It is argued that the recent definition of a realistic physics theory by N. Gisin cannot be considered comprehensive unless it is supplemented with requirement that any realistic theory must be computationally realistic as well.
It is argued that any possible definition of a realistic physics theory – i.e., a mathematical model representing the real world – cannot be considered comprehensive unless it is supplemented with requirement of being computationally realistic. That is, the mathematical structure of a realistic model of a physical system must allow the collection of all the system's physical quantities to compute all possible measurement outcomes on some computational device not only in an unambiguous way but also in a reasonable amount of time. In the paper, it is shown that a deterministic quantum model of a microscopic system evolving in isolation should be regarded as realistic since the NP-hard problem of finding the exact solution to the Schrödinger equation for an arbitrary physical system can be surely solved in a reasonable amount of time in the case, in which the system has just a small number of degrees of freedom. In contrast to this, the deterministic quantum model of a truly macroscopic object ought to be considered as non-realistic since in a world of limited computational resources the intractable problem possessing that enormous amount of degrees of freedom would be the same as mere unsolvable.
Much has been discussed in the philosophy of science about how we should understand the scientific enterprise. On the one hand, scientific realists believe that empirically adequate theories can be supplemented by interpretations that can mirror reality-as-it-is; on the other hand, anti-realists argue that this is not the case, as long as scientific theories make sufficiently accurate experimental predictions the addition of narratives is irrelevant for the scientific enterprise, and regarding narratives, it is preferable to remain agnostic. In this paper, we argue that realism was never really at stake in this debate.
The so-called “orthodox” interpretation of quantum physics attributed to Niels Bohr is commonly regarded as abandoning realism. I have already opposed this view elsewhere (Folse 1985) but partially in response to criticism of my position (Shimony 1985), here I propose to relate Bohr’s realism to recent contributions to the realism debate given by Hacking (1983), Cartwright (1983), and Ellis (1985). Specifically, I argue that Bohr’s complementarity viewpoint requires a causal entity realism. Furthermore, labeling Bohr an anti-realist with respect to theories is misleading because it assumes the correspondence theory of truth that Bohr holds quantum theory forces us to reject. Although there are many realist views, I take the root of realism to be the quest for knowledge about the reality producing the phenomena we experience. It is realism in this sense that Bohr defended and that makes science significant to metaphysics.
Recent experiments of Gröblacher et al proved the violation of a Leggett-type inequality that was claimed to be valid for a broad class of non-local hidden-variable theories. The impossibility of constructing a non-local and realistic theory, unless it entails highly counterintuitive features, seems thus to have been experimentally proved. This would bring us close to a definite refutation of realism. Indeed, realism was proved to be also incompatible with locality, according to a series of experiments testing Bell inequalities. The present paper addresses the said experiments of Gröblacher et al and presents an explicit, contextual and realistic, model that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics. It thus violates the Leggett-type inequality that was established with the aim of ruling out a supposedly broad class of non-local models. We can thus conclude that plausible contextual, realistic, models are still tenable. This restates the possibility of a future completion of quantum mechanics by a realistic and contextual theory which is not in a class containing only highly counterintuitive models. The class that was ruled out by the experiments of Gröblacher et al is thus proved to be a limited one, arbitrarily separating models that physically belong in the same class.