Bellʼs 1964 theorem causes a severe problem for the notion that correlations require explanation, encapsulated in Reichenbachʼs principle of common cause. Despite being a hallmark of scientific thought, dropping the principle has been widely regarded as much less bitter medicine than the perceived alternative—dropping relativistic causality. Recently, however, some authors have proposed that modified forms of Reichenbachʼs principle could be maintained even with relativistic causality. Here we break down Reichenbachʼs principle into two independent assumptions—the principle of common cause proper and factorization of probabilities . We show how Bellʼs theorem can be derived from these two assumptions plus relativistic causality and the law of total probability for actual events, and we review proposals to drop each of these assumptions in light of the theorem. In particular, we show that the non-commutative common causes of Hofer-Szabó and Vecsernyés fail to have an analogue of the notion that the common causes can explain the observed correlations. Moreover, we show that their definition can be satisfied trivially by any quantum product state for any quantum correlations. We also discuss how the conditional states approach of Leifer and Spekkens fares in this regard. This article is part of a special issue of Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical devoted to ‘50 years of Bell’s theorem’.
Bellʼs 1964 theorem causes a severe problem for the notion that correlations require explanation, encapsulated in Reichenbachʼs principle of common cause. Despite being a hallmark of scientific thought, dropping the principle has been widely regarded as much less bitter medicine than the perceived alternative—dropping relativistic causality. Recently, however, some authors have proposed that modified forms of Reichenbachʼs principle could be maintained even with relativistic causality. Here we break down Reichenbachʼs principle into two independent assumptions—the principle of common cause proper and factorization of probabilities . We show how Bellʼs theorem can be derived from these two assumptions plus relativistic causality and the law of total probability for actual events, and we review proposals to drop each of these assumptions in light of the theorem. In particular, we show that the non-commutative common causes of Hofer-Szabó and Vecsernyés fail to have an analogue of the notion that the common causes can explain the observed correlations. Moreover, we show that their definition can be satisfied trivially by any quantum product state for any quantum correlations. We also discuss how the conditional states approach of Leifer and Spekkens fares in this regard. This article is part of a special issue of Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical devoted to ‘50 years of Bell’s theorem’.
Reichenbach's principle asserts that if two observed variables are found to be correlated, then there should be a causal explanation of these correlations.Furthermore, if the explanation is in terms of a common cause, then the conditional probability distribution over the variables given the complete common cause should factorize.The principle is generalized by the formalism of causal models, in which the causal relationships among variables constrain the form of their joint probability distribution.In the quantum case, however, the observed correlations in Bell experiments cannot be explained in the manner Reichenbach's principle would seem to demand.Motivated by this, we introduce a quantum counterpart to the principle.We demonstrate that under the assumption that quantum dynamics is fundamentally unitary, if a quantum channel with input A and outputs B and C is compatible with A being a complete common cause of B and C, then it must factorize in a particular way.Finally, we show how to generalize our quantum version of Reichenbach's principle to a formalism for quantum causal models and provide examples of how the formalism works.
Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is the claim that if two events are correlated, then either there is a causal connection between the correlated events that is responsible for the correlation or there is a third event, a so called (Reichenbachian) common cause, which brings about the correlation. The paper reviews some results concerning Reichenbach's notion of common cause, results that are directly relevant to the problem of how one can falsifY Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. Special emphasis will be put on the question of whether EPR-type correlations can have an explanation in terms of Reichenbachian common causes. Most of the results to be recalled indicate that falsifYing Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is much more tricky than one may have thought and that, contrary to some claims in the literature, there is no conclusive proof yet that the EPR correlations predicted by ordinary, non-relativistic quantum mechanics cannot have a common cause; furthermore, recent results about possible Reichenbachian common causes of correlations predicted by quantum field states between spacelike separated local observable algebras in algebraic quantum field theory strongly indicate that there may very well exist Reichenbachian common causes of superluminal correlations predicted by quantum field theory.
This paper is the philosopher-friendly version of our more technical work (Hofer-Szabó and Vecsernyés, 2014). It aims to give a clear-cut definition of Bell's notion of local causality. Having provided a framework, called local physical theory, which integrates probabilistic and spatiotemporal concepts, we formulate the notion of local causality and relate it to other locality and causality concepts. Then we compare Bell's local causality with Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle and relate both to the Bell inequalities. We find a nice parallelism: both local causality and the Common Cause Principle are more general notions than captured by the Bell inequalities. Namely, Bell inequalities cannot be derived neither from local causality nor from a common cause unless the local physical theory is classical or the common cause is commuting, respectively.
Reichenbach's principle asserts that if two observed variables are found to be correlated, then there should be a causal explanation of these correlations.Furthermore, if the explanation is in terms of a common cause, then the conditional probability distribution over the variables given the complete common cause should factorize.The principle is generalized by the formalism of causal models, in which the causal relationships among variables constrain the form of their joint probability distribution.In the quantum case, however, the observed correlations in Bell experiments cannot be explained in the manner Reichenbach's principle would seem to demand.Motivated by this, we introduce a quantum counterpart to the principle.We demonstrate that under the assumption that quantum dynamics is fundamentally unitary, if a quantum channel with input A and outputs B and C is compatible with A being a complete common cause of B and C, then it must factorize in a particular way.Finally, we show how to generalize our quantum version of Reichenbach's principle to a formalism for quantum causal models and provide examples of how the formalism works.
Many of the heated arguments about the meaning of 'Bellʼs theorem' arise because this phrase can refer to two different theorems that John Bell proved, the first in 1964 and the second in 1976.His 1964 theorem is the incompatibility of quantum phenomena with the dual assumptions of locality and determinism.His 1976 theorem is the incompatibility of quantum phenomena with the unitary property of local causality.This is contrary to Bellʼs own later assertions, that his 1964 theorem began with that single, and indivisible, assumption of local causality (even if not by that name).While there are other forms of Bellʼs theorems-which I present to explain the relation between Jarrett-completeness, 'fragile locality', and EPR-completeness-I maintain that Bellʼs two versions are the essential ones.Although the two Bellʼs theorems are logically equivalent, their assumptions are not, and the different versions of the theorem suggest quite different conclusions, which are embraced by different communities.For realists, the notion of local causality, ruled out by Bellʼs 1976 theorem, is motivated implicitly by Reichenbachʼs principle of common cause and explicitly by the principle of relativistic causality, and it is the latter which must be forgone.Operationalists pay no heed to Reichenbachʼs principle, but wish to keep the principle of relativistic causality, which, bolstered by an implicit 'principle of agent-causation', implies their notion of locality.Thus for operationalists, Bellʼs theorem is the 1964 one, and implies that it is determinism that must be forgone.I discuss why the two 'camps' are drawn to these different conclusions, and what can be done to increase mutual understanding.
It is shown that, given any finite set of pairs of random events in a Boolean algebra which are correlated with respect to a fixed probability measure on the algebra, the algebra can be extended in such a way that the extension contains events that can be regarded as common causes of the correlations in the sense of Reichenbach's definition of common cause. It is shown, further, that, given any quantum probability space and any set of commuting events in it which are correlated with respect to a fixed quantum state, the quantum probability space can be extended in such a way that the extension contains common causes of all the selected correlations, where common cause is again taken in the sense of Reichenbachs definition. It is argued that these results very strongly restrict the possible ways of disproving Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.