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arXiv:1207.4462

A Quantum Copy-Protection Scheme with Authentication

László Gyöngyösi, Sándor Imre

Published Jul 18, 2012• 0 citations
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Abstract

We propose a quantum copy-protection system which protects classical information in the form of non-orthogonal quantum states. The decryption of the stored information is not possible in the classical representation and the decryption mechanism of data qubits is realized by secret unitary rotations. We define an authentication method for the proposed copy-protection scheme and analyse the success probabilities of the authentication process. A possible experimental realization of the scheme is also presented.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1207.4462

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We propose a quantum copy-protection system which protects classical information in the form of non-orthogonal quantum states. The decryption of the stored information is not possible in the classical representation and the decryption mechanism of data qubits is realized by secret unitary rotations. We define an authentication method for the proposed copy-protection scheme and analyse the success probabilities of the authentication process. A possible experimental realization of the scheme is also presented.
The security of the proposed quantum information data protection system lies in the fundamental difference between classical and quantum information. In the proposed quantum copy-protection system, classical data are stored in the secret rotation angles of non-orthogonal quantum states. The decryption of the stored information is not possible in the classical representation and the decryption mechanism of data qubits is realised by secret unitary rotations. The data protection system uses a quantum-based data storage system and quantum media authentication method to distinguish between original and forged data media. This paper discusses the working mechanism of quantum copy protection and analyses the success probabilities of the quantum probabilistic authentication steps.
In classical computer science any data that can be read can be copied an unlimited number of times. In the quantum world, the quantum states cannot be copied perfectly, according to the no-cloning theorem. The major difference between quantum and classical copy protection is the physical resource for data storage. The proposed quantum based data protection system lies in the fundamental difference between classical and quantum information. The classical data is stored in the secret rotation angles of non-orthogonal quantum states. In our paper we show that secret quantum decoding operations can be implemented with some associated error, which decreases exponentially with the number of quantum states of the angle state.
In a post-quantum world, where attackers may have access to full-scale quantum computers, all classical password-based authentication schemes will be compromised. Quantum copy-protection prevents adversaries from making copies of existing quantum software; we suggest this as a possible approach for designing post-quantum-secure password authentication systems. In this paper, we show an implementation of quantum copy-protection for password verification on IBM quantum computers. We also share our quantum computation results and analyses, as well as lessons learned.
Most of the quantum authentication protocols are used to authenticate quantum messages.In this paper, by using a pair of non-entangled qubits, a quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed.In the pair of qubits, the first one is used to carry a bit message, and the second one is used as a tag to authenticate the classical message.In our protocol, a bit string instead of a sequence of maximally entangled states is used directly as an authentication key, so the authentication key can be easily stored offline.On the other hand, in our protocol, a unitary operation UA is chosen to encrypt the qubits so that the successful probability of all attacks analyzed is less than one.Our quantum authentication protocol is secure against various attacks such as the no-message attack and message attacks.
Quantum copy-protection is an innovative idea that uses the no-cloning property of quantum information to copy-protect programs and was first put forward by [Aar09]. The general goal is that a program distributor can distribute a quantum state ∣Ψ⟩|\Psi\rangle∣Ψ⟩, whose classical description is secret to the users; a user can use this state to run the program P on his own input, but not be able to pirate this program P or create another state with the same functionality. In the copy-protection with oracle setting, the user has access to a public oracle and can use the given quantum state and the oracle to compute on his/her own input for polynomially many times. However, the user is not able to produce an additional program(quantum or classical) that computes the same as P on almost all inputs. We present a first quantum copy protection scheme with a classical oracle for any unlearnable function families. The construction is based on membership oracles for hidden subspaces in F2n\mathbb{F}_2^nF2n​, an idea derived from the public key quantum money scheme in[Aar12]. We prove the security of the scheme relative to a classical oracle, namely, the subspace membership oracle with the functionality of computing the secret function we want to copy-protect. The security proof builds on the quantum lower bound for the Direct-Product problem ([Aar12],[BDS16]) and the unlearnability of the copy-protected functions. We also show that existence of quantum copy protection and the quantum hardness of Learning-with-Errors (LWE) will imply publicly verifiable quantum money.
Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender A and a receiver B sharing a classical secret key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified or replaced by a dishonest party with control of the communication line. In this paper we study the authentication of messages composed of quantum states. We give a formal definition of authentication in the quantum setting. Assuming A and B have access to an insecure quantum channel and share a secret, classical random key, we provide a non-interactive scheme that enables A to both encrypt and authenticate an m qubit message by encoding it into m+s qubits, where the error probability decreases exponentially in the security parameter s. The scheme requires a secret key of size 2m+O(s). To achieve this, we give a highly efficient protocol for testing the purity of shared EPR pairs. It has long been known that learning information about a general quantum state will necessarily disturb it. We refine this result to show that such a disturbance can be done with few side effects, allowing it to circumvent cryptographic protections. Consequently, any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt them. In contrast, no such constraint exists classically. This reasoning has two important consequences: It allows us to give a lower bound of 2m key bits for authenticating m qubits, which makes our protocol asymptotically optimal. Moreover, we use it to show that digitally signing quantum states is impossible.