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arXiv:1108.2024

Autonomy all the way down: Systems and dynamics in quantum Bayesianism

Chris Fields

Published Aug 9, 2011• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum Bayesianism ("QBism") has been put forward as an approach to quantum theory that avoids foundational problems by altogether disavowing the objective existence of quantum states. It is shown that QBism suffers its own versions of the familiar foundational problems, and that these QBist versions are illuminating not just for QBism, but for more traditional foundational approaches as well.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1108.2024

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Quantum Bayesianism ("QBism") has been put forward as an approach to quantum theory that avoids foundational problems by altogether disavowing the objective existence of quantum states. It is shown that QBism suffers its own versions of the familiar foundational problems, and that these QBist versions are illuminating not just for QBism, but for more traditional foundational approaches as well.
Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism, is a recent development of the epistemic view of quantum states, according to which the state vector represents knowledge about a quantum system, rather than the true state of the system. QBism explicitly adopts the subjective view of probability, wherein probability assignments express an agent’s personal degrees of belief about an event. QBists claim that most if not all conceptual problems of quantum mechanics vanish if we simply take a proper epistemic and probabilistic perspective. Although this judgement is largely subjective and logically consistent, I explain why I do not share it.
The Quantum-Bayesian interpretation of quantum theory claims to eliminate the question of quantum nonlocality. This claim is not justified, because the question of non-locality does not arise due to any interpretation of quantum theory, but due to objective experimental facts. We define the notion "objective paradox" and explain, comparing QBism and the Copenhagen interpretation, how avoidance of any paradox results into poor explanatory power of an interpretation, if there actually exists an objective paradox.
Fast forward to the beginning of the current century, when a new version of the quantum-states-are-states-of-knowledge interpretation was launched by Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs, and Ruediger Schack (2002). At first it was called Quantum Bayesianism, having been conceived as an extension of a personalist Bayesian theory of probability, but since then it has re-branded itself as QBism, the term preferred by Mermin (2017) because “QBism is as big a break with 20th century ways of thinking about science as Cubism was with 19th century ways of thinking about art.”
The purpose of this book is to explain Quantum Bayesianism ('QBism') to "people without easy access to mathematical formulas and equations" (4-5). Qbism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that "doesn't meddle with the technical aspects of the theory [but instead] reinterprets the fundamental terms of the theory and gives them new meaning" (3). The most important motivation for QBism, enthusiastically stated on the book's cover, is that QBism provides "a way past quantum theory's paradoxes and puzzles" such that much of the weirdness associated with quantum theory "dissolves under the lens of QBism". Could a non-technical book that almost fits in your pocket really succeed in resolving the notorious paradoxes of quantum theory? I believe the answer is: not in this case. There are three primary reasons. Firstly, the argument that QBism solves quantum paradoxes is not convincing. Secondly, it proves difficult to pin down exactly what QBism says. Thirdly, as a scientific theory QBism seems explanatorily inert, which is maybe why the topic of scientific explanation is not broached. Sections 2-4 below discuss each of these problems in turn. However, there is still a wealth of insights that make this book a worthwhile read, and I shall begin with those.
Abstract The idea that the quantum probabilities are best construed as the personal/subjective degrees of belief of Bayesian agents is an old one. In recent years the idea has been vigorously pursued by a group of physicists who fly the banner of quantum Bayesianism (QBism). The present paper aims to identify the prospects and problems of implementing QBism, and it critically assesses the claim that QBism provides a resolution (or dissolution) of some of the long-standing foundations issues in quantum mechanics, including the measurement problem and puzzles of nonlocality.