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arXiv:1312.2801

Non-local common cause explanations for EPR

Matthias Egg, Michaël Esfeld

Published Dec 10, 2013• 0 citations
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Abstract

The paper argues that a causal explanation of the correlated outcomes of EPR-type experiments is desirable and possible. It shows how Bohmian mechanics and the GRW mass density theory offer such an explanation in terms of a non-local common cause.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1312.2801

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Standard common causal explanations of the EPR situation assume a so-called joint common cause system that is a common cause for all correlations. However, the assumption of a joint common cause system together with some other physically motivated assumptions concerning locality and no-conspiracy results in various Bell inequalities. Since Bell inequalities are violated for appropriate measurement settings, a local, non-conspiratorial joint common causal explanation of the EPR situation is ruled out. But why do we assume that a common causal explanation of a set of correlation consists in finding a joint common cause system for all correlations and not just in finding separate common cause systems for the different correlations? What are the \nperspectives of a local, non-conspiratorial separate common causal explanation for the EPR scenario? And finally, how do Bell inequalities relate to the weaker assumption of separate common cause systems? \n
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In this paper I assess the adequacy of no-conspiracy conditions present in the usual derivations of the Bell inequality in the context of EPR correlations. First, I look at the EPR correlations from a purely phenomenological point of view and claim that common cause explanations of these can not be ruled out. I argue that an appropriate common cause explanation requires that no-conspiracy conditions are re-interpreted as mere common cause-measurement independence conditions. Violations of measurement independence thus need not entail any kind of conspiracy (nor backwards in time causation). This new reading of measurement dependence provides the grounds for an explicitly non-factorizable (in the sense of Bell’s factorizability) common cause model for EPR. 1
In his recent work, Michael Redhead (1986, 1987, 1989, 1990) has introduced a condition he calls robustness which, he argues, a relation must satisfy in order to be causal. He has used this condition to argue further that EPR-type correlations are neither the result of a direct causal connection between the correlated events, nor the result of a common cause associated with the source of the particle pairs which feature in these events. Andrew Elby (1992) has used this same condition as a premise in an independent argument for the conclusion that EPR-type correlations cannot be causally explained (except, perhaps, by a nonlocal hidden variable theory). I wish to argue here that robustness is itself too fragile a notion to support such conclusions.