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arXiv:1307.7989 · Foundations of Physics

Ontological Models, Preparation Contextuality and Nonlocality

Manik Banik, Some Sankar Bhattacharya, Sujit K. Choudhary, Amit Mukherjee, Arup Roy

Published Oct 7, 2014• 17 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s10701-014-9839-4

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Abstract An ontological model is termed as maximally ψ -epistemic if the overlap between any two quantum states is fully accounted for by the overlap of their respective probability distributions of ontic states. However, in the literature, there exist two different mathematical definitions (termed here as 1M ψ E and 2M ψ E) that capture the equivalent notion of maximal ψ -epistemicity. In this work, we provide three theorems to critically examine the connections between preparation non-contextuality and the aforementioned two definitions of maximal ψ -epistemicity. In theorem 1, we provide a simple and direct argument of an existing proof to demonstrate that the mixed state preparation non-contextuality implies the first definition of maximal ψ -epistemicity. In theorem 2, we prove that the second definition of maximal ψ -epistemicity implies pure-state preparation non-contextuality. If both the definitions capture the equivalent notion of maximal ψ -epistemicity, then from the aforementioned two theorems one infers that the mixed-state preparation non-contextuality implies pure-state preparation non-contextuality. But, in theorem 3, we demonstrate that the mixed-state preparation non-contextuality in an ontological model implies pure-state contextuality and vice versa. This leads one to conclude that 1M ψ E and 2M ψ E capture inequivalent notions of maximal ψ -epistemicity. The implications of our results and their connections to other no-go theorems are discussed.
In the framework of ontological models, the inherently nonclassical features of quantum theory always seem to involve properties that are fine tuned, i.e. properties that hold at the operational level but break at the ontological level. Their appearance at the operational level is due to unexplained special choices of the ontological parameters, which is what we mean by a fine tuning. Famous examples of such features are contextuality and nonlocality. In this article, we develop a theory-independent mathematical framework for characterizing operational fine tunings. These are distinct from causal fine tunings – already introduced by Wood and Spekkens in [NJP,17 033002(2015)] – as the definition of an operational fine tuning does not involve any assumptions about the underlying causal structure. We show how known examples of operational fine tunings, such as Spekkens' generalized contextuality, violation of parameter independence in Bell experiment, and ontological time asymmetry, fit into our framework. We discuss the possibility of finding new fine tunings and we use the framework to shed new light on the relation between nonlocality and generalized contextuality. Although nonlocality has often been argued to be a form of contextuality, this is only true when nonlocality consists of a violation of parameter independence. We formulate our framework also in the language of category theory using the concept of functors.
Abstract We show that it is possible to construct a preparation non-contextual ontological model that does not exhibit ‘transformation contextuality’ for single qubits in the stabilizer subtheory. In particular, we consider the ‘blowtorch’ map and show that it does not exhibit transformation contextuality under the Grassmann Wigner–Weyl–Moyal (WWM) qubit formalism. Furthermore, the transformation in this formalism can be fully expressed at order , where it satisfies all of Kolmogorov’s axioms of classical probability theory, and so does not qualify as a candidate quantum phenomenon. In particular, we find that the Grassmann WWM formalism at order corresponds to an ontological model governed by an additional set of constraints arising from the relations defining the Grassmann algebra. Due to this additional set of constraints, the allowed probability distributions in this model do not form a single convex set when expressed in terms of disjoint ontic states and so cannot be mapped to models whose states form a single convex set over disjoint ontic states. However, expressing the Grassmann WWM ontological model in terms of non-disjoint ontic states corresponding to the monomials of the Grassmann algebra results in a single convex set. We further show that a recent result by Lillystone et al that proves a broad class of preparation and measurement non-contextual ontological models must exhibit transformation contextuality lacks the generality to include the ontological model considered here; Lillystone et al ’s result is appropriately limited to ontological models whose states produce a single convex set when expressed in terms of disjoint ontic states. Therefore, we prove that for the qubit stabilizer subtheory to be captured by a preparation, transformation and measurement non-contextual ontological theory, it must be expressed in terms of non-disjoint ontic states, unlike the case for the odd-dimensional single-qudit stabilizer subtheory.