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arXiv:1109.0959 · International Journal of Modern Physics B

TIGHTENING THE EAVESDROPPING ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION FOR CONTINUOUS VARIABLE QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOLS THAT INVOLVE NONMAXIMALLY ENTANGLEMENT

Ahmed Becir, M. R. B. WAHIDDIN

Published Jun 13, 2012• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this paper, we derive tight bounds for the eavesdropping attacks on continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocol that involves nonmaximally entangled states. We show that deriving bounds on the eavesdropper's accessible information based on the Heisenberg uncertainty yields upper bounds, but those bounds are not tight. For this reason, we follow different techniques to derive the desired tight bounds. The new bounds are tight for all CV-QKD protocols that involve two-mode entangled state. Our derivations are applied to direct and reverse reconciliation schemes of protocol implementation, respectively.

DOI
10.1142/s0217979212501093

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In this paper, we derive tight bounds for the eavesdropping attacks on continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocol that involves nonmaximally entangled states. We show that deriving bounds on the eavesdropper's accessible information based on the Heisenberg uncertainty yields upper bounds, but those bounds are not tight. For this reason, we follow different techniques to derive the desired tight bounds. The new bounds are tight for all CV-QKD protocols that involve two-mode entangled state. Our derivations are applied to direct and reverse reconciliation schemes of protocol implementation, respectively.
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In this paper, we explore the enhancement of secure transmission distance in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) under limited eavesdropping conditions by employing a quantum scissor (QS). We derive an analytical expression for the output state and demonstrate that QS significantly extends the secure communication range. Additionally, we analyze the impact of limited eavesdropping on the secret key rate, showing that restricted access to intercepted light improves security compared to an unrestricted eavesdropper scenario. To provide a comprehensive assessment, we investigate both direct and reverse reconciliation schemes. Our numerical simulations and analytical comparisons reveal that QS improves the secure transmission distance in both cases, despite reducing the secret key rate at shorter distances. The results show that QS mitigates the detrimental effects of channel loss, allowing for an extended communication range in CV-QKD systems. These findings highlight the potential of QS as a key tool for enhancing long-distance secure quantum communication in practical scenarios. • Study of secure-distance enhancement in CV-QKD with limited eavesdropping using a QS. • QS improves the maximum secure transmission distance of the CV-QKD protocol. • Key rates under limited eavesdropping are analyzed for both reconciliation types. • Limited eavesdropping yields higher key rates than the fully unrestricted case. • Optimal modulation variance and QS gain that extend protocol range are identified.
We analyze the distribution of secure keys using quantum cryptography based on the continuous variable degree of freedom of entangled photon pairs. We derive the information capacity of a scheme based on the spatial entanglement of photons from a realistic source, and show that the standard measures of security known for quadrature-based continuous variable quantum cryptography (CV-QKD) are inadequate. A specific simple eavesdropping attack is analyzed to illuminate how secret information may be distilled well beyond the bounds of the usual CV-QKD measures.
The original two-way continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution (CV-QKD) protocols [S. Pirandola, S. Mancini, S. Lloyd and S. L. Braunstein, Nat. Phys. 4 (2008) 726] give the security against the collective attack on the condition of the tomography of the quantum channels. We propose a family of new two-way CV-QKD protocols and prove their security against collective entangling cloner attacks without the tomography of the quantum channels. The simulation result indicates that the new protocols maintain the same advantage as the original two-way protocols whose tolerable excess noise surpasses that of the one-way CV-QKD protocol. We also show that all sub-protocols within the family have higher secret key rate and much longer transmission distance than the one-way CV-QKD protocol for the noisy channel.
A fully general approach to the security analysis of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) is presented. Provided that the quantum channel is estimated via the covariance matrix of the quadratures, Gaussian attacks are shown to be optimal against all collective eavesdropping strategies. The proof is made strikingly simple by combining a physical model of measurement, an entanglement-based description of CV-QKD, and a recent powerful result on the extremality of Gaussian states [M. M. Wolf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 96, 080502 (2006)10.1103/PhysRevLett.96.080502].