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arXiv:1206.1740 · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

Secure Bit Commitment From Relativistic Constraints

Jędrzej Kaniewski, Marco Tomamichel, Esther Hänggi, Stephanie Wehner

Published Feb 14, 2013• 46 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We investigate two-party cryptographic protocols that are secure under assumptions motivated by physics, namely special relativity and quantum mechanics. In particular, we discuss the security of bit commitment in the so-called split models, i.e., models in which at least one of the parties is not allowed to communicate during certain phases of the protocol. We find the minimal splits that are necessary to evade the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go argument and present protocols that achieve security in these split models. Furthermore, we introduce the notion of local versus global command, a subtle issue that arises when the split committer is required to delegate noncommunicating agents to open the commitment. We argue that classical protocols are insecure under global command in the split model we consider. On the other hand, we provide a rigorous security proof in the global command model for Kent's quantum protocol. The proof employs two fundamental principles of modern physics, the no-signaling property of relativity and the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics.

DOI
10.1109/tit.2013.2247463

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We investigate two-party cryptographic protocols that are secure under assumptions motivated by physics, namely special relativity and quantum mechanics. In particular, we discuss the security of bit commitment in the so-called split models, i.e., models in which at least one of the parties is not allowed to communicate during certain phases of the protocol. We find the minimal splits that are necessary to evade the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go argument and present protocols that achieve security in these split models. Furthermore, we introduce the notion of local versus global command, a subtle issue that arises when the split committer is required to delegate noncommunicating agents to open the commitment. We argue that classical protocols are insecure under global command in the split model we consider. On the other hand, we provide a rigorous security proof in the global command model for Kent's quantum protocol. The proof employs two fundamental principles of modern physics, the no-signaling property of relativity and the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics.
We investigate two-party cryptographic protocols that are secure under assumptions motivated by physics, namely special relativity and quantum mechanics. In particular, we discuss the security of bit commitment in the so-called split models, i.e., models in which at least one of the parties is not allowed to communicate during certain phases of the protocol. We find the minimal splits that are necessary to evade the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go argument and present protocols that achieve security in these split models. Furthermore, we introduce the notion of local versus global command, a subtle issue that arises when the split committer is required to delegate noncommunicating agents to open the commitment. We argue that classical protocols are insecure under global command in the split model we consider. On the other hand, we provide a rigorous security proof in the global command model for Kent's quantum protocol [1]. The proof employs two fundamental principles of modern physics, the no-signaling property of relativity and the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. © 2013 IEEE.
As a fundamental cryptographic primitive, bit commitment has lots of important and practical applications in modern cryptography. All previously proposed non-relativistic quantum bit commitment protocols cannot evade the Lo–Chau and Mayers attacks. Furthermore, relativistic quantum bit commitment protocols require rigorous spacetime constraints. In this paper, we present a simple, feasible but practically secure quantum bit commitment protocol without any spacetime constraint. The security of the proposed protocol is based on non-relativistic quantum mechanics, but it can resist all known attacks, including the Lo–Chau and Mayers attacks in practice.
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive in which Bob wishes to commit a secret bit to Alice. Perfectly secure bit commitment between two mistrustful parties is impossible through asynchronous exchange of quantum information. Perfect security is however possible when Alice and Bob split into several agents exchanging classical and quantum information at times and locations suitably chosen to satisfy specific relativistic constraints. Here we report on an implementation of a bit commitment protocol using quantum communication and special relativity. Our protocol is based on [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 130501 (2012)] and has the advantage that it is practically feasible with arbitrary large separations between the agents in order to maximize the commitment time. By positioning agents in Geneva and Singapore, we obtain a commitment time of 15 ms. A security analysis considering experimental imperfections and finite statistics is presented.
Quantum physics allows for unconditionally secure communication between parties that trust each other. However, when the parties do not trust each other such as in the bit commitment scenario, quantum physics is not enough to guarantee security unless extra assumptions are made. Unconditionally secure bit commitment only becomes feasible when quantum physics is combined with relativistic causality constraints. Here we experimentally implement a quantum bit commitment protocol with relativistic constraints that offers unconditional security. The commitment is made through quantum measurements in two quantum key distribution systems in which the results are transmitted via free-space optical communication to two agents separated with more than 20 km. The security of the protocol relies on the properties of quantum information and relativity theory. In each run of the experiment, a bit is successfully committed with less than 5.68×10(-2) cheating probability. This demonstrates the experimental feasibility of quantum communication with relativistic constraints.
In this thesis we explore the benefits of relativistic constraints for cryptography. We first revisit non-communicating models and its applications in the context of interactive proofs and cryptography. We propose bit commitment protocols whose security hinges on communication constraints and investigate its limitations. We explain how some non-communicating models can be justified by special relativity and study the limitations of such models. In particular, we present a framework for analysing security of multiround relativistic protocols. The second part of the thesis is dedicated to analysing specific protocols. We start by considering a recently proposed two-round quantum bit commitment protocol. We propose a fault-tolerant variant of the protocol, present a complete security analysis and report on an experimental implementation performed in collaboration with an experimental group at the University of Geneva. We also propose a new, multiround classical bit commitment protocol and prove its security against classical adversaries. This demonstrates that in the classical world an arbitrarily long commitment can be achieved even if the agents are restricted to occupy a finite region of space. Moreover, the protocol is easy to implement and we report on an experiment performed in collaboration with the Geneva group.