Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1408.1651

Comment on: Maximal violation of Bell inequalities by position measurements

Detlef Dürr, Sheldon Goldstein, Tim Maudlin, Robin Schlenga, Daniel V. Tausk, Roderich Tumulka, Nino Zanghì

Published Aug 7, 2014• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In an article published in 2010, Kiukas and Werner claim to have shown that Bohmian Mechanics does not make the same empirical predictions as ordinary Quantum Mechanics. We explain that such claim is wrong.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1408.1651

Related papers

Reply to "Maximal violation of Bell inequalities by position measurements"

Daniel V. Tausk

In a recent article, Kiukas and Werner claim to have shown that Bohmian Mechanics does not make the same empirical predictions as ordinary Quantum Mechanics. More precisely, they have shown that ordinary Quantum Mechanics predicts maximal violations of the CHSH-Bell inequality for a certain experiment in which only position measurements are performed on two noninteracting entangled free non-relativistic particles. Kiukas and Werner claim that Bohmian Mechanics doesn't predict a violation of the CHSH-Bell inequality for that experiment. We explain that such claim is wrong and that the argument supporting their claim neglects the fact that Bohmian Mechanics does not satisfy all the assumptions needed to prove the CHSH-Bell inequality. We also clear up another few misconceptions about Bohmian Mechanics appearing in their article.

arXiv:1408.2900•Aug 13, 2014•0 citations

Is Bohmian Mechanics an empirically adequate theory?

Kim Joris Boström

Bohmian mechanics (BM) draws a picture of nature, which is completely different from that drawn by standard quantum mechanics (SQM): Particles are at any time at a definite position, and the universe evolves deterministically. Astonishingly, according to a proof by Bohm the empirical predictions of these two very different theories coincide. From the very beginning, BM has faced all kinds of criticism, most of which are either technical or philosophical. There is, however, a criticism first raised by Correggi et al. (2002) and recently strengthened by Kiukas and Werner (2010), which holds that, in spite of Bohm's proof, the predictions of BM do not agree with those of SQM in the case of local position measurements on entangled particles in a stationary state. Hence, given that SQM has been proven to be tremendously successful in the past, BM could most likely not be considered an empirically adequate theory. My aim is to resolve the conflict by showing that 1) it relies on hidden differences in the conceptual thinking, and that 2) the predictions of both theories approximately coincide if the process of measurement is adequately accounted for. My analysis makes no use of any sort of wavefunction collapse, refuting a widespread belief that an "effective collapse" is needed to reconcile BM with the predictions of SQM.

arXiv:1503.00201•Mar 1, 2015•4 citations

Bohmian Mechanics fails to compute multi-time correlations

Robert C. Helling

The violation of Bell type inequalities in quantum systems manifests that quantum states cannot be described by classical probability distributions. Yet, Bohmian mechanics is a realistic, non-local theory of classical particle trajectories that is claimed to be indistinguishable by observations from more traditional approaches to quantum mechanics. We set up a spatial version of the GHZ system with qubits realised as positional observables that demonstrates that the Bohmian theory fails to match predictions of textbook quantum mechanics (and most likely experients) unless enlarged by a microscopic theory of collapse of the wave function after observation. For this discrepancy to occur it is essential that positions at different times do not commute.

arXiv:2502.14449•Feb 20, 2025•0 citations

Why Bohmian Mechanics? One- and Two-Time Position Measurements, Bell Inequalities, Philosophy, and Physics

Nicolas Gisin

In Bohmian mechanics, particles follow continuous trajectories, so two-time position correlations have been well defined. However, Bohmian mechanics predicts the violation of Bell inequalities. Motivated by this fact, we investigate position measurements in Bohmian mechanics by coupling the particles to macroscopic pointers. This explains the violation of Bell inequalities despite two-time position correlations. We relate this fact to so-called surrealistic trajectories that, in our model, correspond to slowly moving pointers. Next, we emphasize that Bohmian mechanics, which does not distinguish between microscopic and macroscopic systems, implies that the quantum weirdness of quantum physics also shows up at the macro-scale. Finally, we discuss the fact that Bohmian mechanics is attractive to philosophers but not so much to physicists and argue that the Bohmian community is responsible for the latter.

arXiv:1509.00767•Entropy•Feb 2, 2018•57 citations

Bohmian mechanics contradicts quantum mechanics

Arnold Neumaier

It is shown that, for a harmonic oscillator in the ground state, Bohmian mechanics and quantum mechanics predict values of opposite sign for certain time correlations. The discrepancy can be explained by the fact that Bohmian mechanics has no natural way to accomodate the Heisenberg picture, since the local expectation values that define the beables of the theory depend on the Heisenberg time being used to define the operators. Relations to measurement are discussed, too, and shown to leave no loophole for claiming that Bohmian mechanics reproduces all predictions of quantum mechanics exactly.

arXiv:quant-ph/0001011•Jan 6, 2000•56 citations

Bohmian Mechanics: A Panacea for What Ails Quantum Mechanics, or a Different and Problematic Theory?

Aristidis Arageorgis, John Earman

The popular impression of Bohmian mechanics is that it is standard quantum mechanics with the addition of some extra gadgets---exact particle positions and a guiding equation for particle trajectories---the advantages being that the gadgets pave the way for a resolution of the measurement problem that eschews state vector reduction while restoring the determinism lost in standard quantum mechanics. In fact, the Bohmian mechanics departs in significant ways from standard quantum mechanics. By itself this is not a basis for criticism; indeed, it makes Bohmian mechanics all the more interesting. But Bohmian mechanics is not, as the popular impression would have it, empirically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics in terms of probabilistic predictions for the outcomes of measurements of quantum observables. Indeed, in physically important applications to systems for which standard quantum mechanics delivers empirically well-confirmed probabilistic predictions, the sophisticated form of Bohmian mechanics designed to prove the global existence of Bohmian particle trajectories fails to deliver unequivocal predictions---of even a probabilistic variety---for the future behavior of said systems. Possible responses to this lacuna are discussed.

•Apr 19, 2017•1 citation
In a recent article, Kiukas and Werner claim to have shown that Bohmian Mechanics does not make the same empirical predictions as ordinary Quantum Mechanics. More precisely, they have shown that ordinary Quantum Mechanics predicts maximal violations of the CHSH-Bell inequality for a certain experiment in which only position measurements are performed on two noninteracting entangled free non-relativistic particles. Kiukas and Werner claim that Bohmian Mechanics doesn't predict a violation of the CHSH-Bell inequality for that experiment. We explain that such claim is wrong and that the argument supporting their claim neglects the fact that Bohmian Mechanics does not satisfy all the assumptions needed to prove the CHSH-Bell inequality. We also clear up another few misconceptions about Bohmian Mechanics appearing in their article.
Bohmian mechanics (BM) draws a picture of nature, which is completely different from that drawn by standard quantum mechanics (SQM): Particles are at any time at a definite position, and the universe evolves deterministically. Astonishingly, according to a proof by Bohm the empirical predictions of these two very different theories coincide. From the very beginning, BM has faced all kinds of criticism, most of which are either technical or philosophical. There is, however, a criticism first raised by Correggi et al. (2002) and recently strengthened by Kiukas and Werner (2010), which holds that, in spite of Bohm's proof, the predictions of BM do not agree with those of SQM in the case of local position measurements on entangled particles in a stationary state. Hence, given that SQM has been proven to be tremendously successful in the past, BM could most likely not be considered an empirically adequate theory. My aim is to resolve the conflict by showing that 1) it relies on hidden differences in the conceptual thinking, and that 2) the predictions of both theories approximately coincide if the process of measurement is adequately accounted for. My analysis makes no use of any sort of wavefunction collapse, refuting a widespread belief that an "effective collapse" is needed to reconcile BM with the predictions of SQM.
The violation of Bell type inequalities in quantum systems manifests that quantum states cannot be described by classical probability distributions. Yet, Bohmian mechanics is a realistic, non-local theory of classical particle trajectories that is claimed to be indistinguishable by observations from more traditional approaches to quantum mechanics. We set up a spatial version of the GHZ system with qubits realised as positional observables that demonstrates that the Bohmian theory fails to match predictions of textbook quantum mechanics (and most likely experients) unless enlarged by a microscopic theory of collapse of the wave function after observation. For this discrepancy to occur it is essential that positions at different times do not commute.
In Bohmian mechanics, particles follow continuous trajectories, so two-time position correlations have been well defined. However, Bohmian mechanics predicts the violation of Bell inequalities. Motivated by this fact, we investigate position measurements in Bohmian mechanics by coupling the particles to macroscopic pointers. This explains the violation of Bell inequalities despite two-time position correlations. We relate this fact to so-called surrealistic trajectories that, in our model, correspond to slowly moving pointers. Next, we emphasize that Bohmian mechanics, which does not distinguish between microscopic and macroscopic systems, implies that the quantum weirdness of quantum physics also shows up at the macro-scale. Finally, we discuss the fact that Bohmian mechanics is attractive to philosophers but not so much to physicists and argue that the Bohmian community is responsible for the latter.
It is shown that, for a harmonic oscillator in the ground state, Bohmian mechanics and quantum mechanics predict values of opposite sign for certain time correlations. The discrepancy can be explained by the fact that Bohmian mechanics has no natural way to accomodate the Heisenberg picture, since the local expectation values that define the beables of the theory depend on the Heisenberg time being used to define the operators. Relations to measurement are discussed, too, and shown to leave no loophole for claiming that Bohmian mechanics reproduces all predictions of quantum mechanics exactly.
The popular impression of Bohmian mechanics is that it is standard quantum mechanics with the addition of some extra gadgets---exact particle positions and a guiding equation for particle trajectories---the advantages being that the gadgets pave the way for a resolution of the measurement problem that eschews state vector reduction while restoring the determinism lost in standard quantum mechanics. In fact, the Bohmian mechanics departs in significant ways from standard quantum mechanics. By itself this is not a basis for criticism; indeed, it makes Bohmian mechanics all the more interesting. But Bohmian mechanics is not, as the popular impression would have it, empirically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics in terms of probabilistic predictions for the outcomes of measurements of quantum observables. Indeed, in physically important applications to systems for which standard quantum mechanics delivers empirically well-confirmed probabilistic predictions, the sophisticated form of Bohmian mechanics designed to prove the global existence of Bohmian particle trajectories fails to deliver unequivocal predictions---of even a probabilistic variety---for the future behavior of said systems. Possible responses to this lacuna are discussed.