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arXiv:1409.3525

Cryptographic security of quantum key distribution

Christopher Portmann, Renato Renner

Published Sep 11, 2014• 154 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This work is intended as an introduction to cryptographic security and a motivation for the widely used Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) security definition. We review the notion of security necessary for a protocol to be usable in a larger cryptographic context, i.e., for it to remain secure when composed with other secure protocols. We then derive the corresponding security criterion for QKD. We provide several examples of QKD composed in sequence and parallel with different cryptographic schemes to illustrate how the error of a composed protocol is the sum of the errors of the individual protocols. We also discuss the operational interpretations of the distance metric used to quantify these errors.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1409.3525

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This work is intended as an introduction to cryptographic security and a motivation for the widely used Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) security definition. We review the notion of security necessary for a protocol to be usable in a larger cryptographic context, i.e., for it to remain secure when composed with other secure protocols. We then derive the corresponding security criterion for QKD. We provide several examples of QKD composed in sequence and parallel with different cryptographic schemes to illustrate how the error of a composed protocol is the sum of the errors of the individual protocols. We also discuss the operational interpretations of the distance metric used to quantify these errors.
The security issues facing quantum key distribution (QKD) are explained, herein focusing on those issues that are cryptographic and information theoretic in nature and not those based on physics. The problem of security criteria is addressed. It is demonstrated that an attacker's success probabilities are the fundamental criteria of security that any theoretic security criterion must relate to in order to have operational significance. The errors committed in the prevalent interpretation of the trace distance criterion are analyzed. The security proofs of QKD protocols are discussed and assessed in regard to three main features: their validity, completeness, and adequacy of the achieved numerical security level. Problems are identified in all these features. It appears that the QKD security situation is quite different from the common perception that a QKD-generated key is nearly perfectly secure. Built into our discussion is a simple but complete quantitative description of the information theoretic security of classical key distribution that is also applicable to the quantum situation. In the Appendixes, we provide a brief outline of the history of some major QKD security proofs, a rather unfavorable comparison of current QKD proven security with that of conventional symmetric key ciphers, and a list of objections and answers concerning some major points of this paper.
If we combine two secure cryptographic systems, is the resulting system still secure?Answering this question is highly nontrivial and has recently sparked a considerable research effort, in particular, in the area of classical cryptography.A central insight was that the answer to the question is yes, but only within a well-specified composability framework and for carefully chosen security definitions.In this article, we review several aspects of composability in the context of quantum cryptography.The first part is devoted to key distribution.We discuss the security criteria that a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol must fulfill to allow its safe use within a larger security application (e.g. for secure message transmission); and we demonstrate-by an explicit example-what can go wrong if conventional (non-composable) security definitions are used.Finally, to illustrate the practical use of composability, we show how to generate a continuous key stream by sequentially composing rounds of a QKD protocol.In the second part, we take a more general point of view, which is necessary for the study of cryptographic situations involving, for example, mutually distrustful parties.We explain the universal composability (UC) framework and state the composition theorem that guarantees that secure protocols can securely be composed to larger applications.We focus on the secure composition of quantum protocols into unconditionally secure classical protocols.However, the resulting security definition is so strict that some tasks become impossible without additional security assumptions.Quantum bit commitment is impossible in the UC framework even with mere computational security.Similar problems arise in the quantum bounded storage model and we observe a trade-off between the UC and the use of the weakest possible security assumptions.
Quantum key distribution (QKD), another name for quantum cryptography, is the most advanced subfield of quantum information and communication technology (QICT). The first QKD protocol was proposed in 1984, and since then, more protocols have been proposed. It uses quantum mechanics to enable secure exchange of cryptographic keys. In order to have high confidence in the security of the QKD protocols, such protocols must be proven to be secure against any arbitrary attacks. In this chapter, we discuss and demonstrate security proofs for QKD protocols. Security analysis of QKD protocols can be categorised into two techniques, namely infinite-key and finite-key analyses. Finite-key analysis offers more realistic results than the infinite-key one, while infinite-key analysis provides more simplicity. We briefly provide the background of QKD and also define the basic notion of security in QKD protocols. The cryptographic key is shared between Alice and Bob. Since the key is random and unknown to an eavesdropper, Eve, she is unable to learn anything about the message simply by intercepting the ciphertext. This phenomenon is beyond the ability of classical information processing. We then study some tools that are used in the derivation of security proofs for the infinite- and finite-length key limits.
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is quantified by a parameter ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, which -- under well-defined physical assumptions -- can be bounded explicitly. This contrasts with computationally secure schemes, where security claims are only asymptotic (i.e., under standard complexity assumptions, one only knows that ε→0\varepsilon \to 0ε→0 as the key size grows, but has no explicit bound). Here we explain the definition and interpretation of ε\varepsilonε-security. Adopting an axiomatic approach, we show that ε\varepsilonε can be understood as the maximum probability of a security failure. Finally, we review and address several criticisms of this definition that have appeared in the literature.
The emergence of quantum computing has provided new paradigms for cryptography. On the one hand, it poses significant new threats to existing classically cryptographic systems, requiring the community to define new security models that capture what a quantum adversary can do. On the other hand, it gives us new tools to design cryptographic protocols, with weaker assumptions than in the classical world, or even protocols that are impossible classically. In this survey, we first give an overview of new security definitions for classical cryptography, considering quantum adversaries who can either only use local quantum computation (post-quantum security), or even send quantum messages and in particular have access to oracle in superposition (quantum security). We explore these new notions through the examples of commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, encryption, and signatures. Then, we present what is arguably the most famous application of quantum cryptography: quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that take advantage of unique properties of quantum mechanics to provide secure communication unconditionally. We also explore cryptography beyond QKD, focusing on unclonable cryptography: a family of cryptographic functionalities, built with quantum states, and designed to be resistant to counterfeit by leveraging the “no-cloning” theorem. We examine in particular quantum money, but also the recent notions of unclonable encryption and copy-protection, including related variants. By presenting a comprehensive survey of these topics, this paper aims to provide a thorough understanding of the current landscape and future potential of quantum cryptography.
This chapter introduces Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), a key cryptographic technology that employs quantum mechanics to enhance communication security. Central to QKD is its use of quantum principles such as superposition, entanglement, and the no-cloning theorem, which collectively facilitate the generation of secure cryptographic keys. These keys are secure against both traditional cryptographic attacks and those posed by emerging quantum computing technologies. The chapter begins with a detailed introduction to the core concepts of QKD, explaining how it fundamentally differs from classical cryptographic methods by ensuring security based on the laws of physics rather than computational complexity. It traces the historical evolution of QKD, from early theoretical formulations to its current implementations and the development of key protocols like the BB84, which marked a significant milestone in practical QKD applications. As the discussion progresses, the chapter explores various sophisticated QKD protocols, including E91, decoy-state, and Measurement Device Independent (MDI) protocols. Each protocol is analysed for its operational mechanics, security features, and the specific challenges it addresses in protecting data against quantum threats. The technical complexities and requirements for implementing these protocols in real-world scenarios are also examined, showing their potential and limitations for extending secure communication networks. Moreover, the chapter evaluates the practical challenges associated with QKD, such as managing transmission distances, environmental susceptibilities, and the infrastructural demands of deploying quantum networks. It concludes by highlighting the future directions of QKD, underscoring its growing integration into critical global communication infrastructures, and its significant potential to revolutionize data security in the quantum age. This chapter presents the significance of QKD in modern cryptography, demonstrating its evolution from a conceptual framework to a fundamental technology set to counteract the challenges of quantum decryption. Through this approach, the chapter demonstrates the critical role of QKD in fortifying the foundations of secure communications worldwide.