In this article, we propose quantum position verification (QPV) schemes where all the channels are untrusted except the position of the prover and distant reference stations of verifiers. We review and analyze the existing QPV schemes containing some pre-shared data between the prover and verifiers. Most of these schemes are based on non-cryptographic assumptions, i.e. quantum/classical channels between the verifiers are secure. It seems impractical in an environment fully controlled by adversaries and would lead to security compromise in practical implementations. However, our proposed formula for QPV is more robust, secure and according to the standard assumptions of cryptography. Furthermore, once the position of the prover is verified, our schemes establish secret keys in parallel and can be used for authentication and secret communication between the prover and verifiers.
In this work, we study position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. The aim is to use the geographical position of a party as its only credential. On the negative side, we show that if adversaries are allowed to share an arbitrarily large entangled quantum state, the task of secure position-verification is impossible. To this end, we prove the following very general result. Assume that Alice and Bob hold respectively subsystems
A and
B of a (possibly) unknown quantum state
∣ψ⟩∈HA⊗HB. Their goal is to calculate and share a new state
∣φ⟩=U∣ψ⟩, where
U is a fixed unitary operation. The question that we ask is how many rounds of mutual communication are needed. It is easy to achieve such a task using two rounds of classical communication, whereas, in general, it is impossible with no communication at all. Surprisingly, in case Alice and Bob share enough entanglement to start with and we allow an arbitrarily small failure probability, we show that the same task can be done using a single round of classical communication in which Alice and Bob exchange two classical messages. Actually, we prove that a relaxed version of the task can be done with no communication at all, where the task is to compute instead a state
∣φ′⟩ that coincides with
∣φ⟩=U∣ψ⟩ up to local operations on
A and on
B, which are determined by classical information held by Alice and Bob. The one-round scheme for the original task then follows as a simple corollary. We also show that these results generalize to more players. As a consequence, we show a generic attack that breaks any position-verification scheme. On the positive side, we show that if adversaries do not share any entangled quantum state but can compute arbitrary quantum operations, secure position-verification is achievable. Jointly, these results suggest the interesting question whether secure position-verification is possible in case of a bounded amount of entanglement. Our positive result can be interpreted as resolving this question in the simplest case, where the bound is set to zero. In models where secure position-verification is achievable, it has a number of interesting applications. For example, it enables secure communication over an insecure channel without having any preshared key, with the guarantee that only a party at a specific location can learn the content of the conversation. More generally, we show that in settings where secure position-verification is achievable, other position-based cryptographic schemes are possible as well, such as secure position-based authentication and position-based key agreement.
Abstract Quantum position verification (QPV) enables multiple verifiers to certify a prover’s location using quantum communication and physical assumptions. With experimental demonstrations of QPV becoming increasingly feasible, enhancing the practicality and security of QPV protocols is more important than ever. In this work, we make three key contributions toward this goal. First, we introduce a robust QPV protocol in which the verifier’s state preparation is independent of channel loss, improving reliability in real-world conditions. Second, we refine existing security analysis techniques to bolster protocol resilience against experimental imperfections. Third, we identify and address some implicit assumptions present in existing security analyses, providing a framework to eliminate such assumptions. Additionally, as an example of QPV application beyond location verification, we illustrate how QPV can be leveraged for authenticating classical communication in quantum key distribution.
Position verification is an emerging field of quantum cryptography. Its goal is to verify whether a distant communicating party is telling the truth about where they are. However, the problem is usually formulated in a way that the position is the only credential of that party, which cannot guarantee uniqueness. In this study, the authors show how a practically secure position verification algorithm – assuming it exists – might be used to track (i.e. repeatedly verify the position) of some unique key or cipher text. To achieve this, they rely on pre‐prepared position verification data called trackers. They also propose three algorithms that implement their general tracking scheme and examine some questions related to their security. These implementations include shuffling trackers into valuable data and hiding their memory address through a random permutation; using CNOT operations to entangle valuable data and trackers; and using random qubit strings from which either trackers or secret keys can be produced at will. These methods may be used to track a diplomatic package or reveal the location of a malicious party during a denial of service attack.
This thesis deals with position-based quantum cryptography (PBQC), a type of quantum cryptography. More concretely, we focus on the design and study of quantum position verification (QPV) protocols, which act as a building block for PBQC. We prioritise the development of QPV protocols that are loss-tolerant, error-robust, and feasible with current or near-future technology, concentrating on photon-based protocols and linear-optical equipment. We also theoretically study different attack settings on QPV in the context of state discrimination, dealing with the interplay between non-locality and interaction. We introduce a new QPV protocol based on the SWAP test and Hong-Ou-Mandel interference and study it in detail regarding attacks and practical feasibility. We further provide a solution to a major practical issue of QPV -- signal loss. A minor modification of the standard structure of QPV, namely introducing a small time delay and a commitment to play from the honest prover, allows us to provably make the transmission loss between the verifiers and the honest party irrelevant for security for a class of QPV protocols. Moreover, we generalise and study QPV protocols in the continuous-variable setting. Exploring theoretical aspects of QPV attacks, we focus on the difference between quantum and classical communication. We show new bounds on existing protocols, construct protocols that can be attacked with quantum communication but not locally, show a separation between quantum and classical communication attacks on QPV, and derive a necessary condition on the attack error based on the structure of the QPV input ensemble.
Chandran, et al. introduce the direction of position based cryptography at CRYPTO 2009. In position based cryptography, the position of a party is used to be its unique “credential” in order to realize the cryptographic tasks, such as position based encryption, position based signature, position based key exchange and so on. Position based key exchange, as a basic primitive in position based cryptography, can be used to establish a shared key based on the position of the participant. To begin with, this paper presents the notions of the prover-to-verifier mode and the prover-to-prover mode for position based key exchange. In the prover-to-verifier mode, a secret key can be shared between a prover and the verifiers according to the position of the prover. While in the prover-to-prover mode, two provers located at the valid positions can negotiate a shared key with the help of the verifiers and any other party whose position is illegal cannot obtain the shared key. At the same time, this paper formalizes two security definitions against colluding adversaries: position based prover-to-verifier key exchange and position based prover-to-prover key exchange. Then, this paper introduces the bounded retrieval model and the implementations of position based key exchange in two modes based on the bounded retrieval model. Finally, this paper discusses the position based key exchange protocols in two modes from both security and performance perspectives.