Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1109.1066 · Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE

Fundamental and practical problems of QKD security: the actual and perceived situation

Horace P. Yuen

Published Oct 6, 2011• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

It is widely believed that quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved unconditionally secure for realistic models applicable to various current experimental schemes. Here we summarize briefly why this is not the case, from both the viewpoints of fundamental quantitative security and applicable models of security analysis, with some morals drawn.

DOI
10.1117/12.897422

Related papers

Practical challenges in quantum key distribution

Eleni Diamanti, Hoi-Kwong Lo, Bing Qi +1 more

Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditional security in data communication and is currently being deployed in commercial applications. Nonetheless, before QKD can be widely adopted, it faces a number of important challenges such as secret key rate, distance, size, cost and practical security. Here, we survey those key challenges and the approaches that are currently being taken to address them.

arXiv:1606.05853•npj Quantum Information•Nov 7, 2016•872 citations

Security of Quantum Key Distribution

Horace P. Yuen

The security issues facing quantum key distribution (QKD) are explained, herein focusing on those issues that are cryptographic and information theoretic in nature and not those based on physics. The problem of security criteria is addressed. It is demonstrated that an attacker's success probabilities are the fundamental criteria of security that any theoretic security criterion must relate to in order to have operational significance. The errors committed in the prevalent interpretation of the trace distance criterion are analyzed. The security proofs of QKD protocols are discussed and assessed in regard to three main features: their validity, completeness, and adequacy of the achieved numerical security level. Problems are identified in all these features. It appears that the QKD security situation is quite different from the common perception that a QKD-generated key is nearly perfectly secure. Built into our discussion is a simple but complete quantitative description of the information theoretic security of classical key distribution that is also applicable to the quantum situation. In the Appendixes, we provide a brief outline of the history of some major QKD security proofs, a rather unfavorable comparison of current QKD proven security with that of conventional symmetric key ciphers, and a list of objections and answers concerning some major points of this paper.

arXiv:1602.07602•IEEE Access•Jan 1, 2016•96 citations

A brief introduction of quantum cryptography for engineers

Bing Qi, Liping Qian, Hoi‐Kwong Lo

We present the fundamental principles behind quantum key distribution and discuss a few well-known QKD protocols. Bearing in mind that the majority of our readers are from engineering and experimental optics, we focus more on the experimental implementation of various QKD protocols rather than security analysis. Another important topic that is covered here is the study of the security of practical QKD systems.

arXiv:1002.1237•Feb 5, 2010•25 citations

Quantum Key Distribution Networks: Challenges and Future Research Issues in Security

Chia‐Wei Tsai, Chun‐Wei Yang, Jason Lin +2 more

A quantum key distribution (QKD) network is proposed to allow QKD protocols to be the infrastructure of the Internet for distributing unconditional security keys instead of existing public-key cryptography based on computationally complex mathematical problems. Numerous countries and research institutes have invested enormous resources to execute correlation studies on QKD networks. Thus, in this study, we surveyed existing QKD network studies and practical field experiments to summarize the research results (e.g., type and architecture of QKD networks, key generating rate, maximum communication distance, and routing protocol). Furthermore, we highlight the three challenges and future research issues in the security of QKD networks and then provide some feasible resolution strategies for these challenges.

Applied Sciences•Apr 22, 2021•75 citations

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF PRACTICAL QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION

Norbert Lütkenhaus

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the leading example in the field of quantum information that shows, how the explicit use of quantum mechanics allows to solve tasks that cannot be solved in the classical regime. Despite noisy and lossy transmission lines and detectors, we can make these systems work with todays technology. In doing so, we are able to maintain the rigorous notion of unconditional security that characterizes the idealized protocol by Bennett and Brassard 1 . In this article I introduce the concept of QKD and show the problems that occur in the realizations. These problems impose limitations on what we can achieve with QKD which we review together with a recent positive security proof.

Laser Spectroscopy•Jun 1, 2002•1 citation

Security Analysis of Stochastic Routing Scheme in Grid‐Shaped Partially‐Trusted Relay Quantum Key Distribution Network

Xingtong Liu, Jian Wang, Ruilin Li +1 more

Quantum key distribution (QKD) technology provides proved unconditional security in pointto-point key transmissions based on quantum mechanics. However, several limitations, most prominently range, make it complex to construct large QKD network. The trusted relay QKD network is the most practical scene, and stochastic routing scheme was proposed to solve the fatal problem that some relay nodes may be controlled by adversary. But most results in stochastic routing scheme hinge on an adversary model without consideration of attacker's prior-knowledge and attack strategy. To reveal the security problem, we propose a new adversary model and apply it in grid-shaped partially-trusted relay QKD network. Then we analyze the best attack strategy and the impact on security under various situations respectively. Analysis and simulation results show that in some cases the security of stochastic routing scheme will be compromised, and a generalized upper bound for the overall safe probability is obtained. We also discuss how to alleviate the security problem, making the network more robust to attacks.

Chinese Journal of Electronics•Mar 1, 2018•3 citations
It is widely believed that quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved unconditionally secure for realistic models applicable to various current experimental schemes. Here we summarize briefly why this is not the case, from both the viewpoints of fundamental quantitative security and applicable models of security analysis, with some morals drawn.
The security issues facing quantum key distribution (QKD) are explained, herein focusing on those issues that are cryptographic and information theoretic in nature and not those based on physics. The problem of security criteria is addressed. It is demonstrated that an attacker's success probabilities are the fundamental criteria of security that any theoretic security criterion must relate to in order to have operational significance. The errors committed in the prevalent interpretation of the trace distance criterion are analyzed. The security proofs of QKD protocols are discussed and assessed in regard to three main features: their validity, completeness, and adequacy of the achieved numerical security level. Problems are identified in all these features. It appears that the QKD security situation is quite different from the common perception that a QKD-generated key is nearly perfectly secure. Built into our discussion is a simple but complete quantitative description of the information theoretic security of classical key distribution that is also applicable to the quantum situation. In the Appendixes, we provide a brief outline of the history of some major QKD security proofs, a rather unfavorable comparison of current QKD proven security with that of conventional symmetric key ciphers, and a list of objections and answers concerning some major points of this paper.
A quantum key distribution (QKD) network is proposed to allow QKD protocols to be the infrastructure of the Internet for distributing unconditional security keys instead of existing public-key cryptography based on computationally complex mathematical problems. Numerous countries and research institutes have invested enormous resources to execute correlation studies on QKD networks. Thus, in this study, we surveyed existing QKD network studies and practical field experiments to summarize the research results (e.g., type and architecture of QKD networks, key generating rate, maximum communication distance, and routing protocol). Furthermore, we highlight the three challenges and future research issues in the security of QKD networks and then provide some feasible resolution strategies for these challenges.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the leading example in the field of quantum information that shows, how the explicit use of quantum mechanics allows to solve tasks that cannot be solved in the classical regime. Despite noisy and lossy transmission lines and detectors, we can make these systems work with todays technology. In doing so, we are able to maintain the rigorous notion of unconditional security that characterizes the idealized protocol by Bennett and Brassard 1 . In this article I introduce the concept of QKD and show the problems that occur in the realizations. These problems impose limitations on what we can achieve with QKD which we review together with a recent positive security proof.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) technology provides proved unconditional security in pointto-point key transmissions based on quantum mechanics. However, several limitations, most prominently range, make it complex to construct large QKD network. The trusted relay QKD network is the most practical scene, and stochastic routing scheme was proposed to solve the fatal problem that some relay nodes may be controlled by adversary. But most results in stochastic routing scheme hinge on an adversary model without consideration of attacker's prior-knowledge and attack strategy. To reveal the security problem, we propose a new adversary model and apply it in grid-shaped partially-trusted relay QKD network. Then we analyze the best attack strategy and the impact on security under various situations respectively. Analysis and simulation results show that in some cases the security of stochastic routing scheme will be compromised, and a generalized upper bound for the overall safe probability is obtained. We also discuss how to alleviate the security problem, making the network more robust to attacks.