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arXiv:1209.2423

Reply to recent scepticism about the foundations of quantum cryptography

Renato Renner

Published Sep 11, 2012• 24 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In a series of recent papers, Hirota and Yuen claim to have identified a fundamental flaw in the theory underlying quantum cryptography, which would invalidate existing security proofs. In this short note, we sketch their argument and show that their conclusion is unjustified --- it originates from a confusion between necessary and sufficient criteria for secrecy.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1209.2423

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arXiv:quant-ph/0412212•Dec 29, 2004•0 citations
In a series of recent papers, Hirota and Yuen claim to have identified a fundamental flaw in the theory underlying quantum cryptography, which would invalidate existing security proofs. In this short note, we sketch their argument and show that their conclusion is unjustified --- it originates from a confusion between necessary and sufficient criteria for secrecy.
In a recent note (arXiv:1209.2423) Renner claims that the criticisms of Hirota and Yuen on the security foundation of quantum key distribution arose from a logical mistake. In this paper it is shown that Renner misrepresents the claims of Yuen and also Hirota while adopting one main theorem of Yuen in lieu of his own previous error. This leads to his incoherent position which ignores quantitative security criterion levels that undermine the current security claims, a main point of the Yuen and Hirota criticisms. This security criterion issue has never been properly addressed in the literature and is here fully discussed, as are several common misconceptions on QKD security. Other foundational issues are touched upon to bring out further the present precarious state of quantum key distribution security proofs.
It is claimed in the many papers that a trace distance (d) guarantees the universal composition security in quantum key distribution (QKD). In this introduction paper, at first, it is explicitly explained what is the main misconception in the claim of the unconditional security for QKD theory. In general terms, the cause of the misunderstanding on the security claim is the Lemma in the paper of Renner. It suggests that the generation of the perfect random key is assured by the probability (1 − d), and its failure probability is d. Thus, it concludes that the generated key provides the perfect random key sequence when the protocol suceeds. So the QKD provides perfect secrecy to the one time pad. This is the reason for the composition claim. However, the quantity of the trace distance (or variational distance) is not the probability for such an event. If d is not small enough, always the generated key sequence is not uniform. Now one needs the reconstruction of the evaluation of the trace distance if one wants to use it. One should first go back to the indistinguishability theory in the computational complexity based, and to clarify the meaning of the value of the variational distance. In addition, the same analysis for the information theoretic case is necessary. The recent serial papers by H.P.Yuen have given the answer on such questions. In this paper, we show more concise description of Yuen’s theory, and clarify that the recent upper bound theories for the trace distance by Tomamichel et al and Hayashi et al are constructed based on the reasoning of Renner and it is unsuitable as the analysis for information theoretic security. Finally, we introduce a macroscopic quantum communication with different principle to replace Q-bit QKD.