis in the field of computation. Church Turing thesis can be classified as Strong Church Turing thesis and Normal Church Turing thesis. Church Turing hypothesis says “that a computing problem can be solved in any computer if and only if it can be solved on a very simple ‘machine’, named TURING MACHINE”. We introspect the difference in the model of computers that are developed on these two competitive algorithms. We will also be studying the physical realization of bits in a quantum computer with special mention to the commercial quantum computer systems offered at the moment. Our objective is to find out the relation of a quantum bit and the Strong Church Turing Thesis converging the gap between theoretical model and physical structure.
It is possible in principle to construct quantum mechanical observables and unitary operators which, if implemented in physical systems as measurements and dynamical evolution, would contradict the Church-Turing thesis, which lies at the foundation of computer science. Elsewhere we have argued that the quantum measurement problem implies a finite, computational model of the measurement and evolution of quantum states. If correct, this approach helps to identify the key feature that can reconcile quantum mechanics with the Church-Turing thesis: finitude of the degree of fine-graining of Hilbert space. This suggests that the Church-Turing thesis constrains the physical universe and thereby highlights a surprising connection between purely logical and algorithmic considerations on the one hand and physical reality on the other.
Church-Turing Thesis as saying something about the scope and limitations of physical computing machines. Although this was not the intention of Church or Turing, the Physical Church Turing thesis is interesting in its own right. Consider, for example, Wolfram’s formulation: One can expect in fact that universal computers are as powerful in their computational capabilities as any physically realizable system can be, that they can simulate any physical system...Nophysically implementable procedure could then shortcut a computationally irreducible process. (Wolfram 1985) Wolfram’s thesis consists of two parts: (a) Any physical system can be simulated (to any degree of approximation) by a universal Turing machine (b) Complexity bounds on Turing machine simulations have physical significance. For example, suppose that the computation of the minimum energy of some system of n particles takes at least exponentially (in n) many steps. Then the relaxation time of the actual physical system to its minimum energy state will also take exponential time. An even more extreme formulation of (more or less) the same thesis is due to Aharonov (1998): A probabilistic Turing machine can simulate any reasonable physical device in polynomial cost. She calls this The Modern Church Thesis. Aharonov refers here to probabilistic Turing machines that use random numbers in addition to the usual deterministic table of steps. It seems that such machines are capable to perform certain tasks faster than fully deterministic machines. The most famous randomized algorithm of that kind concerns the decision whether a given natural number is prime. A probabilistic algorithm that decides primality in a number of