Phase-randomized light is one of the key assumptions in the security proof of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocol using an attenuated laser. Though the assumption has been believed to be satisfied for conventional systems, it should be reexamined for current high-speed QKD systems. The phase correlation may be induced by the overlap of the optical pulses, the interval of which decreases as the clock frequency increases. The phase randomness was investigated experimentally by measuring the visibility of interference. An asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer was used to observe the interference between adjacent pulses from a gain-switched distributed feedback laser diode driven at 10 GHz. Low visibility was observed when the minimum drive current was set far below the threshold, while interference emerged when the minimum drive current was close to the threshold. The theoretical evaluation on the impact of the imperfect phase randomization provides target values for the visibility to guarantee the phase randomness. The experimental and theoretical results show that secure implementation of decoy BB84 protocol is achievable even for the 10-GHz clock frequency by using the laser diode under proper operating conditions.
Phase-randomized light is one of the key assumptions in the security proof of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocol using an attenuated laser. Though the assumption has been believed to be satisfied for conventional systems, it should be reexamined for current high-speed QKD systems. The phase correlation may be induced by the overlap of the optical pulses, the interval of which decreases as the clock frequency increases. The phase randomness was investigated experimentally by measuring the visibility of interference. An asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer was used to observe the interference between adjacent pulses from a gain-switched distributed feedback laser diode driven at 10 GHz. Low visibility was observed when the minimum drive current was set far below the threshold, while interference emerged when the minimum drive current was close to the threshold. The theoretical evaluation on the impact of the imperfect phase randomization provides target values for the visibility to guarantee the phase randomness. The experimental and theoretical results show that secure implementation of decoy BB84 protocol is achievable even for the 10-GHz clock frequency by using the laser diode under proper operating conditions.
One of the key assumptions in the security proof of BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with a weak coherent light source is that the phase of each pulse emitted from the source is random. If the phases correlated, an efficient eavesdropping method exists, and more sacrifice bits are necessary to guarantee the security of the protocol. The phase correlation between the adjacent pulses was examined experimentally, for the first time, by measuring the visibility of interference. An asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer was used to observe the interference between adjacent pulses from a distributed feedback (DFB) laser diode driven by 10 GHz clock signal. Clear interference was observed when the DC bias current exceeds the laser threshold. This high visibility implies phase correlation between pulses. In contrast, only a low visibility, i.e. very weak phase correlation, was observed when the DC bias current was set far below the threshold. The phase correlation became stronger as the DC bias current increased. The experimental results imply that a QKD equipment implementing BB84 protocol with a coherent light source is secure as long as the laser is operated in gain-switch even for 10 GHz clock frequency.
Phase randomization is essential for the security of practical decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Commonly, implementations rely on laser sources which are either actively phase-randomized, or gain-switched. However, at high repetition rates these show correlations, which can ultimately compromise security and performance. We present a 1.25 GHz phase-randomized QKD source based on a super-luminescent light emitting diode (SLED) operating in the C-band as a compact and cost-effective alternative. The source generates ∼100 ps optical pulses with 400 ps pulse-to-pulse separation, compatible with high-speed time-bin encoding. Interferometric measurements demonstrate >99% visibility between adjacent time bins, confirming strong first-order coherence within the same quantum signals, while the spontaneous-emission-driven nature of the SLED ensures intrinsic global phase randomization between adjacent signals. This work establishes a scalable SLED-based platform for high-speed prepare-and-measure QKD systems.
One of the key assumptions in the security proof of BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with a weak coherent light source is that the phase of each pulse emitted from the source is random. If the phases correlated, an efficient eavesdropping method exists, and more sacrifice bits are necessary to guarantee the security of the protocol. The phase correlation between the adjacent pulses was examined experimentally, for the first time, by measuring the visibility of interference. An asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer was used to observe the interference between adjacent pulses from a distributed feedback (DFB) laser diode driven by 10 GHz clock signal. Clear interference was observed when the DC bias current exceeds the laser threshold. This high visibility implies phase correlation between pulses. In contrast, only a low visibility, i.e. very weak phase correlation, was observed when the DC bias current was set far below the threshold. The phase correlation became stronger as the DC bias current increased. The experimental results imply that a QKD equipment implementing BB84 protocol with a coherent light source is secure as long as the laser is operated in gain-switch even for 10 GHz clock frequency.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users to communicate with theoretically provable secrecy [1]. This is vitally important to secure the confidential data of governments, businesses and individuals. As the technology is adopted by a wider audience, a quantum network will become necessary for multi-party communication, as in the classical communication networks in use today. Unfortunately, a number of phase-encoded QKD protocols based on weak coherent pulses have been developed. Whilst the first protocol, proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84), is still commonly used, other protocols such as differential phase shift [2] or coherent one way QKD [3] are also adopted. Each protocol has its benefits; however all would require a different transmitter and receiver, increasing the complexity and cost of quantum networks. In this work we demonstrate a multi-protocol transmitter [4-6] that also has the benefits of small footprint, low power consumption and low complexity. We use this transmitter to give the first experimental demonstration of an improved version of the BB84 protocol, known as the differential quadrature phase shift protocol. We have achieved megabit per second secure key rates at short distances, and have shown secure key rates that are, on average, 2.71 times higher than the standard BB84 protocol. This enhanced performance over such a commonly adopted protocol, at no expense to experimental complexity, could lead to a widespread migration to the new protocol. The security of the BB84 protocol relies on each signal and reference pulse pair being globally phase randomised with respect to all other pulse pairs. In the DQPS protocol, blocks with a length L ≥ 2 are used and each block has a globally random phase with respect to all other blocks. Implementing this protocol would ordinarily require a high-speed random number generator and a phase modulator. As well as increasing device complexity, it would also require an unrealistic continuous source of electrical modulation signals for complete security. The transmitter we use injects light from a master laser diode into a 2 GHz gain-switched slave laser diode. The principal of optical injection locking means that the slave laser inherits the phase of the master laser. We apply modulations to the master laser current within a block to control the phase of the slave laser output pulses, and then drive the master laser below threshold for a short period of time when phase randomisation is required. This ensures the lasing comes from below threshold, thus the phase adopted by the slave laser pulse is completely random. We perform an autocorrelation measurement on the blocks to show their randomness. [1] N. Gisin et al. Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002). [2] K. Inoue et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 037902 (2002). [3] D. Stucki et al. Appl. Phys. Lett. 87 194108 (2005). [4] Z. Yuan et al. Phys. Rev. X. 6, 031044 (2016). [5] G. L. Roberts et al. Laser Phot. Rev. 11, 1700067 (2017). [6] G. L. Roberts et al. arXiv:1709.04214 [quant-ph] (2017).
Decoy-state methods are essential to perform quantum key distribution (QKD) at large distances in the absence of single-photon sources. However, the standard techniques apply only if laser pulses are used that are independent and identically distributed. Moreover, they require that the laser pulses are fully phase randomized. However, realistic high-speed QKD setups do not meet these stringent requirements. In this work, we generalize decoy-state analysis to accommodate laser sources that emit imperfectly phase-randomized states. We also develop theoretical tools to prove the security of protocols with lasers that emit pulses that are independent, but not identically distributed. These tools can be used with recent work [G. Curr\'as-Lorenzo, S. Nahar, N. L\"utkenhaus, K. Tamaki, and M. Curty, Quantum Sci. Technol. (2023)] to prove the security of laser sources with correlated phase distributions as well. We quantitatively demonstrate the effect of imperfect phase randomization on key rates by computing the key rates for a simple implementation of the three-state protocol.
Security certification of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems under practical conditions is necessary for social deployment. This article focused on the transmitter, and, in particular, investigated the intensity fluctuation of the optical pulses emitted by a gain-switched semiconductor laser used in QKD systems implementing decoy-BB84 protocol. A large intensity fluctuation was observed for low excitation, showing strong negative correlation between the adjacent pulses, which would affect the final key rate. The fluctuation decreased and the correlation disappeared as excitation increased. Simulation with rate equations successfully reproduced the experimental results and revealed that the large fluctuation originates from an intrinsic instability of gain-switched lasers driven periodically at a rate comparable to the inverse of carrier lifetime, as in GHz-clock QKD systems. Methods for further reduction of the intensity fluctuation were also discussed.