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arXiv:1410.3631

Entanglement gives rise to Pareto optimality in the generalised quantum Hawk-Dove Game

E. A. B. Lindsell, Karoline Wiesner

Published Oct 14, 2014• 4 citations
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Abstract

We quantise the generalised Hawk-Dove Game. By restricting the strategy space available to the players, we show that every game of this type can be extended into the quantum realm to produce a Pareto optimal evolutionarily stable strategy. This equilibrium replaces the inefficient classical one when the entanglement prepared in the game exceeds a critical threshold value, which we derive analytically.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1410.3631

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We quantise the generalised Hawk-Dove Game. By restricting the strategy space available to the players, we show that every game of this type can be extended into the quantum realm to produce a Pareto optimal evolutionarily stable strategy. This equilibrium replaces the inefficient classical one when the entanglement prepared in the game exceeds a critical threshold value, which we derive analytically.
本文介绍量子博弈和量子演化博弈的基本概念,并分析鹰鸽博弈的量子策略和量子演化稳定策略。量子策略可以得到鹰鸽博弈的Pareto均衡,我们发现在资源利益比损失多情况下,鹰鹰策略不仅是Nash均衡还是量子演化稳定策略。 We introduce the basic concepts of quantum strategy and quantum evolution stable strategy and use them to analyze the Hawk-Dove game. We find that quantum strategy can realize the Pareto equilibrium by Dove-Dove strategy and the Hawk-Hawk strategy is not only a Nash equilibrium, but also a quantum evolution stable strategy when the re-source gain is larger than the loss in the Hawk-Dove game.
We quantize the Hawk–Dove game by using the most general form of a pure initial state to investigate the existence of pure and mixed evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). An example is considered to draw a comparison between the classical and quantum version of the game. Our choice of the most general initial quantum state enables us to make the game symmetric or asymmetric. We show that for a particular set of game parameters where there exists only mixed ESS in the classical version of the game, quantization allows even a pure strategy to be an ESS for the symmetric game in addition to mixed ESS. On the other hand only pure strategy ESS can exist for the asymmetric quantum version of the Hawk–Dove game.
In this paper,using the theory of Quantum game established a quantum model of the hawk-dove game under asymmetric information,find the quantum Nash equilibrium strategy with different values of entanglement.And comparison with the classical game theory.In conditions of the classic game,we come to several equilibrium strategies which associated with conflict costs.In conditions of the quantum game,when the entanglement is equal to we draw a only Nash equilibrium strategy which unrelated with conflict costs.Classical game equilibrium strategy is a special case of quantum,where the entanglement is equal to zero.So this promotes the Nash equilibrium strategy of hawk-dove game,also greatly simplifies the operation.
Quantum “cash in a hat” game has been investigated in this paper. The new quantum game can cease the “moral hazard” and naturally leads both players to the Pareto optimal solution under the maximal entangled state. We also exploit the influence of the degree of the entanglement on the quantum game. It is revealed that there exist two threshold, a classical threshold γtucand a quantum threshold γthQfor γ ϵ [0, π/2]. The quantum game still behave “classically” if γ ≤ γtucand moral hazard can be overcome if γ > γthq. It should be underlined that there exists a Nash equilibrium between γthcand γthQ, which is unfortunately not Pareto optimal.
N. Vyas and C. Benjamin (arXiv:1701.08573[quant-ph]) propose a new mixed strategy for the (quantum) Hawk-Dove and Prisoners' Dilemma games and argue that this strategy yields payoffs, which cannot be obtained in the corresponding classical games. They conclude that this refutes the earlier assertion by S.J. van Enk and R. Pike that the quantum equilibrium solution is present in a corresponding extended classical game. This paper argues that the scheme suggested by N. Vyas and C. Benjamin changes the rules of the original game, and hence it does not refute the argument put forward by van Enk and Pike.