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arXiv:1406.4342 · Nature Communications

Experimental quantum key distribution with finite-key security analysis for noisy channels

Davide Bacco, Matteo Canale, Nicola Laurenti, Giuseppe Vallone, Paolo Villoresi

Published Sep 6, 2013• 56 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1038/ncomms3363

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